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Figure 1: Title Page of R. Gosling, The Laws of Honour, or A Compendious Account of the Ancient 
Derivation of All Titles, Dignities, Offices, &c as well as Temporal, Civil or Military (1714). This 
focus on honour and title perhaps represents our typical view of the peerage during the ‘long 
eighteenth century’. 
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Abstract  
 
This thesis argues that the late Stuart and early Georgian period saw the development of what 
may be termed a ‘deliberative oligarchy’, and sets out its contours. In short, a pluralistic 
politics enabled competing viewpoints to represent themselves to the British state, in a way 
that meant interests and partisans interacted with ‘reason’ and ‘fact’. Rather than the public 
being spectators to politics, they were seen as fellow co-legislators, and parliamentarians 
increasing sought to direct the public into deliberative participatory processes. This argument 
builds on Mark Knights’ work on the culture of partisanship and misrepresentation during the 
‘rage of party’, Paul Langford’s demonstration of the role of ‘propertied Englishman’ to the 
functioning of the state in the ‘aristocratic century’, the importance of Barbara Shapiro’s 
‘culture of fact’, E.P. Thompson’s characterisation of the rule of law, and the extensive 
participation in local government.  This was a distinct stage in British history, where the state 
became increasingly ‘reactive’  to the middling sorts, but also that ‘reason’, ‘fact’ and 
balancing of ‘interests’ became more important for judging policy. Partly inspired by Jürgen 
Habermas’ ‘two track’ model of the public sphere, the thesis considers how the ‘informal’ 
public sphere present in print, coffee houses and public debate was directed into, and 
influenced by, a deliberative parliament. The thesis examines the cultural causes of public 
participation—namely the concept of ‘interest’ and a ‘culture of facts’—and the nature of 
state structures. Using the largely unused archive of the House of Lords, the thesis 
systematically examines the use of the House as a British appeal court, the incidence of 
petitioning, and considers parliament’s relationship with the wider public sphere. These 
features enabled some of the partisan features of the ‘rage of party’ and ‘clash of interests’ to 
be contained within a pluralistic and stable political system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis explores the growing culture and status of public participation in parliament and 
the ruling of Britain from the accession of James II to the beginnings of the whig oligarchy of 
the mid-eighteenth century. It is a study of the most significant outbreak of petitioning with 
the centre since the 1640s, the role of civil litigation in a period that saw the effective creation 
of a new high court, and the engagement between Scots and English at Westminster in the 
first decade or so of union. My subject is not the peerage as individuals, patrons or ministers, 
but the impact and role of the House of Lords in British political culture in the first thirty 
years after the Glorious Revolution. What impact did the increased presence of parliament 
after 1688 have on the rhythm, pattern, and extent of political culture, ‘Britishness’ as a new 
national identity, and how did it contribute to the achievement of political stability by the 
1720s? 
There are four significant schools of thought on eighteenth-century Britain that this 
thesis seeks to interact with. The first is the collection of work that owes its origins to the 
interpretations set out in J.H. Plumb’s Growth of Political Stability and Geoffrey Holmes’s 
Politics in the Age of Anne (both published in 1967).  This model had the ending of the ‘rage 
of party’ at its core, with the decline of the tory party leading to an ‘age of oligarchy’. 
Plumb’s oligarchy was based on the establishment of single party government, the growth of 
the executive and its control over parliament, and greater stability for landed families through 
stricter estate settlements. The focus on party in these accounts meant the period of Walpole’s 
ascendency remained firmly the ‘age of oligarchy’.1 It was not until the Wilkite and 
                                                     
1
 Marxist historians took little issue with this account of political structures—see, for example, D. Hay 
et al, Albion’s Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England (London, 1976); 
Hay and N. Rogers, Eighteenth-Century English Society: Shuttles and Swords (Oxford, 
1997); E.P. Thompson, ‘The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth 
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parliamentary reform petitions of the second half of the eighteenth century that parliament 
was forced open to outside influence and the elite consensus collapsed. However, despite the 
decline of electoral strife after 1716, John Brewer, Linda Colley and Frank O’Gorman have 
been able to show the importance of party and ideology to a period previously interpreted by 
reference to Namierite concerns for kinship, patronage and hierarchy.
2
 In this thesis, a focus 
on interest groups rather than party, and on the locality rather than the central state, shows 
that many features and concerns regarding partisanship continued to be raised by interest 
groups, litigation and public participation in parliament, questioning further the nature of 
political stability and oligarchy after 1716. Public ‘restraint’ was earned through negotiation 
throughout this period of oligarchy. Robert Walpole harvested the spoils of cultural trends 
developing from the Restoration onwards, and whose pace was quickened by the presence of 
parliament after 1688/89 and the growth of both ‘party rage’ and the ‘clash of interests’. 
A reaction to this narrative of a growing middling sort and a divisive political culture 
came in the form of revitalising the role of the peerage, and the characterisation by Jonathan 
Clark that England was ruled by an ‘ancien régime’.3 It was argued the peerage were a central 
pillar of the whig oligarchy, with John Beckett and John Cannon stressing the rise of great 
estates, the growth of patronage and paternalism, and increasing social deference towards the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Century’, Past and Present, 50 (1971), pp. 76-136; idem, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of 
the Black Act (London, 1977). 
2
 J. Brewer, Party, Ideology and Popular Politics at the Accession of George III (Cambridge, 1976); 
L. Colley, In Defiance of Oligarchy: The Tory Party 1714-1760 (Cambridge, 1982); F. 
O’Gorman, Voters, Patrons, and Parties: The Unreformed Electorate of Hanoverian 
England, 1734-1832 (Oxford, 1989). P. Langford, Public Life and the Propertied 
Englishman, 1689-1798 (Oxford, 1991) explores the importance of the ‘middling sorts’. 
3
 J.C.D. Clark, English Society 1688-1832: Ideology, Social Structure and Political Practice During 
the Ancien Régime (Cambridge, 1985). 
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group in the eighteenth century.
4
 Cannon followed Plumb and Lewis Namier closely, in 
arguing the whig oligarchy saw a ‘closed’ elite of peers dominate eighteenth-century Britain, 
with the labouring and middling sorts largely acquiescing to this ‘aristocratic’ hegemony. The 
birth of a consumer society, a growing central state and rising significance of the ‘middling 
sorts’, remained eclipsed by ‘traditional’ features of eighteenth-century Britain, namely 
aristocratic and monarchical power, ‘anglicanism’, and conservative thought.5 The 
importance of the peerage in this oligarchic state was less about their role in parliament, but 
in wider society. Land, inheritance and local service were the basis of their status and 
credibility, not parliamentary, legal, or wider political activity.
6
 This was because the role of 
the Lords was perceived to be a conservative and marginal one—Cannon argued its role was 
to ‘preserve the balance of elements established at the revolution.’7 The model of 
                                                     
4
 J. Beckett, The Aristocracy in England, 1660-1914 (Oxford, 1986); J. Cannon, Aristocratic Century: 
The Peerage of Eighteenth-Century England (Cambridge, 1984); C. Jones and D. Jones, eds, 
Peers, Politics and Power: The House of Lords, 1603-1911 (London, 1986); C. Jones, ed, A 
Pillar of the Constitution: The House of Lords in British Politics, 1640-1784 (London, 1989); 
A. Swatland, The House of Lords in the Reign of Charles II (Cambridge, 1996). For an earlier 
work, see G. Holmes, ‘The Court and the Parties in the House of Lords’, in his British Politics 
in the Age of Anne (London, 1967).  
5
 J. Brewer, N. McKendrick and J.H. Plumb, The Birth of a Consumer Society: The 
Commercialisation of Eighteenth-Century England (London, 1982); I. Christie, Stress and 
Stability in Late Eighteenth-Century Britain (Oxford, 1985). 
6
 The introduction to Beckett, The Aristocracy in England, explores this argument.  
7
 Cannon, Aristocratic Century, p. 125; C. Jones, ‘The House of Lords and Parliamentary Stability’, in 
his edited volume, Britain in the First Age of Party, 1680-1750 (London, 1987), p. 109; M. 
McCahill, Order and Equipoise: The Peerage and the House of Lords, 1783-1806 (London, 
1978).  
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constitutional development on which this argument relied saw the role of the House of Lords 
waning, declining from a ‘fire raiser’ of the 1710s to ‘firemen in a town without fires’ by the 
1730s.
 
This thesis suggests the peerage remained important, but their power was created 
through negotiation with lower orders, reflecting the growth of parliament and the wider 
‘public sphere’. 
My thesis does not wish to challenge these two central pillars of eighteenth-century 
Britain, in terms of the presence of political stability or an oligarchy, but rather to argue that 
these were constructed on a different basis to our current understanding and were more 
challengeable and negotiable than assumed in these above accounts. This approach builds on 
the work inspired by Paul Langford, who demonstrated the importance of parliament as a 
‘legislative marketplace’ to a range of middling propertied interests.8 The focus on the House 
of Lords in this thesis is not, therefore, an attempt to resurrect the kind of studies that were 
produced during in the 1980s (which was probably the greatest period of focus on the 
peerage), or rewrite Arthur Turberville’s House of Lords in the Reign of William III (1913)—
readers are referred elsewhere to studies of the procedures, parties and ministers of the house, 
or the aristocracy as a social unit.
9
 Neither does the work seek to resurrect a high politics 
                                                     
8
 For work Langford inspired, see P. Gauci, ed, Regulating the British Economy, 1660-1850 
(Farnham, 2011), which explores the interactions between the state, interest groups and 
economic development; J. Hoppit, ed, Failed Legislation, 1660-1800 (London, 1997); idem, 
‘Patterns of Parliamentary Legislation, 1660-1800’, Historical Journal, 39 (1996), pp. 109-31;  
J. Innes, Inferior Politics: Social Problems and Social Policies in Eighteenth-Century Britain 
(Oxford, 2009). 
9
 A. Turberville, The House of Lords in the Reign of William III (Oxford, 1913). For useful studies on 
procedure, see A. Rees, The Practice and Procedure of the House of Lords, 1714-1784 (PhD, 
Aberystwyth University, 1987); R. Tennyson, Private Legislation: Function and Procedure in 
the Eighteenth Century (PhD, University of California, Berkeley, 2009). See note 4 for works 
16 
 
view of parliament or the peerage, it attempts the opposite, by identifying the points of 
interaction between politics, society and culture, and demonstrates the extent ordinary Britons 
were involved in the functioning of the state.  
Since the 1980s, great strides forward have been made in our understandings of 
politics in the seventeenth and early eighteenth century. Inspired by Jürgen Habermas’s 
‘public sphere’, historians have explored the increasing avenues for public discussion and 
involvement in politics, with coffee houses and the print revolution taking centre stage. 
Britain between 1679 and 1715 saw an incidence of elections not seen before, growing 
political partisanship, representation through print, addresses and ideas of credit, as well as 
‘misrepresentation’ through manipulation and lies. The ‘public’ were becoming an umpire of 
politics through participating in general elections, with the electorate being as high as one in 
five adult males.
10
 The work of Mark Knights on this culture of ‘representation and 
misrepresentation’ and how it was managed and resolved is an important inspiration to the 
approach this thesis takes.
11
 The centrality of parliament, and the Commons in particular, to 
the growth of the public sphere has also been demonstrated in the early Stuart period, with 
Chris Kyle stressing parliament’s role as a ‘theatre’ for public consumption.12 This thesis 
                                                                                                                                                                     
on the aristocracy. Some work has begun on the peerage in recent years—particularly J. 
Adamson, The Noble Revolt: The Overthrow of Charles I (2007) and R. Paley and P. 
Seaward, eds, Honour, Interest and Power: An Illustrated History of the House of Lords 
(London, 2010), which precedes the forthcoming work of the History of Parliament Trust.  
10
 G. Holmes, ‘The Electorate and the National Will in the First Age of Party’, in his Politics, Religion 
and Society in England, 1679-1742 (London, 1986). 
11
 M. Knights, Representation and Misrepresentation in Later Stuart Britain (Oxford, 2005), esp. pp. 
335-75.  
12
 C. Kyle, Theatre of State: Parliament and Political Culture in Early Stuart England (Stamford, 
2012). 
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seeks to expand on the nature of these changes and the impact they had on political culture, 
especially in relation to petitioning and the language of interest, both ensuring a pluralistic 
and divided political culture co-existed with a relatively stable oligarchy. 
But this thesis differs from these previous accounts in one important respect. I argue 
that to overlook the role of ‘participation’ in our accounts of politics and parliament in this 
period is to miss important aspects of how society functioned—and not only because it brings 
in the Lords (which, of course, had no elections), but also because it was central to the 
creation of a deliberative political culture. Concerns for public rationality were found not just 
in elections or overtly ‘political’ issues such as the trial of Sacheverell or the making of peace 
and war, but in everyday participation. Britain, and England especially, was not just a 
‘society of spectators’ commenting indirectly on politics through print, discussions in coffee 
houses, or even as voters delegating authority to MPs, but dependent on a participative 
culture and mechanisms, even at Westminster. Too often, accounts of politics, both in the 
modern world and the early modern period, consider the subject along the lines of ‘voting’ 
and ‘representative democracy’, ignoring a further axis of participation and the active 
involvement of the public in decision making.  
The extent that England at a local level was such a participative state is a familiar one; 
the structural weakness of the central state was a prominent part of the accounts of Conrad 
Russell and John Morrill to explain the outbreak of civil war.
13
 Mark Goldie has described 
the ‘unacknowledged republic’ of local office holders that existed in the late seventeenth 
century and called for a shift to the study of ‘governance’—a dispersed and shared process of 
                                                     
13
 C. Russell, The Fall of the British Monarchies, 1637-1642 (Oxford, 1991) and J. Morrill, Revolt of 
the Provinces: The People of England and the Tragedies of War, 1630-1648 (London, 1976). 
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governing, with a lack of clear division between rulers and ruled.
14
 But parliament has not yet 
been integrated into these accounts of the state or, indeed, political culture. Here, it is argued 
parliament was the apex of the participative state and capable of setting the rhythm, timing, 
and subject of print and political culture. Debates in coffee houses, the incidence of printing 
and the forming of political and social identities, were all influenced by events in parliament. 
The main source for this thesis, the archive of the House of Lords, is well placed to 
demonstrate the presence of this culture. Whilst we are reasonably well served with records 
of parliamentary debates for the Commons, the lower house struggles to provide information 
on the involvement of the public in its proceedings, as only its printed journals avoided 
destruction in the parliamentary fire of 1834. But the Lords, in many respects, forms the 
‘jewel’ of the parliamentary archive. Not only do we have its manuscript journals, but its 
witness books, appeal cases, committee books and the petitions presented to it—a source of 
systematic evidence of public participation in the upper chamber of parliament throughout the 
‘long eighteenth century’. The result of being able to consider methodically participation in 
parliament through the lens of petitioning, lobbying, committees and appeals cases, is to 
show the Septennial and Riot Acts only ended an element of the partisan political culture. 
The oligarchy was open to opinion ‘out of doors’ that was expressed through petitioning, 
litigation and direct participation in parliament itself. In addition to the archives of 
parliament, this thesis also mobilises archives of the central state (particularly the treasury) 
and those of corporations and local communities to understand the social depth and 
geographical reach of petitioning and litigation. This also allows us to trace the processes of 
policy-making through several layers of the state, creating the ‘circulation of power’ between 
different institutions and interests that together constituted the ‘deliberative oligarchy’. 
                                                     
14
 M. Goldie, ‘The Unacknowledged Republic: Office-Holding in Early Modern England’, in T. 
Harris, ed, The Politics of the Excluded, c. 1500-1850 (Basingstoke, 2001), pp. 153-9. 
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Investigating participation is not just about considering an alternative to elections and 
more distant forms of engagement like commenting in print, but also its relationship with the 
culture of ‘misrepresentation’. Mark Knights highlighted the issues and concerns raised by 
fears of lies, manipulation, the involvement of ‘the people’ and self interest up to 1716 in his 
Representation and Misrepresentation, and sketched out some responses that contributed to 
reasoned public judgement.
15
 In his account, the anxieties of decaying public discourse and 
reasonableness was one of factors resulting in the Septennial Act of 1716, reducing the 
frequency of elections from three to every seven years in an attempt to cool this ‘party rage’ 
and carefully manage the involvement of the public in politics.  
This culture bears many similarities to today, and it should be noted that the direction 
my work in this area has been influenced by recent themes in political science and 
contemporary debates. Matthew Flinders has recently offered an updated version of Bernard 
Crick’s In Defence of Politics (1962) in his Defending Politics (2012). Public discourse is full 
of rhetoric of ‘lies’—on Iraq, tuition fees, and Europe—whilst memories of ‘corruption’ from 
the expenses ‘scandal’ still justifies a prevailing anti-politics mood, with politicians being 
seen as modern ‘folk devils’.16 Polls continue to record concern on how Scots on competing 
sides of the independence referendum campaign of 2014 could possibly be reconciled after 
months of intensive, partisan campaigning.  
A primary response to this ‘crisis of politics’ has been the shift towards what the 
American scholar Michael Schudson has termed, a ‘monitory democracy’, building on the 
greater intensity of communicative media. If we check every statement by politicians, and 
                                                     
15
 Knights, Representation and Misrepresentation, pp. 337-61. 
16
 M. Flinders, ‘The Demonization of Politicians: Moral Panics, Folk Devils and MPs’ Expenses’, 
Contemporary Politics, 18 (2012), pp. 1-17.  
20 
 
listen to technocrats and ‘experts’, so the theory goes, then politics will be better.17 
Alternatively, expanding the capability of the ‘majority’ to decide issues through referenda, 
rather than considering avenues for negotiation and balancing the ‘public voice’ with the rule 
of law, is also commonly cited. But these solutions start with the same underlying issue—that 
politics is a liar’s game, incapable of responding to the interests of ‘real’ people. In short, 
Knights and many contemporaries today have identified a problem in political culture, and 
my thesis offers a partial resolution to these.  If society and politics were so divided in 1716 
(and remained so after 1716, driven by petitioning, litigation, and interest groups), how did 
the British state and society function sustainably in the long term? Why did the political 
system not just collapse, or individuals withdraw from the public sphere, especially if a 
strong oligarchy was not created that did not eliminate some of these pressures? Such 
questions will be combined with the longer-held concern of historians for how the autonomy 
of local communities and propertied interests in the eighteenth century was protected, the 
failure to do so having contributed to the instability of the previous century.  
My answer to these questions is to advance the notion that eighteenth-century Britain 
was ruled by a ‘deliberative oligarchy’—a  political system where reasoned thought (such as 
law, political arithmetic and other modes of fact-finding), existed alongside partisanship, 
pluralism and division, with relatively open access to policy-making (such as through popular 
participation in petitions or committees). The local origins of disputes also ensured there were 
opportunities for reconciliation; policy makers being not an unknown ‘other’, but 
                                                     
17
 M. Schudson, ‘Changing Concepts of Democracy’, MIT Communications Forum (8 May 1998). For 
ideas of monitory democracy, see J. Keane, Life and Death of Democracy (London, 2009), 
pp. xxvii-xxxiii, 686-701, 736-47; idem, ‘Monitory Democracy and Media-Saturated 
Societies’, Griffith Review, 24 (2009), no pagination.  
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geographically close neighbours and interests.
18
 The fact that Britain was not a straight-
forward oligarchy has been noted before. As Paul Langford wrote after demonstrating the 
importance of the middling sorts to the politics and culture of eighteenth-century England, ‘if 
this was indeed an oligarchy, it was one which operated within a restricted framework and on 
a consensual basis, it accepted the priorities of a broadly bourgeois society’.19 But I wish to 
go further, and establish the characteristics and limits of this oligarchy. Following an 
‘institutional turn’ in studies of the science of the public sphere and deliberative politics, the 
importance of parliaments and the legal system to their functioning has come under increased 
study.
20
 We should imagine a two stage process, examining the means that debates and 
discussions in the wider public sphere are channelled into legislative bodies, in a way 
conducive to the legitimation of the law through participation and deliberation under certain 
rules and ‘norms’.21 Borrowing from this concept of the public sphere—but not being 
beholden or restricted to it—I examine how effective parliament was as the most significant 
body in the ‘public sphere’, and how far it was able to see wider civil society directed into it 
and influence its functioning. As Nancy Fraser puts it: 
In fact, the issue becomes more complicated as soon as we consider the emergence 
of parliamentary sovereignty.....Sovereign parliaments are what I shall call strong 
publics, publics whose discourse encompasses both opinion-formation and 
decision-making. As a locus of public deliberation culminating in legally binding 
decisions (or laws), parliament was to be the site for the discursive authorization of 
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the use of state power. With the achievement of parliamentary sovereignty, 
therefore, the line separating (associational) civil society and the state is blurred.
22 
 
Following this, the thesis considers how responsive the Westminster parliament was 
to the wider public, and the ‘norms’ and values that lay behind public participation. Legal 
systems, parliaments and regulatory regimes have a far more important role in Jürgen 
Habermas’s model for the creation of a deliberative political system, offering a new 
significance and audience to parliamentary history, and this is primarily why I quote it here. 
Let me state now that eighteenth-century parliaments did not mirror Habermas’s model, any 
more than the early modern public sphere fitted his periodisation of its development, was 
rational, consensual, or dominated by the bourgeois. How power was legitimised, the 
relations between parliament and the public, the basis and nature of public participation, and 
ultimately how political stability is achieved, have long been questions of historians, and this 
thesis builds on previous work under a concept of ‘deliberation’ that eighteenth-century 
Britons would have recognised. John Parkinson in his Deliberating in the Real World 
provided eight features of a deliberative political system, which I primarily concentrate on in 
this thesis: 
1. Those affected by proposed policies must be able to participate. 
2. Procedures of decision-making must be inclusive, rational and have input from 
‘experts’. 
3. There must be no division between speakers and policy-makers. 
4. To solve this problem, elected and accountable agents should be part of this 
process (such as, but not limited to, MPs). 
5. Because every citizen cannot be physically present, those that participate on their 
behalf must be seen as legitimate and representative. 
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6. ‘Relationship representation’ can be created through publicity of events, enabling 
the monitoring of events by outsiders. 
7. Participation must have a substantive impact—in either a negative or positive 
sense. It should not be symbolic or ritualistic. 
8. Deliberative institutions need some stability. If the ‘rules of the game’ frequently 
change, only those that can bear the cost of relearning the rules will be 
enfranchised.
23
   
The ‘deliberative oligarchy’ of the eighteenth century performed many of these 
elements. The culture of parliament and policy-making met these eight tests in the following 
terms: 
1. Petitioners, lobbyists and pamphleteers could comment unhindered, with the 
policy-making processes not dominated by traditionally defined groups (such as 
corporations or chartered companies). 
2. Fact-finding, political arithmetic and ‘cultures of fact’ were institutionalised and 
expected by both parliamentarians and outsiders. 
3. Those who attended parliament were seen as co-legislators, not spectators. The 
use of parliament to pass local acts and the presence of an effective legal system 
were also important.  
4. There was an expectation for Peers and MPs to carry out business on behalf of 
interests and localities. Parliamentarians often functioned as agents for 
communities that they had no direct electoral relationship with.
24
  Parliamentary 
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agents and witnesses sent by communities to attend committees offered another 
alternative, especially in the Lords. 
5. Petitioners were able to claim to represent an ‘interest’ or locality, which was 
shared and recognised in the wider community.  
6. Parliamentary secrecy and limits to public access were more limited than thought. 
7. The role of witnesses, litigants and ‘experts’ had substantive impacts on the 
policies made and enforced. The local origins of much legislation and 
opportunities to litigate also aided this ability. 
8. Parliamentary and legal procedures changed little over this period, and 
understandings of them were aided by the growth of printed guides of the law and 
parliament, as well as direct experience of the population in both. 
At base, the form of political society I argue existed meant a plurality of interests and views 
was accepted by elites as positive feature of political life, and that all operated within a 
culture that decided that impartiality and openness should be the primary features of how 
policy-making occurred. Dissent was not seen as leading to revolt and instability, but rather 
better politics, policy and, indeed, stability. There were, necessarily, tensions between the 
pressures of petitioning and electioneering which encouraged decisions based on a simple 
‘majority’, with the role of ‘facts’ and reason in a deliberative culture, but the resolving of 
these is a feature of all politics. Not all citizens could participate in parliament, but the 
middling sorts who lobbied the state were doing so in a way that was in a qualitatively 
different form from what occurred before 1689. As Edmund Burke told the electors of 
Bristol:  
Parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of 
the whole; where not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, 
but the general good resulting from the general reason of the whole... all 
25 
 
these widespread interests must be considered; must be compared; [and] 
must be reconciled, if possible.
25
 
 
This echoed comments made earlier in the century. In 1732, an MP had told the Commons 
that ‘in all cases where there seems to be a clashing of interests, we ought to have no regard 
to the partial interest of any country, or set of people; the good of the whole should be 
considered...’26 The Political State of Great Britain described the debates on the trade bill of 
1713 in similar terms: 
Consider how much pains [parliamentarians] took to inform themselves 
fully. Never was any matter managed with more deliberation and candour; 
the numerous petitions which were sent up from all parts of the nation 
against this treaty were read and examined, the merchants and tradesmen 
were heard in both houses.... 
27
 
 
These views ensured that procedures and attitudes were in place that contributed to a 
deliberative parliament. Committees, courts and parliament were spaces in which multiple 
opinions acknowledged the presence of others in order to uncover the ‘public interest’. This 
meant in addition to an adversarial politics focused on elections and petitioning, policy-
makers and participants were in a culture of dialogue, creating legitimacy for the state and 
tying in the wider political community. The reality of dialogue and deliberation through 
participation at the centre and in the locality was the counterpoint to polarisation. These 
pluralistic features and procedures ensured Britain was not a simple oligarchy where political 
power was monopolised, with formal and imposed limits on participation, and where 
parliamentary proceedings were largely secret. Instead, there existed an open political culture 
reaching right into the heart of policy-making and its enforcement, creating an authentic 
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pluralism. The engagement of parliamentarians and lobbyists with alternative views within 
the parliamentary arena—and the localities, where much litigation and legislation 
originated—helped ensure that animosities could be reduced, acting as a counter-balance to 
the partisan culture described by Knights, and ensured political pluralism co-existed with one 
party government and social oligarchy.  
THEMES 
 
There are seven broad themes of research  in this thesis that take up these points, a number of 
which expand the list of challenges to achieving a culture of deliberation, and others that 
sought resolution. They show that concerns for the rationality of the ‘public voice’ were 
raised on both material and ‘political’ issues, and that the origins of the ‘deliberative 
oligarchy’ were both institutional and cultural. The nature of politics and participation was 
sufficiently altered for this period to be considered a distinct phase of ‘deliberative’ policy-
making.   
 
1. Civil Litigation and a ‘New’ High Court 
 
Although the seventeenth century was the most litigious period in English history, the impact 
of civil litigation is not well understood, the majority of work on the law having focused on 
crime and criminal law.
28
 Although the eighteenth century was the period of the ‘great 
litigation decline’ and the growth of the statutory state, the legal system remained a central 
aspect to the functioning of the state. The role of law has been much debated, it either 
supporting the ideology of the ruling oligarchy, replacing the importance of religion (found in 
Albion’s Fatal Tree) or, alternatively, providing a tool to challenge those in power. The work 
of Christopher Brooks, Henry Horwitz and David Lemmings has been of particular 
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importance in the opening up the field on the role of civil litigation.
29
 This thesis expands on 
their work by demonstrating the role of civil litigation as a policy-making tool, using the 
example of the House of Lords. The consequences of the Glorious Revolution on the 
frequency of meetings of parliaments, elections and the growth of statutes has been well 
examined, but the effective establishment of a ‘new’ high court in the House of Lords has 
gone largely unstudied.
30
 The annual presence of parliament after 1689 ensured the Lords had 
a greater significance as a court than it had during the Restoration, and was firmly established 
as an appeal court after disputes were settled over its jurisdiction by the 1670s. The creation 
of this new court was significant, constituting a new dynamic in the legal system and the 
capacity of civil law to amend statutes. On the surface, it suggests the peerage were in a more 
powerful position, capable of being the supreme power in the constitution, with the court 
providing another tool that ensured there was ‘no escaping’ their power and patronage, 
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paralleling their economic power.
31
  But if we examine the use it was put to, and by whom, 
the challenges to aristocratic control and the policy pursued appear far more widespread.  
The study of law can be an uncomfortable one. The issue of studying the criminal 
law, as noted by Douglas Hay, is how to separate the ‘good’ criminals pursuing ‘social crime’ 
as proto-revolutionaries and protesters, and the ‘bad’ who murdered and raped 
indiscriminately.
32
 Although this issue is less acute in relation to civil litigation, views 
echoing the sentiments of Charles Dickens’ account of Jarndyce v. Jarndyce in his Bleak 
House, are hard to escape. The description of the case as ‘drag[ging]  its dreary length before 
the court, [being] perennially hopeless’,  with the ‘whole estate...found to have been absorbed 
in costs’ after generations of dispute, does question the utility and significance of legal cases 
to general historical inquiries.
33
 If many cases were about familial disputes, what does 
litigation tell us, other than the hostility of individuals towards one another? The grounds on 
which people pursued litigation is an important issue, and will be discussed in relation to why 
Scots appealed to the Lords. Nonetheless, the fact is the state was challenged and policy 
amended through litigation, and it was undertaken by those outside the social or political 
elite. This is not to argue that the law was an equal-opportunity, open-access mechanism, 
without social bias, but a surprising proportion of appeals to the Lords were from lower social 
groups. 
Appeals to the House of Lords dealt with a wide variety of issues, and not just estate 
settlements and credit relations (which were important and significant on a collective level). 
Cases dealt with the status of the Episcopal Church in Scotland, river navigation, the right to 
hold markets, the monopolies of the East India and African Companies, and a host of other 
                                                     
31
 Beckett, Aristocracy in England, p. 1.  
32
 Hay, Albion’s Fatal Tree, p. xvi.  
33
 C. Dickens, Bleak House (London, 1853), pp. 3, 616. 
29 
 
issues. My primary argument is that litigation was perceived as ‘no way inferior...to the 
express positive text of an act of parliament’ and appeals were used as such, capable of 
creating the same ‘clash of interests’ as bills and acts did, and having the same consequences 
for the scope of the state’s activity.34 The ability to pursue litigation was present throughout 
this period and enabled policies contained in acts to be challenged in the courts. Together 
with the extent of smuggling and other means of challenging enforcement, litigation raises 
the question of who was more important in the forming, amending and enforcing of policy—
ministers and parliamentarians, or smugglers and litigants?  
In addition to the mechanisms of policy-making were the cultural implications of the 
law for political culture. The law provided an impartial discourse that ‘locked’ the powerful 
into the rhetoric of precedent and equity. As E.P. Thompson wrote in his conclusion to Whigs 
and Hunters, if the landed interest used the law for their own interests, being ‘evidently 
impartial and unjust, then it will mask nothing, [and] legitimise nothing’.35 If peers wished 
the law to stand in order to protect their own interests and estates, then it had to be applied 
equally in spite of social inequalities and prejudices—whether inspired by party, interest, or 
rank. The law was a pillar creating conditions for deliberation, forcing elites and those who 
claimed to represent the ‘majority’ to negotiate with minorities—one of the consequences of 
this being a ‘culture of fact’, explained further below. The creation of these ‘norms’ was 
important in creating shared explanations, justifications and routes for policy-making, helping 
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to reconcile tensions between competing interests under a system that tended towards more 
reasoned debate.
36
 
 
2. A Weaker State 
 
A central reason why participation was seen as ‘inevitable’ was the need of parliamentarians 
for information and advice. Since the publication of John Brewer’s The Sinews of Power, an 
important narrative of this period has been that Britain was developing into a strong fiscal-
military state, with a clearer division between the state and the public.
37
 Complementing this 
has been the work of Julian Hoppit and Joanna Innes showing that the state was increasingly 
placed on a statutory basis during the eighteenth century.
38
 Clearer parliamentary sovereignty 
and the replacement of customary law by regulation through statute ensured there was a shift 
in the eighteenth century from ‘consent to command’.39 It is undoubtedly the case that the 
period from the 1640s to the 1720s saw the transformation of the capacity of the English state 
to raise revenue and the extent of legislative activity after the Glorious Revolution, elements 
of which did strengthen the executive. The British state did enter a new phase of sustained 
warfare, and demands from the middling sorts supported a higher level of legislative activity 
in parliament throughout the eighteenth century.  
But there were areas in which the state remained weak—particularly when the 
creation and enforcing of policy is considered. Indeed, there is a strong case, which this thesis 
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makes, that local influence over policy increased during the eighteenth century. Bills and acts 
were altered by committees, lobbyists, and litigants, reducing the power of local elites.
40
 We 
are familiar with the interpretation of the ‘bloody code’—a series of acts that laid out the 
death penalty for more than two hundred crimes—being very different from the tone of the 
acts, and this could be found across much legislation.
41
 Equally, the standing orders of 
parliament restricting access to the Palace of Westminster were also primarily ‘reserve’ 
powers. Litigation did alter the enforcement and nature of statutes, the state being as much 
constructed by litigation, both by individual appeals and communities, as statutes or central 
government action.
42
 
 
3. ‘A Culture of Fact’ 
 
Many of the acts parliament passed aimed to strengthen the power of local communities and 
institutions, not the centre, and of which Westminster had little information to judge the 
merits of the proposed bill. The thesis, following the ideas of the ‘unacknowledged republic’ 
outlined above, argues that because of the local origins of much legislation, parliament 
continued to be reliant on parish officials, local businessmen and traders to inform debate and 
determine the merit of bills.  
We can go further, and show that a culture existed which meant parliament was 
reliant on outside advice and expertise to function effectively. The argument takes as its 
starting point the argument of Barbara Shapiro that changes in the legal system inspired a 
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growing ‘culture of fact’, that meant new standards of evidence were required to inform and 
justify policy.
43
 During the Restoration, the status of expert witnesses in courts was changing, 
and justifying arguments by ‘facts’ diffused across society and into parliament.44 This 
challenges the idea the eighteenth century was ruled by a poorly-informed state, in 
comparison to the nineteenth-century ‘information state’ and the work pursued by William 
Petty and others during the Restoration.
45
 The method exposed by Petty was not a new 
intervention in political culture, he arguing writers and policymakers should express 
themselves only ‘in terms of number, weight or measure; to use only arguments of sense... 
[and to study causes that] have visible foundations in nature’ in response to the turmoil of the 
mid-seventeenth century, but it gained new importance after 1689.
46
 Political arithmetic and 
the diffusion of a ‘culture of facts’ meant there was a need for lobbyists, witnesses and 
experts to inform parliament.  
Although the method did attempt to restrict discourse to a narrow range of people—
Petty believed he should become ‘accounter general’ who could inform the crown of the 
means to ‘balance interests and parties’, overcoming self and private interest— this was not 
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the practice. 
47
 Due to the weak nature of the state, it was necessary for ‘ordinary’ people and 
interests to present information taken from local ‘archives’ and businesses to committees 
after 1689. This was because there was a political culture that demanded ‘facts’ and evidence 
to evaluate bills and acts, cementing the role of the public in the proceedings of parliament. 
 
4. News, Secrecy, and Access 
 
A further element that ensured the peerage and the oligarchy were more porous to outside 
influence than assumed is a more common subject of study, especially in relation to political 
culture. The relationship between parliament and print culture has been explored for some 
time, but the interpretation of the Lords continues to stress their distance from the public, in 
stark contrast to the Commons. Many historians still, even if implicitly by not including the 
Lords in their studies, echo the remarks of a pamphlet of 1679 which suggested ‘the people 
not knowing what the Lords do in a session…makes them think they do nothing at all’.48 The 
Lords is commonly seen as the most hostile to public involvement in their business and wider 
politics, refusing to print its votes, and the first to take action against printers and 
newspapers.
49
 The role of the peerage in politics and society was not created through 
negotiation, judicial processes or ‘popularity’, but through deference, patronage and kinship. 
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This means that the Lords played little role in the growth of the Habermasian public 
sphere that is said to have developed in Britain in the late seventeenth century. Print and press 
helped to contribute to the ‘rage of party’, but also, along with coffee houses, aided the 
development of spaces for reasoned political debate. Parliament has been overlooked as one 
of these spaces. Parliamentarians were surprisingly tolerant of the public accessing the Palace 
of Westminster and the two chambers of parliament in the early modern period. Rather than 
being dominated by concerns with secrecy, access of the public to Westminster was tolerated, 
being seen as an inevitable part of legislating. Parliamentarians sought to manage public 
access, in terms of ensuring lobbyists and petitioners did not turn to violent protest, rather 
than seeking to reduce their presence. This was despite the rhetoric of standing orders and 
statutes such as the 1661 Tumultuous Petitioning Act or the 1715 Riot Act. This access 
ensured groups could be self-selecting and lobby parliament relatively unhindered throughout 
the early modern period. The debates and political mobilisations that resulted from the 
establishment of the ‘public sphere’ could be directed into parliament and impact on the 
deliberations of MPs and peers.  
 
5. A Petitioning Society 
 
An element, like litigation, that ensured communities across the British Isles were 
participating in politics at Westminster was the extent and intensity of petitioning. Not 
everyone could deliberate together, but a representative petition—signed, as was sometimes 
the case, by hundreds, and sometimes thousands of individuals—could bring legitimacy to 
the process of legislating at the centre. Parliamentarians were actively increasing the status of 
petitioners and the ability to petition after 1689. Although far from being a new feature of 
political culture, a wide range of social and geographical groups (including women on 
occasion) were able to lobby parliament to negotiate and challenge policies pursued by elites. 
35 
 
It should be stated from the outset that this will not be a general discussion of 
petitions based on pamphlets, second hand evidence from contemporaries, or the partial 
records of parliamentary journals, but rather the hundreds of petitions presented to the House 
of Lords and survived the fire in 1834. Their survival allows us to produce systematic 
evidence on the true extent of the political nation during this period and the capacity of local 
groups to learn about and influence events in Westminster. The presence of petitions ensured 
all groups could comment on proceedings before parliament, including those beyond the 
electorate, and for this to continue despite the decline in the frequency of general elections. 
The extent of petitioning to parliament is central to demonstrating that a plural politics was 
firmly established in early modern Britain, and for ideas of the ‘majority’ and ‘consent’ to 
establish themselves in political rhetoric. The ‘democratising’ element of this can be 
overstressed—these petitions fluctuated in number and intensity over the century, but they 
ensured dialogue and negotiation were present in the ‘aristocratic century’.  
Petitions raised many of the issues that concerned contemporaries regarding public 
participation, as set out by Mark Knights. The public were shown through their subscribing to 
be divided and have multiple voices. Petitioners could, and did, call for laws to be rejected or 
supported on the basis of majority support, raising issues about the ability of the public to be 
judgers and arbiters, and the tension between deliberative and ‘democratic’ legitimacy. In 
addition, they ensured that parliamentarians (including peers) were accountable to their 
communities, re-opening debates on whether they were ‘representatives’ or ‘delegates’, and 
added to pressure for a deliberative culture to counter these demands.  Nonetheless, petitions 
provided a form of restrained opposition and alternative to violence, helping to build political 
stability, though on very different terms to that proposed by Plumb.  
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6. Interest Groups 
 
The late Stuart period, from the Exclusion Crisis to the accession of George I, was a period 
that experienced the first extended ‘rage of party’, with ideological conflict following largely 
whig, tory, and occasionally jacobite, lines. The work of Holmes, William Speck and the 
History of Parliament project has shown the extent Namierite characteristics were not a 
feature or driver of politics in this early period, political divisions being partisan, ideological, 
and popular.
50
 This model is often complicated by the presence of court-country divisions 
over the power of the executive, but this thesis seeks to add another element to this spectrum, 
namely the role of interest groups. As Perry Gauci has shown, it was unincorporated 
merchants and those with no formal representation who were the most frequent petitioners to 
the House of Commons, enabling petitions to reach far into communities and strengthen local 
and interest-based identities.
51
 The requiring of members of a community to subscribe and 
support an action over an extended period of time, motivated by hostility to an ‘other’—
potentially another locality or interest group—aided the formation of alternative identities to 
those based on ‘party’.  
This concern for interest groups is not new—Holmes even has a chapter on the ‘clash 
of interests’ in his Politics in the Age of Anne—but their role in British society and their 
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functioning is still not fully understood. Public partisanship and adversarial conflict was 
reflected in more than just party politics, despite attempts by Steve Pincus and others recently 
to argue otherwise.
52
 Divisions on parliamentary legislation did not follow party lines, rather 
reflecting tensions between geographically close economic challengers or interest-groups.
53
 
This language and concept of interest offered an alternative ‘rage’ that continued throughout 
the century, being reflected in local legislation and petitioning. This means an alternative 
explanation to why political stability was achieved is needed, given these continuing divides. 
In addition, it questions the extent of aristocratic hegemony. As Hoppit has suggested, 
studying how the landed interest functioned shows a group that was a poor competitor to their 
mercantile and manufacturing counterparts.
54
  
This argument requires us to address the extent local communities were not insular or 
consensual communities, in contrast to divided London and other urban centres. The 
experience of ruling at a local level and extension of the ‘nerves of state’ into the localities 
would have aided the creation of a national political consciousness, but also shows that, on 
their own initiative, localities and interest groups themselves lobbied parliament at the centre 
for state and statutory power to be employed. This creates a dialogue between social and 
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 R. Sweet, ‘Local Identities and a National Parliament, c. 1688-1835’, in J. Hoppit, ed, Parliaments, 
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Culture of Local Xenophobia’, Social History, 28 (2003), pp. 1-30. 
54
 J. Hoppit, ‘Rethinking the Interests of the British State’, Paper delivered to the IHR ‘Britain in the 
Long Eighteenth-Century Seminar’, October 2011; idem, ‘The Landed Interest and the 
National Interest’, in Idem, ed, Parliaments, Nations and Identities. 
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political history, through demonstrating the educative potential of extensive office holding 
and local participation for involvement in national politics. Stuart Handley has shown the 
frequency of petitions and proposals from Lancashire in the late Stuart period, and other areas 
followed a similar pattern.
55
 Too often these struggles in the localities over the woollen trade, 
river navigation, calicoes or enclosure are portrayed as occurring on a ‘lower’ level of 
politics. But as was shown by Tim Harris, the material demands of the London crowd during 
the Restoration fed into wider attitudes towards France, popery, and the rule of Charles II.
56
 
Equally, David Sacks has shown the extent that local ‘little business’ often highlighted 
national issues and reflected struggles for power amongst elites that later flowed into national 
politics.
57
 The consciousness and political identities of the lower orders were not just 
constructed over religious or constitutional issues, but material ones too. Not only did the act 
of subscribing to a petition or suing a more powerful individual or institution have 
consequences on the attitude of the individual or group towards the wider generality, but 
would form the context in which national decisions were received. Petitioning and interest 
groups ensured that an alternative existed to electoral and party strife and continued debates 
on the role and ability of the public act as arbiters of policy. 
 
7. A Composite State: The Lords as the ‘British House’. 
 
The final theme this thesis examines is the nature, functioning and survival of the ‘composite 
state’. Historians have long attempted to address the Anglo-centricism of much historical 
                                                     
55
 S. Handley, ‘Provincial Influence on General Legislation: The Case of Lancashire, 1689-1731’, PH, 
16 (1997), pp. 171-84.   
56
 T. Harris, London Crowds in the Reign of Charles II: Propaganda and Politics From the 
Restoration Until the Exclusion Crisis (Cambridge, 1987). 
57
 D. Sacks, ‘The Corporate Town and the English State: Bristol’s “Little Businesses” 1625-1641’, 
P&P, 110 (1986), pp. 69-105.  
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writing and produce a truly ‘British’ perspective of this period, and this thesis addresses this 
in relation to the Lords’ role as a high court for Ireland, Scotland, England and Wales.58 The 
conflicts between the Westminster and Dublin Parliament for judicial supremacy are 
discussed, but individual appeals were most significant in the case of Scotland.
59
 
Explanations for Scotland’s place in the union after 1707 have tended to focus on its 
involvement in empire, arguing that the union articles created a separate sphere of autonomy 
where Scottish national institutions, notably the General Assembly and the Convention of 
Royal Burghs, filled the void left by the dissolution of the Scottish parliament. Until recently, 
the major themes for the construction of a British state and identity after 1707 have largely 
overlooked the role of the Westminster parliament and its reception in different parts of the 
‘British Isles’. One of the few studies of this by Joanna Innes, focusing on Scottish legislation 
at Westminster, showed the extent that Scottish legislative activity declined after 1707, 
supporting the thesis that Scots retreated into a domestic sphere of autonomy, leaving empire 
as the dominant space of Anglo-Scottish interaction.
60
 Bob Harris has shown Scottish activity 
at Westminster was largely defensive during the early years of union, but Scottish MPs and 
peers were capable of advancing their ‘national interest’ on occasion, with Scotland more 
than a ‘landowner’s world’.61  The common view, however, is that outnumbered at 
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 For example, G. Burgess, ed, The New British History: Founding a Modern State 1603-1715 
(London, 1999). 
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 These are explored in D. Hayton, ‘The Stanhope/Sunderland Ministry and the Repudiation of Irish 
Parliamentary Independence’, EHR, 113 (1998), pp. 610-35.  
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 Innes, ‘Legislating for Three Kingdoms’, in Hoppit, ed, Parliaments, Nations and Identities, p. 28. 
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 B. Harris, ‘The Scots, the Westminster Parliament, and the British State in the Eighteenth Century’, 
in Hoppit, ed, Parliaments, Nations and Identities; idem, ‘Landowners and Urban Society in 
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Westminster by English MPs, peers and bishops, with the continuities of the Westminster 
parliament favouring them also, Scots saw little of interest across the border.  
This thesis considers the use of the House of Lords as an appeal court after 1707 by 
Scottish interests (their petitions to parliament were to the Commons in this period, meaning 
they were unfortunately lost in the fire of 1834).  It follows Innes in showing there were 
distinctive national characteristics to the use of parliament. Legislative business remained 
overwhelmingly English, whilst appeals business was increasingly Scottish. Scotland, with 
the smallest electorate in the union, could see its elites and established institutions challenged 
by litigants at Westminster, showing Scotland was not as oligarchic or as distant from 
Westminster as believed.  But it also aided the strengthening of a British identity and state. 
The idea of a ‘North Britishness’ did inspire some appeals from Scotland, in an attempt of 
some to move towards a commercial society on an English model.
62
 Litigation offered a 
means to challenge dominant Scottish institutions. 
The calming of relations with Ireland and Scotland was a small element of Plumb’s 
account of the achievement of political stability.
63
 Through Scots and English meeting in the 
same parliament, it became far harder for monarchs to pit their kingdoms against one another, 
as Charles II had during the Exclusion Crisis (the Scottish parliament voting against the 
exclusion of James from the throne, threatening civil war if the whigs pursued their cause).
64
 
One English and Scottish parliament now faced one monarch. Making policy through statute 
and legal appeal in reaction to the demands of interests after 1707, meant changes largely 
                                                     
62
 C. Kidd, ‘North Britishness and the Nature of Eighteenth-Century British Patriotisms’, HJ, 49 
(1996), pp. 361-82.  
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reflected the strength of interests in their respective regions and kingdoms. This largely 
occurred without provoking a response in the other kingdom, because the creation of a 
uniform ‘British’ policy was not an aim of parliamentarians.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The role of parliament had been growing in political culture since the 1620s, and the post-
revolution period saw a new height achieved in its reach and role. This growth had not been a 
linear process, but rather one that ebbed and flowed reflecting political, religious and 
economic flashpoints. The presence of conflict at certain moments from the 1620s, into the 
1640s, and onwards into the Exclusion Crisis and the ‘rage of party’ marked a transformation 
in political culture. The presence of parliament after 1689 helped to cement this, sustaining 
public commentary and participation in politics, not just in terms of relations between crown 
and parliament, but also the usefulness of parliament to the wider political nation. This thesis 
initially seeks to expand our understanding of the nature and extent of the political nation 
during the post-1688 period. But it also offers further explanations for how political stability 
was achieved, through the development of a ‘deliberative oligarchy’. Parliament was 
understood by its members and those ‘out of doors’ to be an institution reliant on outside 
advice and influence. There were theatrical aspects to its role that attracted spectators—
notably in set piece events like the trial of Henry Sacheverell—but also a culture of 
deliberative participation. This was the primary reason the eighteenth-century oligarchy was 
so resilient. Despite a narrow membership, access to policy-making was relatively open, 
making the terms and direction of oligarchic rule negotiable and adaptable. This meant the 
culture of ‘misrepresentation’ that continued to build after 1716 thanks to petitioning and 
interest-based disputes had a means of being resolved.  
This thesis is organised into five thematic chapters. The primary purpose of 
investigating the ‘deliberative oligarchy’ in this fashion is to allow an examination of how far 
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politics in this period met the features of deliberation outlined above. It also enables an 
illustration of the richness of the archival material of the Lords, and the range of subjects it 
encompasses. However, a culture of deliberation was developing throughout the period 
covered in this thesis (and indeed earlier, as we shall see). The moments when deliberation 
was strongest are highlighted throughout the chapters.  
The first two chapters of this thesis consider the impact of the Glorious Revolution on 
the Lords’ role as high court, attention being given particularly to the use of the house by 
Scottish litigants. Nowhere was the capacity of interests to alter policy clearer than their 
ability to pursue litigation at a local and national level. This addresses questions on the 
knowledge of parliamentary proceedings, the geographical and social reach of its 
participants, and the strength of the state.  
The third chapter considers how open the House of Lords was to outside advice and 
lobbying presented through print and physical access. Central to this is examining the attitude 
of parliamentarians towards the presence of the wider public in the Palace of Westminster—
and so this section does consider parliament’s role as a ‘theatre’. But it goes beyond 
demonstrating the Palace was ‘open’, by examining the role of lobbyists and interest groups 
in committees, acting as co-legislators, rather than mere spectators.  
The fourth chapter pursues the question of why this was the case. It examines the 
demand of peers for ‘facts’ and political arithmetic as means to overcome self-interest and 
division. These methods became an expected and necessary part of policy making. But 
political arithmetic also offered a challenge to deliberation and open participation, in seeking 
to limit discussion to ‘experts’. This chapter considers why, on balance, demands for ‘facts’, 
especially in subjects beyond the fiscal-military sphere, contributed to wider public 
involvement in the state and parliament.  
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The final chapter considers a further challenge to deliberation, namely the partisan 
mobilisations inherent in the petitions presented to the House of Lords. It examines the role 
of petitioning in creating a conception of society based on the idea and identity of interest, as 
opposed to class, rank, or party. The presence of these petitions and interest-based disputes 
ensured pluralism and contestation continued into the 1720s. Participatory mechanisms were 
firmly part of the formal and informal operation of the state, and remained despite the 
Septennial Act of 1716. The mobilisation of the public, concerns for ‘misrepresentation’ and 
partisan rhetoric remained, but within a more deliberative culture and system that enabled the 
public to remain central to the politics of eighteenth-century Britain.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Transformation of the House of Lords as High Court, 1689-1720 
 
‘...Delays in judgement in other courts shall be redressed in parliament... [but this] has rarely 
been put into practice by reason of discontinuance of parliament or default or neglect of the 
peers of this realm...’ 
 
Peers commenting on their role before 1689, from Parliamentary Archives, HL/PO/JO/10/1/421/244, 
Law Reform Bill, 4 April 1690. 
 
There was one feature of eighteenth-century Britain that moderated the power of elites, 
parties and, later, the whig oligarchy more than any other: the weakness and the multilayered 
nature of the state. Through lacking the capacity and habit of executing laws, aristocratic 
elites simply lacked the tools for being a true political oligarchy, having to share the 
processes of policy-making with the wider population. The Glorious Revolution, and the 
union in the case of Scotland, strengthened this fundamental fact. The Westminster 
parliament’s role as a ‘legislative marketplace’, being useful to a wide range of interests—
particularly the ‘propertied Englishmen’—has been well established by Julian Hoppit, Joanna 
Innes and Paul Langford.
1
 England was clearly a ‘reactive state’ when it came to policy-
                                                     
1
 The changes in the scope of parliament’s legislative business are shown in J. Hoppit, ed, Failed 
Legislation, 1660-1800 (London, 1997). Important studies of legislation are found in J. Innes, 
‘Parliament and the Shaping of Eighteenth-Century Social Policy’, Transactions of the Royal 
Historical Society, Fifth Series, 40 (1990), pp. 63-92; P. Langford, Public Life and the 
Propertied Englishman, 1689-1798 (Oxford, 1991), esp. Chapter 3; idem, ‘Property and 
“Virtual Representation” in Eighteenth-Century England’, HJ, 31 (1988), pp. 83-115. For 
studies of the judicial business of  the Lords, see J. Hart, Justice Upon Petition: The House of 
Lords and the Reformation of Justice, 1621-1675 (London, 1991); idem, ‘Judicial Review in 
the House of Lords (1640-1643)’, JLH, 5 (1984), pp. 65-76; A. Horstman, Justice and Peers: 
The Judicial Activities of the Seventeenth-Century House of Lords (PhD, California, 
Berkeley, 1977); A. Swatland, The House of Lords in the Reign of Charles II (Cambridge, 
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making.
2
 But a further structural change that resulted from the events of 1688/89 has gone 
largely unexplored and which made it harder for any one interest to dominate policy-making. 
Due to the increased frequency, predictability and length of parliamentary sessions, the 
Glorious Revolution, in effect, created a new layer to the legal system. The House of Lords 
became a permanent ‘high court’, capable of altering the decisions of lower courts across the 
British Isles. Its presence means the narrative of decline of customary rights, the increasing 
power of statutes and the coercive power of the central state, projected by historians from this 
growth of the statute book, needs to be amended.
3
 
Although peers were active judges, these two chapters temper the interpretation that 
their newly-empowered role should lead to a restating of ideas of an ‘aristocratic century’ or 
be seen as bolstering the power of the whig oligarchy, with peers abusing the law to pursue 
political or personal gripes. Rather, the growth of legislative activity and a pre-existing, albeit 
declining, culture of litigation, meant laws could last for only a short period of time before 
being amended or challenged during the eighteenth century. Later chapters consider public 
influence on the legislative process, but these two chapters consider the capacity of non-elites 
to influence policy through the legal system. If parliament and the central state was 
dominated by a whig oligarchy, and Scotland by the Presbyterian Church and Convention of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
1996), Chapter 5; W. Prest, ‘An “Ordinary Court of Justice?” The Appellate Jurisdiction of 
the House of Lords, 1689-1760’, sketches out the developing power of the Lords.  I am 
grateful to Wilfred Prest for sharing this draft paper.  
2
  A concept encapsulated in L. Davison, T. Hitchcock, T. Keirn and R. Shoemaker, eds, Stilling the 
Grumbling Hive: The Response to the Social and Economic Problems in England, 1689-1750 
(Stroud, 1992). 
3
 J. Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1784 (London, 1989), 
Chapter 3; D. Lemmings, Law and Government in England in the Long Eighteenth Century: 
From Consent to Command (Basingstoke, 2011).  
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Royal Burghs, one structure to which minorities could turn was the supposedly impartial 
legal system. This ability ensured a variety of interests were capable of influencing the 
exercise and enforcement of authority within an agreed system of rules, even once the 
‘majority’ or dominant interest had spoken. 
Much work has been done on the law, most famously in Douglas Hay’s essay, 
‘Property, Authority and the Criminal Law’, where he argued its procedures should be seen 
as a ‘ruling-class conspiracy’ against the wider population, being ‘a selective instrument of 
class judgement’.4 The study of crime and criminal justice has seen the most extensive 
research, but in more recent years historians have turned to civil litigation, with the work of 
Christopher Brooks and David Lemmings being particularly important in opening up this 
field, arguably more significant to the maintenance of social relations than the criminal law.
5
 
                                                     
4
 D. Hay et al, Albion’s Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England (London, 
1976), pp. 48, 52. For an important conflicting view, see E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: 
The Origin of the Black Act (London, 1977), Chapter 10. 
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 Debates have been dominated over the extent there was a ‘great litigation decline’ in the eighteenth 
century, see C. Brooks, ‘Interpersonal Conflict and Social Tension: Civil Litigation in 
England, 1640-1830’, in A. Beier, D. Cannadine and J. Rosenheim, eds, The First Modern 
Society: Essays in English History in Honour of Lawrence Stone (Cambridge, 1989); J. 
Finlay, The Community of the College of Justice: Edinburgh and the Court of Session, 1687-
1808 (Edinburgh, 2012), pp. 9-10; H. Horwitz, ‘Chancery’s “Younger Sister”: The Court of 
Exchequer and its Equity Jurisdiction, 1649–1841’, HR, 72 (1991), pp. 160-82; idem and P. 
Ploden, ‘Continuity or Change in the Court of Chancery in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries?’, JBS, 35 (1996), pp. 24-57; C. Muldrew, ‘Credit and the Courts: Debt Litigation 
in a Seventeenth-Century Urban Community,’ EcHR, 43 (1993), pp. 23-38; W. Prest, ‘The 
Experience of Litigation in Eighteenth-Century England’, in D. Lemmings, ed, The British 
and Their Laws in the Eighteenth Century (Woodbridge, 2005), pp. 133-54. 
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Despite this work, litigation is often ‘carved-off’ from the wider operation of the state, partly 
reflecting the poor nature of legal records. But there is also the assumption that cases and 
appeals were overtly personal and reflected the self-interest of individuals, and representative 
of little more than social distrust or the falling out of opposing parties.  
But litigation was, in many respects, similar and as significant in its effects as acts of 
parliament. Any common agreements or decisions require trade-off and disappointed parties; 
it is not that litigation is a ‘bad’ form of dispute resolution and policy-making, competing 
against ‘good’ forms of conflict, such as those found in the thousands of bills and acts of the 
eighteenth century. Although it may be assumed that many of the appeals were related to 
dispute landownership or credit relations, these two chapters focus on litigation as an aspect 
of politics and economics, it being a common part of business life and a clear alternative, and 
sometimes preference, over pursuing legislation. Litigation should be seen as further means 
of directing the central state to act over matters of policy, being utilised over a range of policy 
issues. Litigation could create and reflect the same ‘clash of interests’ that bills and acts did 
produce. But because it was available at the lower reaches of society in lesser and local 
courts, the policies and power of elites were challenged and amended far more than is 
assumed. The nature of the state and the enforcement of its policies were not constructed by a 
narrow range of parliamentarians. The legal system helped to hinder the monopolisation of 
power by those in control of parliament or the wider state.  
These two chapters argue parliament’s impact and importance to eighteenth-century 
Britain came not just from its mediating function as a representative body, with the public 
remotely supervising and judging the decisions of peers and MPs, but through enabling 
bodies and interests to shape and develop policy. Parliament was firmly rooted in wider 
society, and because it was a ‘reactive’ institution its activity and influence was based on the 
actions of interest groups and other outsiders. Parliamentary history is more than a study of 
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the activities of its members, be they MPs, peers, or bishops, and their selection to sit in the 
two houses, but rather a wider functioning of society and social relations; the ‘fact [being] 
that parliament was important for its legislation, not for its personnel—for what it did, not for 
who it was’.6  
These two chapters consider one of the aspects of ‘what it did’, namely parliament’s 
legal business, and shows the extent decisions made by peers were not determined by kinship 
or party, but wider societal norms—such as ideas of justice and precedent. Particularly in the 
judging of law, cultural and intellectual norms such as these ‘locked’ peers into the discourse 
of law, reducing the scope of their individual agency. This chapter demonstrates the structural 
aspect to this, in terms of growth of appeals business up to 1720, and considers who used the 
court and where they came from within the British Isles. Unlike the records for lower courts 
which have constrained their systematic quantitative study over a long period, the surviving 
evidence for the Lords is on a scale small and organised enough to provide a range of 
continuous evidence from the Restoration onwards. Whilst this chapter is necessarily 
quantitative and concerned with legal structures, the next considers the impact of appeals to 
the Lords on the forming of policy, particularly in Scotland and England, and its contribution 
to the ‘deliberative oligarchy’. Non-elites and minority interests had to be both numerous and 
capable of winning appeals for the Lords to have a significant impact on the nature of 
oligarchy. 
 
I: A ‘New’ High Court: The House of Lords after the Glorious Revolution.  
 
The House of Lords dealt with a wide variety of legal appeals. It was the ‘supreme 
jurisdiction in cases of appeals from courts of equity... being the last resort’, though it did not 
hear original cases after the 1670s or criminal appeals (outside impeachment and criminal 
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 J. Goodare, ‘Who was the Scottish Parliament?’, PH, 14 (1995), pp. 173-8, at p. 176.  
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trials of peers).
7
 From England and Wales, peers heard cases in error from the Courts of 
Common Pleas and King’s Bench, and appeals from Chancery, Exchequer, and the Palatinate 
Courts of Lancaster and Durham. Remaining Welsh civil litigation came under the 
jurisdiction of Westminster King’s Bench in the 1770s.8 From Ireland, despite constitutional 
conflicts between the two parliaments in the 1690s and late 1710s, cases from lower courts 
could be appealed to the Lords, as well as from the Irish House of Lords itself (the 
Declaratory Act of 1720 merely clarifying an accepted practice). Following the union with 
Scotland, appeals were heard from the Court of Session and the newly-created Scottish 
Exchequer, even though there was concern and division over this in the union negotiations. 
Occasional appeals came from the Highest Court of Justiciary, but by the late eighteenth 
century the Lords accepted it had no jurisdiction over the court.
 9
 The Lords quickly 
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 R. Atkins, An Enquiry into the Jurisdiction of Chancery in Cases of Equity (1695), p. i.  
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 T. Watkin, The Legal History of Wales (Chippenham, 2007), pp. 156-7. Previously Welsh appellants 
could only appeal to the Great Sessions on subjects later under the King’s Bench jurisdiction.  
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 The House heard one criminal case from Scotland before 1720, that of Magistrates of Elgin v. 
Presbyterian Ministers of Elgin (1713), when the house claimed jurisdiction over the Scottish 
High Court of Justiciary—see D. Jones, ‘The Judicial Role of the House of Lords before 
1870’, in L. Blom-Cooper, B. Dickinson and G. Drewry, eds, The Judicial Role of the House 
of Lords, 1876-2009 (Oxford, 2009), p. 8. The cases of Bywater v. Lord Advocate (1781) and 
his Majesty’s Advocate v. Murdison (1773) saw the Lords accept the High Court of Justiciary 
was the last court of resort in Scottish criminal cases, a position agreed to by the English 
attorney general and lord advocate. An earlier appeal was also rejected in 1754 on a death 
sentence—see A. MacLean,  ‘The House of Lords and Appeals from the High Court of 
Justiciary, 1707-1887’, Juridical Review, 30 (1985), pp. 192-226; N. Walker, Final Appellate 
Jurisdiction in the Scottish Legal System (Edinburgh, 2010).  
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established itself as an active policy-maker across the ‘British Isles’ after 1688 and the union 
of 1707. 
Before examining the scale of litigation it is necessary to provide a short summary of 
the procedures and development of legal appeals.
10
 The House of Lords revived its role as 
high court in 1621 through the re-introduction of impeachment, an event soon followed by 
appeals from litigants, but it was not until 1675 that business took the form that was still 
present after 1689.
11
 Before the Restoration peers had sought not to ‘hear the case in the 
House itself’, instead referring cases to the courts below, working as an ‘administrative 
tribunal’.12 It also heard original appeals until the late 1660s, with Skinner v.  The East India 
Company (1667-1670) the most infamous case, but the furore meant that only two more 
original appeals were heard. During the Restoration, two significant developments occurred. 
The first was that peers began to reverse Chancery decrees, the first in 1667, rather than 
merely referring them to courts below for rehearing, making it a more attractive avenue for 
litigants and important as a policy-maker.
13
 The second development was that the Lords was 
affirmed to be the final court in matters of equity in Shirley v. Fagg (1675), securing appeals 
from Chancery. The scope of the Lords’ business (at least from England and Wales) was 
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 Hart, ‘Judicial Review in the House of Lords’, pp. 76-7; idem, ‘The House of Lords, and the 
Appellate Jurisdiction in Equity’, PH, 2 (1983), pp. 49-70.  
13
 Swatland, House of Lords, p. 73; Journals of the House of Lords,  xii, pp. 134, 206, 212. 
51 
 
largely settled in the period under study. In terms of procedures, two mechanisms could be 
utilised to bring an appeal to the house. Cases would be presented either through a petition, 
which detailed the facts of the case and took a similar form to those presented to lower courts 
and primarily drafted by counsel; or through writ of error by a judge. In both forms, cases 
were likely to be answered by a petition from the opposing party before a hearing in the 
house as a whole with two counsel on each side. Peers would then resolve to reverse, vary, or 
affirm the appeals, occasionally with the assistance of judges, once the parties and counsel 
had withdrawn.  
Using the journals and manuscript records of the house, systematic evidence about the 
growth of the Lords’ role after the Glorious Revolution can be produced. The chronological 
trend of these appeals is shown in graph one. The trend is of uneven but increased activity 
during the Restoration, with a spike immediately after the Glorious Revolution settling into a 
steadier pattern of around thirty cases a session between 1694 and 1714, partly reflecting the 
similar lengths of these sessions. This meant the house dealt with an average of thirty-four 
appeals each session after 1689, more than double the fourteen received each session during 
the Restoration (though only eight sessions during the Restoration actually reached this 
figure).
 14
 These figures show the Glorious Revolution, in effect, created a new standing high  
                                                     
14
 Figures from LJ, xi-xxi. Original appeals, received largely in the 1660s (only two being heard after 
1670), are not included in these figures, the majority being referred by the committee of 
petitions to lower courts—see Swatland, House of Lords, p. 72. The lack of appeals in 1660 
reflects the fact that almost 900 petitions were presented asking for provisos to be added to 
the Acts for the Restoration of Ecclesiastical Benefices or Confirmation of Legal Proceedings, 
examined in Hart, Justice Upon Petition, pp. 231, 233, 237, 240.  
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court. The shift is stark, with 322 appeals presented between 1660 and the Revolution, 
expanding to 1072 cases between 1689 and 1720. 
This was not just significant for the English and Welsh polity after 1689, but also for 
the British Isles as a whole, the union having a similarly transformative effect on the Scottish 
judicial landscape. Whilst the pre-union Scots Parliament determined only nine of the fifty-
three appeals presented to it between 1689 and 1707, the House of Lords between 1707 and 
1720 judged more than eighty-five percent of the 129 cases Scottish litigants brought.
15
 Not 
only was the quantity larger, but the range of business was wider. Because peers sought to 
expand its jurisdiction when given the opportunity by litigants, the impact was an appeal 
court at Westminster that considered a wider range of subjects than the Edinburgh parliament 
had. The Greenshields case of 1710 on the practising of English liturgy in Scotland did see 
the question raised of whether ‘a parliament now sitting in Scotland would receive it’; being 
an ecclesiastical case, but it was resolved sixty-eight votes to thirty-two to allow it.
16
 An 
appeal on the matter of tithes from Haddington was said to ‘alarm our ministers’, with no 
previous appeal to the Scottish parliament on the subject, though four other tithe cases came 
to the Lords from Scotland before 1720.
17
 Appeals against the costs of a legal appeal from the 
Court of Session were allowed, as were appeals from the new Scottish Exchequer Court.
18
 A 
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dispute over the farming of taxes in Edinburgh, which would have gone to Scottish privy 
council before the union, found its way to Westminster as a result of the council’s abolition in 
1707, which had allowed the Lords of Session to come into its place.
19
 Appeals to the 
Westminster Parliament were also more certain than the ‘protestations’ that came to the 
Scottish parliament. A case of 1690 saw the Edinburgh parliament rescind a decision of the 
Court of Session after ‘much debate how far the protestation for remeid of law should be 
regular to prevent unnecessary and too frequent protestations’.20 This uncertainty perhaps 
resulted in the low numbers of judgements of the Scottish Parliament during the 1690s. The 
effect of the union of 1707 was a British parliament capable, if litigants wished it, to be far 
more intrusive into the Scottish legal system and all parts of society touched by it than the 
pre-union Scottish parliament had been, widening the scope and efficiency of Scotland’s 
‘high court’. 
For Ireland, despite the lack of a legislative union, a rising number of appeals after 
1708 ensured that the effects of 1688/89 were felt across the British Isles, with a significant 
shift in the power and scope of its ‘high court’. One hundred and forty appeals came from an 
Irish court to Westminster, far exceeding the activity of the Irish House of Lords that had 
heard only two appeal cases in 1695 and one in 1697. This pattern continued after the 
Declaratory Act of 1720, the Dublin parliament only receiving ten appeals in 1727.
21
 Less 
affected by the revolution of 1688/89 were appeals from the colonies to Westminster. There 
were rare appeals from North America—one came in 1694 between Dutton and Howell, over 
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whether Barbados was a conquered territory, and so not having the privileges of English law 
(it was determined it did not), brought because of the arbitrary rule of its governor.
22
 It was 
not until 1727 that another appeal from the colonies was heard, on the proprietorship of 
Carolina.
23
 Despite an estimated 250 appeals to the privy council between 1680 and 1776, 
peers at Westminster did not become a regular point of appeal for colonies across the 
Atlantic.
24
 The passage of an act in 1696 that allowed the setting up of local admiralty courts, 
rather than appealing to the courts at Westminster Hall, may have ensured there was a 
growing divide between legal structures.
25
 But within the British Isles, the Glorious 
Revolution not only transformed parliament as a legislative body but also as a judicial one, 
creating two great moments of disjuncture in the legal system in 1689 and 1707.  
There are several explanations for the changing volume of legal business. Firstly, it 
was subject to factors that also resulted in the rise of legislative activity. The greater 
predictability and length of parliamentary sessions after the Glorious Revolution can be seen 
as the primary factors in the increase of appeals, after the position of the Lords in relation to 
lower English courts was resolved in the Restoration.
26
 Between 1660 and 1685 the average 
session length had been seventy days; whereas between 1689 and 1714 the average length 
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was nearer 110.
27
 As a result, only 162 cases after the Glorious Revolution took more than 
one session to be determined and only thirty-three of these took more than two.
28
 The pattern 
of parliamentary sessions was particularly conducive to efficient judicial work. By 
assembling in winter and rising in early spring, litigants could expect their appeal to be heard 
in a single session, whilst peers could expect judges to support this function of the house 
before beginning their circuits in March, ordering them ‘not to go away until the rising of this 
House’.29 For Scots, the hearing of sixty-five percent of their cases between February and 
April in the period from 1709 to 1800 allowed advocates to ‘come to London every spring for 
appeals’, as it coincided with the rising of the Court of Session.30 
Administrative reforms by the house also meant appeals were dealt with more 
efficiently, reflecting awareness by peers of the need to respond to the growing weight of 
business they faced. Graph one shows that there was a period of fluctuation immediately after 
the Glorious Revolution as the house experimented with the management of its business. 
Paralleling developments in the standing orders governing legislation, orders controlling 
appeals were largely settled in 1693 and 1698. Through the ordering of the printing of 
appeals, with a continuous record from 1702, their signing by counsel, presentation by a peer, 
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and the banning of counsel from practising in parliament if they failed to attend, vexatious 
litigation was reduced.
31
 Appeals vied with legislation and other business for time, but were 
aided by the decision of peers to pass a standing order that ‘forbids the reading of private bills 
before the hearing of causes’.32 The 1690s saw the stricter adherence by peers to a 1678 order 
that appeals should be presented within fourteen days of the start of a session.
33
  This meant 
that appeals business was mostly completed before bills came up from the Commons in early 
spring. Peers also gave warnings that the end of the session was soon expected, creating a 
skeleton of business for potential litigants.
34 
As a result there was a greater efficiency of 
appeals after 1689, with more than ninety percent of appeals receiving a judgement (and 
those that did not were focused in the two sessions of 1691-2 and 1692-3). This was far 
higher than the fifty percent of writs of error and sixty percent of Chancery appeals to the 
Lords that received judgement between 1660 and 1681.
35
 In other words, there was a fivefold 
increase in the number of judgements made by peers as a result of parliament’s ‘coming of 
age’ after 1689. These rates are higher than the success rate of legislation, with nearly fifty 
percent of bills failing between 1689 and 1714, including nearly twenty percent of personal 
legislation. This made an appeal to the Lords for redress, rather than to parliament as a whole 
for a statute, a more certain path for a decision (though, significantly, not necessarily the 
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desired one).
36
 This reflected the transformation of the Lords into a standing high court, 
becoming a permanent and efficient feature in the legal calendar.  
However, because judicial activity was ‘consumer led’, being driven largely by the 
whims and strengths of individuals (though the executive did take an interest in some cases), 
wider external factors would have determined the trends in appeals.
37
 For example, the spike 
of cases in 1719 was solely the result of a large number of appeals from the commissioners of 
forfeited estates. Attempts were also made to resolve disputes before they went to the Lords, 
and some would have succeeded. Negotiation with creditors failed to stop proceedings in 
George Lockhart’s appeal in 1714, whilst an ‘agreement’ between William Morison and 
Cornelius Kennedy did not succeed in halting a ‘further attack’ on the land title.38 The decline 
of litigation in the eighteenth century is likely to have been the result of developments in the 
localities rather than the central courts, and variations in the rate of appeal to the Lords would 
have reflected this, in addition to the capacity of individuals, institutions and interests to 
negotiate a settlement.
39
 In any case, the growth of appeals meant there was a more intensive 
interaction of outside interests with parliament, and a stronger intervention of parliament 
across the British Isles. 
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II: A Shared Transformation: The House of Lords as a ‘British’ House 
 
Although the Glorious Revolution had transformative effects on both the volume of 
legislation and litigation, the data outlined above shows the profile and ‘constituency’ of each 
was different. Whilst the union with Scotland in 1707 saw little interaction between English 
and Scots on the pursuit of legislation in the first decades of union, suggesting Scots largely 
retreated into domestic institutions after 1707, the Westminster-based court did see litigation 
from across the British Isles, in spite of English procedures, lawyers, law, and the dominance 
of English peers and presence of bishops. Unlike legislation, where Scots were largely 
unwilling to use the British parliament to advance their interests in the early eighteenth 
century, they were willing to move outside their forms of self-government (such as the 
General Assembly or the Convention of Royal Burghs), risk the development of Scots private 
law (contrary to article eighteen in the Treaty of Union) and appeal to the House of Lords 
(which had been left open and unclear in article nineteen). Equally, Irish appeals were present 
at Westminster throughout this period. The result was that peers were able to play a 
significant role in integrating the British Isles into a single civil-legal framework.   
Table one shows the extent the Lords’ business was ‘British’. The table shows the 
relative weight of appeals, broken down into the period before and after the union (though 
these are uneven, with twenty-one sessions before 1707 and twelve after). This suggests 
English appeals were dominant in the immediate period after the Glorious Revolution, before 
declining significantly both as a proportion and number, with an increasing proportion of 
judicial business taken up with Scottish and Irish appeals. The causes of the decline in 
English and Welsh appeals is examined in the next chapter, but at this stage it should be 
noted that the rising number of Scottish and Irish appeals suggests the decline in English 
appeals was not due to internal procedural changes in the Lords. Historians have shown there 
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Table 1: Geographic Distribution of Active House of Lords Appeals, 1685-1720 
 
Date 
 
England Wales England 
and Wales  
Ireland Scotland Total 
1685-1707 (Number) 541 41 678 49 n/a 727 
1685-1707 (Percent) 74 5.6 93 6.8 n/a  
Average per session 25.8 2 32.7 2 n/a  
 
1707-1720 (Number) 150 3 171 92 129 392 
1707-1720 (Percent) 38 0.8 43.6 23.6 32.9  
Average per session 12.5 0.3 14 7.6 10.8  
 
1685-1720 Total      1119 
Sources: LJ, xiv-xxi; PA, HL/PO/JO/10/1, Main Papers; HL/PO/JO/10/6, Main Papers; 
HL/PO/JO/10/3, Main Papers (Large Parchments). These figures are higher than those quoted above, 
as these include the figures for 1685. Note: The total for ‘England and Wales’ includes cases with 
unknown location, but through the originating court it is clear they came from either England or 
Wales. 
 
was a general decline in the amount of litigation in the English localities, and this is likely to 
have been reflected in higher courts. This was particularly true for litigation involving estate 
settlements and debt, with the average number of cases concerned with estate and land titles 
falling from an average of thirteen to ten each session before and after 1707. This pattern of 
British appeals continued for the remainder of the eighteenth century, with an average of 
twenty Scottish appeals presented each session between 1756 and 1793, and constituted fifty-
four percent of appeals between 1813 and 1823.
40
 Of the 501 appeals presented to the house 
between 1794 and 1807, 419 came from Scotland.
41
 This was in contrast to their legislative 
activity, where only fifty bills and acts may be classified as relating to Scotland between 1707 
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and 1727.
42
 Just over one percent of appeals to the Court of Session between 1756 and 1793 
found their way to the Lords in that period, making the Lords an important feature of the 
Scottish legal system.
43
 This suggests peers had an important role managing in Anglo-
Scottish relations with Westminster during the eighteenth century, with their judgements able 
to influence a broad range of issues across Scotland.   
But why were Scots willing to appeal to the Lords, if they were largely unwilling to 
legislate at Westminster? Did they not withdraw into their ‘national’ institutions, like the 
General Assembly and Convention of Royal Burghs, sharing only the British empire with the 
English? The continuing of the pattern of appeals to the pre-union Scottish parliament, and 
the silence over the question of appeals to the Lords in the union negotiations, suggests that 
many Scots did not wish for the Court of Session to be their final court of appeal.
44
 
Protections for the Admiralty Court, Scots private law, to which ‘no alteration [may] be 
made’, and banning appeals to the courts of Westminster Hall, were all included in the treaty, 
but references to the House of Lords were absent.
45
 As John MacClean has argued, Scottish 
commissioners were not intent on excluding appeals to the House of Lords, leaving it instead 
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to the ‘will of the people of Scotland.’46 In this respect, it is significant that Scots did not 
necessarily have positive views of their pre-union institutions, especially the Court of 
Session. As a legacy of the conflict between the court and the Scottish parliament before 
1707 for judicial supremacy, there was support in Scotland for appeals to a ‘parliament’.47 A 
pamphlet of 1675 argued that ‘best qualified for the main and ultimate tuition of these 
common and great concerns’ were parliamentarians; believing that justice should not be left 
to rest on ‘fifteen lords precariously depending...on his majesty’s pleasure’, as the Lords of 
Session was perceived to be.
48
 George Mackenzie, the Lord Chief Justice and advocate of 
union with England agreed with this, arguing although the 
greater part of that parliament [at Westminster] will be absolutely ignorant of, and 
strangers of our laws... I am not for giving an absolute and uncontrollable power to 
our judges...I still think they ought to be accountable.
49
  
 
In the 1690s litigants had complained that they had been ‘enormously leased and highly 
prejudiced’ by the Court of Session.50 This continued to be the case in the mid-1730s, with 
James Erskine, Lord Grange, believing that: 
our judges acted very unequally and that politics rather than the law determined the 
bench and [those] that are thought to be of the country party could hardly expect 
justice.... I believe your friend may be get better justice among them [The House of 
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Lords] than here [in Edinburgh]. .. I cannot think your friend has reason to fear the 
House of Lords... 
 
The reasons for this were clear, in that:  
a judicatory so illustrious must take care at least of their reputation which I see 
some inferior court have learned to neglect...I must let my opinion [be known] 
which is that it is indefinitely better for him to depend on the law and justice of his 
cause than to make any transactions whatsoever. 
51
 
 
The House of Lords could potentially offer distance from Scottish politics and the hostile 
influence of the crown, other interests or patrons. 
 In addition to attitudes towards national institutions, litigation ultimately reflects a 
failure of negotiation, with national bodies of Scotland unable to provide satisfactory answers 
for minorities, and this may be seen in a number of appeals to the Lords.
52
 The Presbyterian 
church were challenged by an Episcopal church in Elgin and by James Greenshields to create 
toleration for their church, and whose appeals south of the border could rely on tory support 
and overcome the fact that ‘all the Scotch lords’ supposedly opposed Greenshields.53 
Edinburgh magistrates were also challenged on economic regulation, firstly by candlemakers 
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over the setting of prices; then by William Paterson who had lost out from farming the tax on 
ale and beer brewed in the city; and later the Scottish college of justice itself, defending their 
exemption from city taxes.
54
 In the case of the candlemakers of Edinburgh, who were 
excluded from the Edinburgh convenery of incorporated crafts and whose appeal to the 
Convention of Royal Burghs was unsuccessful, an appeal to the Court of Session and the 
Lords was an available mechanism to solve disputes with other companies.
55
 This pattern 
echoed the activity of London companies who commonly fought disputes through the 
common council and court of aldermen before pursuing acts of parliament. The forty appeals 
from the English-dominated forfeited estate commission from the Court of Session also 
reflected their wish to use the English dominated and anti-jacobite House of Lords to 
maintain their influence in Scotland. An appeal in 1663 also came to the Westminster Lords 
from the Court of Session, the appellant being an Englishman. He brought his appeal after the 
Lords of the Articles claimed the reversing of ‘a decision of the court of session was never 
done by any parliament’, but was rejected by English peers on a tied vote at Westminster 
because it came from a Scottish court.
56
 These were cases that some Scots or others operating 
there wished to take out the hands of Scottish institutions, if they were found to be 
unsupportive to their causes.  
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Closely aligned with this was the desire of Scots to use English institutions to advance 
schemes to create a more commercial society.
57
 To some in Scotland, English law was more 
attractive than Scots and seen as a means of overcoming the perceived feudal nature of 
Scottish institutions. Significantly, contemporaries saw less of a division between English 
and Scots law than we do today.
58
 Both the Court of Session and litigants cited ‘British’ cases 
before the union with England, reflecting a desire to use English law to advance trading 
interests and accelerate Scotland’s moves towards a commercial society.59 Englishmen in 
Scotland attempted to use the Lords to import English convention, as was the case in Gray v.  
Duke of Hamilton (1708) where the appellant argued that English law should be applied.
60
 
Given these motivations it was not the case, as has sometimes been assumed, that Scots 
appealed for narrow reasons. The belief that the rise in the number of Scottish appeals was 
the result of a standing order of 1709 which allowed the presentation of appeals to prevent the 
execution of the orders of the lower court, limits the meaning and significance of litigation. 
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The standing order is unlikely to have acted as a significant factor, as only twenty-two 
Scottish appeals did not receive judgement in this period (and all were rejected in 1720).
61
  
Neither were Scottish litigants appealing in practice to an English dominated 
institution where ‘strangers’ would be deciding on Scottish law, easing the challenges of 
appealing. The sixteen Scots peers could impact on proceedings in a proportion greater than 
their size and reflects their ability to act as effective lobbyists for their fellow Scots, and not 
just a reliable ‘ministerial bloc’.62 The recorded divisions of the Lords suggest an average 
attendance of forty-six peers, though the number of peers voting ranges from twelve to 
ninety-two. Although divisions are unrepresentative of the ‘typical’ appeal (occurring only 
sixty-six times out the 1076 cases heard) and so reflect interest in particularly contentious 
issues, they suggest only a small number of peers were involved in judging appeals. In terms 
of Scottish cases, there were only three divisions up to 1720. The case of Don v. Don in 1713 
had only twenty peers voting, and there were no more divisions on Scots appeals until the 
forfeiting of jacobite estates in 1719 and 1720, which saw larger divisions involving sixty-six 
and forty-four peers.
63
   
The work of the Lords in its judicial role followed a similar pattern to that identified 
by TK Moore and Henry Hortwiz for the Commons, where a small core of MPs carried out 
business and many chose to specialise in certain forms of legislation.
64
As the fictional peer 
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Lord Foppington in the 1696 play, The Relapse, put it: ‘as to weighty affairs—I leave them to 
weighty men’, preferring drunkenness and adultery to attending to affairs of state.65 The 
sixteen Scottish peers could be extremely significant in these appeals, as the account of a 
French visitor to the House in 1720 suggests: 
[On] Friday last one Monsieur Pleineouf, a foreign minister, was brought into the 
House of Lords whilst a cause [was being heard] ...trying to satisfy his curiosity, 
[he] talked to Lord Sunderland, pray my Lord where are the judges? Why says my 
lord, we the peers are the judges. Hela! Mon dieu, cries the Frenchman. You the 
judges! There is not one lord in the house that minds the least morsel of the cause. 
You are all talking to one another or to me: it’s no matter for that answers the peer. 
There are three or four lords in the house who understand the laws very well and 
give attention and the house always gives in to their opinion. Very well, says 
Pleineouf, then you [and] the rest of the lords take it upon your conscience and 
honour, not that the cause is just or unjust... but that the lords who listen are good 
lawyers and just judges.
66
 
 
Scottish peers could be assiduous in their attendance, enabling them to be the ‘three or four 
lords’ that Pleineouf was told of. They were the ‘few that stayed’ for an appeal concerning 
the case of an Edinburgh businessman, William Morrison, whilst Lord Balmerino was clear 
he had ‘taken more part than well fell to my share’ in appeals business.67 Several peers had 
the legal training that Pleineouf was told was so important. Argyll was a lord of session 
between 1704 and 1708;
 
Archibald Campbell, the first Earl of Ilay and an extraordinary lord 
of the session from 1708 and lord justice general, was present from 1710 to aid the House.
68
 
Similarly, William Johnstone, Marquess of Annandale, had served as an extraordinary lord of 
session in 1693 and was a representative peer from 1709 to 1713. When the Earl of Findlater 
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was elected to the Lords, George Lockhart believed him to be ‘well acquainted with the laws 
and constitution of Scotland’, he being a member of the faculty of advocates and previously 
solicitor general in Scotland.
69
  
Scots peers and MPs were actively involved in appeals, with a lack of a Scottish 
‘block’ that was uniformly hostile to decisions being made at Westminster. This meant that 
some could be used to lobby and explain legal matters to the English peers present. This was 
the case with the appeal of James Greenshields. The Earls of Eglinton and Balmerino (who 
was ‘violently for’ Greenshields) ‘buoyed up Mr Greenshields and prevailed with him to 
stand his ground’.70 Eglinton went with Bishop Nicolson of Carlisle to encourage him to 
‘consider the Act of Uniformity and that against intruding [a reference to a 1693 Act for 
Settling the Quiet and Peace of the Church]’.71 Scots MPs were also involved, some 
supplying Greenshields with money and ‘encouraged him not to submit or yield’.72 Although 
Argyll and Ilay ‘walked out on the appeal’ of Greenshields, though perhaps Ilay only ‘after 
the appeal was sustained, knowing there was nothing to be said worthy of his staying’, others 
had been more supportive.
73
 Lockhart reported that ‘Scots commoners supplied Mr 
Greenshields with money to defray the charges’, whilst he ‘and others of my country 
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were...violent in pushing’ the appeal and divided into ‘several classes’ to wait upon peers. He 
claimed to have ‘baffled’ ministerial opponents by this campaign.74  
It was also the case that on litigation linked to their constituency Scottish MPs would 
take an interest. George Warrender, MP for Edinburgh in 1715, followed closely the cases 
involving the Herriot Hospital and the butchers and candle makers, both of which involved 
Edinburgh magistrates. He had written to the Lord Provost of Edinburgh that when the case 
of the hospital came to the Lords, he: 
wait[ed] on all the Scots members...and as many of the English lords as I knew and 
delivered them the printed case and information. I attended the members also at 
their entering the door of the house and stood by the lawyers all the time. 
 
Afterwards he and ‘our friends present...drank prosperity to the magistrates’ to celebrate their 
victory.
75
 The case of the butchers also saw him ‘in compliance with your [the magistrates] 
desire, concur with the candle makers attorney here and stood by the counsel’ during the 
appeal.
76
 Edinburgh magistrates also employed attorneys and clerks of the college of justice 
to attend Westminster ‘to negotiate the town’s affairs’.77 Scottish appeals were brought by 
Scots and given support by Scottish interests at Westminster, in order to resolve disputes 
amongst their fellow countrymen, just as the English did with legislation; Scots did not just 
withdraw from Westminster into national institutions in the early period of union.
78
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English peers, in the most part, recognised that they should defer to Scottish peers and 
law; otherwise they would weaken their legitimacy as a court of law and threaten the survival 
of the union. Peers were explained Scottish law by English lawyers. Philip Yorke, later Earl 
Hardwicke and solicitor general from 1719, told peers they had ‘been informed... [of the] 
laws of Scotland... [and should] take notice of Scotch law’, quoting cases heard in Scottish 
courts and earlier acts of the Edinburgh parliament.
79
 Discussions also occurred with English 
judges before appeals were heard.
80
 
This is not to say there was universal acclamation for appeals to Westminster from 
Scotland, but there was a trend of interaction, rather than a complete withdrawal into 
domestic institutions. The presence of bishops in the House of Lords was clearly not 
amenable to Presbyterian Scots, with Colonel John Erskine, defending his estate from 
expropriation by the forfeited estates commission in 1719, writing he could not ‘in 
conscience’ address the bishops as judges.81 Robert Dundas, a Scots lawyer appearing before 
the Lords in 1720, found ‘his language was less understood... [and] several lords ceased to 
listen’.82 Cases over the forfeited estates commission in 1719/20 were most likely to attract 
English hostility, reflecting the jacobite threat, though even in six of the forty appeals peers 
protected estates from expropriation. Lord Grange noted the opinion of twelve English judges 
over these appeals was taken, but only a written account represented the Lords of Session. 
Grange believed peers were solely concerned with the broader importance of the cases, with 
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‘not one word spoke[n] on either side concerning the merits of the cause’.83 The treatment of 
these appeals should not be taken as representative, however, these being specific in their 
focus and constituting less than a third of Scottish appeals heard between 1707 and 1720. 
Despite occasional tensions, the idea Scots should ‘keep peace amongst ourselves...keeping 
within our own sphere’ did not become the practice after the union.84  
Even if some Scots were unsympathetic to these appeals opponents were content to 
leave the question unstated in the union articles, ‘supposing that the inconveniences of 
pursuing an appeal to England would incline people rather to acquiesce, and make the 
judgement of the [Court of] Session more definite’.85 But we should also look towards 
English politics to explain why appeals to the House of Lords were left an open question in 
the articles of union. The reason the articles in this area were a ‘botched job’ was not because 
they were an attempt to preserve the independence of the Scottish legal system, but rather to 
avoid a re-opening of the conflict between the two Westminster houses caused by the case of 
Ashby v. White. This case over a disputed Buckinghamshire election, presented to the Lords 
in 1704, challenged the right of the Commons to determine its own membership. This 
resulted in the Commons complaining the Lords’ judicature was a ‘bottomless and insatiable 
gulf...which would swallow up both the prerogative of the crown and the rights and liberties 
of the people’.86 This debate was occurring in the background to the union negotiations and 
neither Westminster house wished to open up again the question of the scope of the Lords 
powers to risk the union. The absence of express provision in the articles was therefore 
acceptable to Scots on both sides of the union debate, those that supported either the Court of 
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Session or the Scottish parliament on the question of the jurisdiction of parliaments, and both 
houses at Westminster.  
The relative power of British parliaments was an important cause of appeals from 
Ireland. These formed a growing proportion of cases in this period, with a continuous line of 
appeals from 1697 and some sporadic appeals previous to this. The practicalities of appeals 
from Ireland posed less of challenge in being appealed to Westminster as both largely 
followed the English common law, but the rights of appeal were far more disputed. The 
conflict between Westminster and Dublin peers began in 1698 in the case of Derry v. Irish 
Society. The appeal came from the Irish House of Lords and saw English peers determine that 
appeals from the Irish Chancery should go to England. This was followed the year after by 
the case of Ward v. Meath, when English peers overruled their Irish counterparts on a 
Chancery case.
87
 The absence of an Irish Parliament until 1703 and the Earl of Meath coming 
to a private agreement, meant the conflict went unresolved.
88
 Further conflict between the 
two parliaments was postponed until the case of Annesley v. Sherlock (1717-1720). The 
estate dispute that began in the Irish Exchequer saw Mrs Sherlock appeal to the Irish Lords 
and was followed by an appeal by Maurice Annesley to Westminster, before a counter-
petition by Mrs Sherlock to the Irish House. The conflict saw Westminster overrule its Irish 
counterpart and led to the Declaratory Act of 1720, which determined that the Irish House of 
Lords was subject to the Westminster Lords in matters of appeal. Despite the conflict with the 
English Commons over Ashby v. White in 1704, and occurring in the context of the Peerage 
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Bill, designed to strengthen the power of the peerage, the Lords was able to secure in statute 
its judicial power over the Irish House.
89
 
This constitutional shift made litigation to Westminster acceptable, but does not 
explain why litigants in Ireland appealed either before or after these disputes. Irish appeals 
were initially concentrated in the years  surrounding the case of Derry v. The Irish Society 
between 1698 and 1701, but this was only one of three cases presented in 1698, and was 
followed by a further seven appeals in the next. The largest spike in appeals began from 1715 
when fourteen cases were presented, all but three of which dealt with the settlement of estates 
(the others dealing with debts), and this activity continued until at least 1720. Only towards 
the end of this period did the clash between parliaments of Annesley v. Sherlock occur and 
any encouragement of appeals to the Westminster Lords this case may have resulted in. The 
greater stability of the Westminster parliament compared to its Dublin counterpart (even 
though it also sat far more frequently and routinely after the Glorious Revolution) encouraged 
these appeals to Westminster. Whilst the Westminster parliament sat for nearly 3600 days 
between 1690 and 1720, the Irish one sat for less than 900, or a quarter of the time.
90
 The 
absence of an Irish parliament from 1699 to 1703, in 1718 and 1720, and the earlier sittings 
of Westminster between 1715 and 1717 meant the Westminster Lords provided a more stable 
forum that was present for longer lengths of time.
91
   
The subject matter of Irish appeals suggests a further factor that encouraged litigation 
to Westminster. Disputed land titles and estate settlements were responsible for seventy 
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percent of Irish cases, higher than the other areas of the ‘British Isles’. This meant the Lords 
impacted most in England and Scotland, whilst its intervention in Ireland was limited to small 
groups of individual landowners and patterns of landownership. Unlike English landowners 
who were increasingly attracted to estate acts to confirm their titles and settlements, the 
majority of Irish litigants concerned with land do not appear to have attempted to pass estate 
acts in the Irish parliament. This placed them on a path which could result in an appeal to 
Westminster as constitutional arrangements between the two houses altered or if the patterns 
of parliamentary sessions were favourable. Only two appeals were a response to a failure to 
pass an estate act in the Irish parliament—that of John Eyre, whose failed attempted in 1697 
caused him to begin legal proceedings that led him to Westminster in 1720, and a long 
dispute of the Earl of Clanricarde and his sons.
92
 The Earl and his sons failed to pass an estate 
bill in 1698 and 1699, resulting in four cases in the House of Lords. The presence of English-
based Irish litigants in several appeals may have influenced their decision to avoid the Irish 
parliament, and appeal to an English court instead of the Irish privy council and parliament.
93
 
Actions in the Westminster house also fed back into legislative activity at Dublin, with two 
cases leading to attempts to put legal proceedings at Westminster into statutory form through 
the Irish Parliament. The defeat of Sir Maurice Eustace in an appeal of 1700 resulted in his 
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lobbying an Irish bill for the relief of his creditors, eventually passing in 1719. The 
successors to James Hamilton amended a judgement made by the Lords on a jointure in 1702 
thirteen years later.
94
  
If the House of Lords was able to draw in appeals from the geographical peripheries 
of the British Isles, the same was true of England. The distribution of cases per thousand 
people in England is shown in map one. The map, necessarily, considers all appeals as equal, 
overlooking the county-wide nature of some subject of litigation. In northern England appeals 
dealing with tolls in Cumberland or river navigation in Newcastle would have had a wider 
reach than an appeal, for example, over a disputed will from Surrey. Nonetheless, there were 
twice as many appeals from Cambridgeshire than Yorkshire, despite their respective 
populations and economic importance. London and Middlesex were responsible for 186 of 
the 850 cases heard by the Lords from England, representing twenty-two percent of English 
and Welsh cases, a similar proportion to the cases presented to the Exchequer and Chancery 
in 1685.
95
 Hertfordshire had a similar number of appeals to London per thousand people, at 
0.32 compared to London’s 0.36. The Lords were not dominated by appeals from London, 
acting as an effective point of appeal for a range of interests across south east England, 
northwards into Cheshire. 
Despite declining rates of litigation in the English localities throughout the eighteenth 
century, the absence of union with Ireland until 1801, and the lack of wider engagement of 
Scots with Westminster, the Lords channelled litigation from across the British Isles into a 
centralised national framework, tying together their policy and law, and extending webs of 
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British patronage. The warnings of the first Scottish respondent to the Lords, Sir John Inglis, 
that ‘no alterations be made in the laws used in Scotland that concerns private rights’ were 
not repeated in any petitions.
96
 The scale and geographical breadth of its business means that 
because of its functional role as high court, the House of Lords was becoming a more 
important arena for local communities to contest national, local and personal issues. The 
Lords could act as another branch to the developing ‘structural urbanism’ of the eighteenth 
century, concentrating activities at one shared location in London.
97
 
 
III: Who Came to the Lords: The Social Depth of Litigants 
 
The impact of the House of Lords on the wider legal system and the identification of peers 
with the law was greater because its use was not limited to social elites. Historians have 
shown the extent there was an ability and willingness for all ranks of society and non-
established interests to pursue their social superiors through litigation, and the Lords were no 
different to this.
98
  
The social descriptions of litigants, taken from their own descriptions in the appeals 
submitted, are shown in table two. The data includes all members who were party to the 
appeal, not just those first named in appeals. The effect of this is to increase the proportion of 
women and minors, but not to adopt this would be to underestimate the numbers that had a 
stake in the judgements of peers. A total of 2554 individuals were involved in legal 
proceedings that reached the House of Lords between 1685 and 1720.  Cases could involve  
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Table 2: Social Descriptions of all Litigants Named in Appeals to House of Lords, 1685-1720 
 
  Description 
Raw 
Number 
Percentage 
Percentage 
Total for 
Category 
Percentage in 
Chancery 
(1627) 
Category 1 
Temporal Peers 136 3.6 
37 31 
Spiritual Peers 14 0.4 
Knights 242 6.4 
Esquires 578 15.3 
Gentleman 280 7.4 
Wives to above 150 3.9 
 
Category 2 
Members of 
Corporations 
43 1.1 
14 
 
Officeholders 40 1.1  
Merchants 101 2.7 13.9 
Persons in Law 24 0.6 
[Professionals] 
4.8 
Clergy 96 2.6 
Sciences and 
Liberal Arts 
27 0.7 
Freeholders 23 0.6  
Farmers 116 3.1 13 
Shopkeepers, 
Tradesmen 
19 0.5  
Artisans 25 0.7  
Military Officers 20 0.5  
 
Category 3 
Wives 250 6.6 
 
24 
13.5 
Spinsters and 
Widows 
196 5.7 0.9 
Common Seamen 1 0.02  
Labouring People 18 0.5  
Paupers 48 1.3  
Creditors 160 4.2  
Minors 219 5.8 15 
 
 
Category 4 
Undesignated 
Males 
898 23.4 
24 
4 
Undesignated 
Females 
53 1.4 5.4 
Source: LJ, xiv-xxi; PA, HL/PO/JO/10/1, Main Papers; HL/PO/JO/10/6, Main Papers; 
HL/PO/JO/10/3, Main Papers (Large Parchments). Data for the Court of Chancery is from Horwitz, 
‘Continuity or Change in the Court of Chancery’, p. 44. This sample totals 446 litigants, compared to 
2554 for the Lords. 
 
large numbers—a disputed estate settlement had sixteen parties to it, a case over common 
land had fifty-four tenants involved, whilst credit cases also drew large numbers, seventeen 
79 
 
being involved in a long-running fraud case of Sedgwick v. Hitchcock.
99
 Direct comparison 
with the pattern in lower courts is difficult as studies focus on earlier periods, but an attempt 
is included in table two with Horwitz’s study of plaintiffs in Chancery in 1627. It may be 
seen the portion of those ranked gentlemen and above is greater in the Lords, but sixty to 
seventy percent of litigants in both courts were from the middling sorts and below.  The 
members of the peerage, the titled gentry and their wives formed thirty-seven percent of the 
litigants, meaning that legal business in the house was not dominated by its own members, 
but was used by a wide range of interests. The large number of undesignated males and 
females—at twenty-four percent—are unlikely to add to the total of the first category, it 
being safe to assume titles would be used in such a context. The distribution of capital sums 
involved in cases supports this assertion, with nearly a third of cases dealing with sums of 
less than £600.
100
  The smallest sum in dispute in an appeal to the Lords was ten pounds of 
rent arrears, with the defendant arguing it was 'beneath the dignity of the house to consider so 
small a matter', though peers proceeded to do so.
101
 These cases over small sums were either 
brought as test cases, or as conflicts that raised broader issues of status, policy, trust, and 
perceptions of a ‘good’ society. This made law a levelling force, with the use of credit, 
customary and contract law utilised by all levels of society. 
The financial means of litigants were clearly important in determining their ability to 
appeal, but an appeal involving a particular interest or locality could draw upon the resources 
of a community. When he was involved in a tithe dispute, the minister of Haddington was 
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given fifty pounds ‘to defray the charges of this process....before the House of Peers’.102 ‘All 
the inhabitants’ of the town of Chatham, in dispute with its neighbour the City of Rochester 
over the holding of a market, ‘were ready to join a purse to defend themselves’, claiming to 
be able to raise ten times more than the city.
103
 The Scottish appeal over the church at Elgin 
was financed by voluntary subscription organised by the Bishop of Edinburgh.
104
 In addition, 
fourteen people were admitted as informa pauperis, meaning their representation by legal 
counsel and their costs were paid, and included five Irishmen, a Welshman, a Scot, and three 
women.
105
 
It is also notable that a high proportion of women were involved in disputes, 
constituting around twenty percent of litigants. This means that some travelled to London, 
challenging notions of restricted domesticity. Although this may be taken as a sign of the 
extent women knew of their legal rights and were relatively free to exercise them, their 
participation was narrowly based. The issues they were involved in were largely restricted to 
estate settlements, disputed wills and jointures, and credit relations. It seems reasonable to 
assume the law acted as a leveller for their participation, in that there were few references to 
their gender in the appeals submitted, and instead being able to use the discourse of law to 
advance their cases (in so far as the law itself was heavily gendered).  
This data suggests middling sorts did use the Lords to advance their interests through 
litigation. The wider population recognised they could use the apparatus of the British state to 
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further their own interests, contributing to the decentralised nature of policy making. They 
were not politically isolated from the elites, their relations built solely on deference or 
patronage, but rather on negotiating and contesting the state through the law and legal 
discourse. Without their presence, litigation in the Lords would not have contributed to a 
pluralistic and deliberative politics to the extent it did. 
 
IV: Conclusion  
 
The scale and experience of litigation in the Lords by a variety of interests meant peers were 
becoming identifiable with legal redress across the ‘British Isles’. The title of ‘high court’ 
remained contested though, still being used to refer to parliament as whole or the lower 
courts, such as Chancery or Admiralty.
106
 Petitions to the Commons continued to refer to it as 
the ‘high court of parliament’ into the 1710s.107 The language of the ‘supreme’ court was 
more established, in referring to the process of impeachment that both chambers of 
parliament shared.
108
 Contemporaries did not recognise a supreme judicial court, defining 
such a body as requiring ‘absolute and unlimited power’ in all cases—including criminal 
cases, and the ‘making’ as well as executing of laws.109 But clearly the House of Lords in the 
civil legal system was the ‘supreme court of justice that can set the true and legal bounds and 
limits to the jurisdiction of inferior courts.’110 Lemuel Gulliver, when describing the English 
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constitution to the King of Brobdingnag in his Travels, made sure to tell him the House of 
Lords was the ‘highest court of judicature, from whence there could be no appeal’.111 In this 
respect, the Lords had an explicit function very different to the Commons, and one that was 
of growing importance in the eighteenth century. 
The weakening of central authorities and the power of elites implicit in the 
functioning of the legal system and the presence of multiple-sites of decision making ensured 
that a plurality of interests was a clear feature of eighteenth-century society. Litigation was 
part of broader multi-institutional lobbying effort, making it harder for any interest to 
consolidate ‘victories’ in other parts of the state. Not all laws, judges, and peers were 
supportive of deliberation and a rule of law, but the difficulties of maintaining control 
through several layers of the legal system and the legislative process were increased after 
1688. Middling sorts from England and Scotland were able to participate in the Lords as an 
unintended consequence of the Glorious Revolution, and perhaps as an intended result of the 
union in the case of Scotland. For the three or four dozen cases heard by the Lords each 
session, there were many more heard by lower courts, multiplying the participants and 
subjects involved in policy-making and its enforcement. The activity of these courts and the 
impact of the ‘great litigation decline’ on oligarchy must be examined elsewhere. Now we 
turn to consider the consequences of the ability of groups across the British Isles to pursue 
litigation to the House of Lords, particularly with regard to the relationship between litigation 
and state formation, the functioning of the British state, and its impact on the nature of 
oligarchy.  
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Correspondence of Jonathan Swift (4 volumes, Oxford, 1963), Volume 2, pp. 342-3. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Constructing the British State: Litigation, Union, and Oligarchy 
 
The Lords command your words by scandalum magnatum, and your estates by judicial 
authority, and I hope you will not make them bigger than the crown, by this way of trial. 
 
Sir Christopher Musgrave, 31 December 1691, in A. Grey, Debates of the House of Commons (10 
volumes, 1769), Volume 10, pp. 223-4.
1
 
 
For two or three reigns have we not had warning that the government would be destroyed in 
Westminster-Hall? We have had learned judges and ignorant, and yet all have conspired our 
ruin. 
 
Sir Henry Capel, 15 June 1689, in Grey’s Debates, Volume 9, p. 323. 
 
The previous chapter demonstrated the range of British involvement in the House of Lords 
through litigation. This chapter considers the ends to which their participation was put—
namely the challenging and amending of law and policy, negotiation of social relationships 
and determining the nature of union after 1707. The decisions of peers helped to destabilise 
prerogative forms of property rights—particularly crown patents and charters—and the 
decisions of lower courts, encouraging the shift towards statute law. Through this, the Lords 
ensured the governing of mainland Britain occurred under a multi-layered institutional 
framework that limited the power of elites and ‘locked’ them into a process of negotiation 
and a rule of law. The ‘reactive state’ was not only present in legislation, but litigation as 
well. 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the presence of Scots as appellants at 
Westminster was one of the most notable aspects of the Lords’ role. Whilst legislative 
activity was overwhelmingly an English phenomenon, Scottish and Irish appeals were heard 
in increasing numbers. Despite the separate Irish parliament and the apparent protection of 
                                                     
1
 These comments are also attributed to Charles Montagu, see H. Horwitz, Parliament, Policy and 
Politics in the Reign of William III (Manchester, 1977), p. 74. The debate was over a bill to 
create a new court for the trial of peers in times when parliament was not sitting.  
84 
 
many Scottish institutions in the union articles, some steps were taken towards a more 
integrative union. Scottish interests pursued litigation with the aim of amending previous acts 
of the Scottish parliament and the decisions of the institutions that dominated Scotland after 
1707. The British state was not solely based on shared access to empire, but also a culture of 
‘North Britishness’ that Colin Kidd has identified, with some interests seeking to move 
towards greater commonality between the two nations. Litigation was also significant for 
English and Welsh interests in strengthening the capacity for localities and interests groups to 
influence policy, aiding the construction of political stability by the 1720s within a pluralistic 
framework of negotiation.  Eighteenth-century political stability rested, in part, on the 
autonomy of local communities from central government; something the legal system helped 
provide and protect.  
Being able to challenge ‘state’ policy had implications for the nature of the state and 
the political culture in which elites, dominant interests and ordinary Britons debated and 
enforced them. It ensured the institutions of the state were drawn upon by a wide range of 
social and geographical interests. People from all ranks and interest used the law, although 
unequal in their social distribution. In this respect, the law offered a means for non-state or 
elite groups to shape the state or local structures, participating in the ‘discourse on 
government’ and reflects the wider participatory culture of late seventeenth-century 
England.
2
 Like bills and acts, legal appeals reflected disputes between two persons, 
                                                     
2
 M. Braddick and J. Walter, eds, Negotiating Power in Early Modern Society: Order, Hierarchy and 
Subordination in Britain and Ireland (Cambridge, 2001); M. Goldie, ‘The Unacknowledged 
Republic’, in T. Harris, ed, The Politics of the Excluded, 1500-1850 (Basingstoke, 2001); S. 
Hindle, The State and Social Change in Early Modern England, 1550-1640 (Basingstoke, 
2000); D. Lemmings, Law and Government in England in the Long Eighteenth Century: 
From Consent to Command (Basingstoke, 2011), p. 77. 
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companies, corporations and communities that could have general importance. 
Contemporaries saw the judgements of the Lords as ‘no way inferior...to the express positive 
text of an act of parliament’ and used them for the same ends.3  As a result, conflicts over the 
regulation of water rights, overseas trade, public finance, land ownership and credit relations 
were fought out in the courts, rather than resolved by an act of parliament.  
These two features of extensive participation and the ability to amend policy through 
litigation lead us to consider the nature of the eighteenth-century oligarchy. Unlike the 
interpretation of the law offered by the Warwick School in Albion’s Fatal Tree, where it was 
one of the tools used by the oligarchy to maintain its control, this chapter argues the law was 
a fundamental part of negotiating oligarchy. The legal system multiplied the avenues and 
difficulties of monopolising power and provided a set of ‘rules’ to ensure deliberative 
engagement with ‘facts’ and alternative perspectives did occur.  
This chapter first considers the use of litigation as an alternative to legislation, 
particularly in relation to England and Scotland. It then examines the disruptive impact of 
litigation on property rights, encouraging a shift of propertied English interests towards 
legislation, before concluding by setting out the implications of litigation on the nature of 
oligarchy. Ultimately, the legal system helped negotiate and limit the power of both dominant 
and minority interests during the eighteenth century with the minimum of force.  
 
I: Parliamentary Intrusion: Litigation and Governing in England and Scotland. 
 
Policy was not just created or amended through parliamentary statute in the eighteenth 
century. Litigation frequently acted as a forerunner, cause or challenge to legislation, and was 
capable of reflecting the same clash of interests and communities. This ensured there was a 
                                                     
3
 E. Wynne, Eunomus, or Dialogues Concerning the Law and Constitution of England (4 volumes, 
1785), Volume 3, p. 193. 
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circular model of law creation, with no absolute supremacy of legislators or judges. Instead, 
litigation created a process of dialogue and communication between different parties, 
beginning with the initial decision to pursue a policy in a community, and continuing through 
parliament, courts, and ultimately into the wider public sphere.
4
  
The subjects of appeals to the House of Lords were many and varied. Table three 
shows the subjects of cases from different parts of the British Isles, in order of the 
commonality of the subject appealed. Reflecting the limited nature of appeals from Ireland 
and Wales—with 130 of the 141 Irish appeals and thirty of the forty-four Welsh appeals 
concerned with estate or credit issues—this chapter focuses on appeals from England and 
Scotland, though English litigation had a stronger relationship with legislation, creating a 
stronger deliberative system.
5
 In both scale and breadth, appeals to the Lords had the most 
substantive impact on the shape of their states and society. Compared to the lower courts, the 
Lords heard more cases that can be classified in a ‘miscellaneous’ subject category. Whilst 
land and estate titles were responsible for around sixty-five percent of the cases heard by 
Chancery and Exchequer in 1685 and 1735, they made up only forty-four percent of the cases 
heard by the Lords. Debt cases, the second largest category of litigation in the two courts, 
contributing between sixteen and twenty percent of their cases, provided just over twenty  
 
 
                                                     
4
 See M. Van Hoecke, ‘Judicial Review and Deliberative Democracy: A Circular Model of Law 
Creation and Legitimation’, Ratio Juris, 14 (2001), pp. 415-23, at pp. 420-1. For recent 
studies of policy in the round, see W. Pettigrew, ‘Constitutional Change in England and the 
Diffusion of Regulatory Initiative, 1660-1714’, History, 99 (2014), pp. 839-63; P. Gauci, ed, 
Regulating the British Economy, 1660-1850 (Farnham, 2011), esp. Chapters 1, 4, 7, 10.  
5
 The subjects of other Welsh cases are: 7 tithe, 3 privilege, 3 office-holding and 1 business dispute. 
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Table 3: Subjects of Appeals to the House of Lords, 1685-1720. 
 
Subject Number of Appeals 
 England and 
Wales 
Scotland (From 
1707) 
Ireland 
Land titles 
Estate Settlement 268 25 51 
Land Title and Rents 150 12 44 
Fortified Estates 
 
42 2 
Business and Credit 
Business  and Market Regulation 104 14  
Debt 185 24 33 
Communications 3   
‘Government’ 
Corporation Powers and Privileges 2   
Elections 2   
Poor Relief 10   
Public Finance 7 2 4 
Office-holding 29 2  
Privilege 30   
Treason and Riot 2   
Religion 
Liturgy 1 2 1 
Tithes 29 4  
‘Personal’ 
Family Dispute 2   
Unknown 
Unknown 19   
Sources: PA, HL/PO/JO/10/1, Main Papers; HL/PO/JO/10/6, Main Papers; HL/PO/JO/10/3, Main 
Papers (Large Parchments); HL/PO/JU/4/1-3, Appeal Cases. Those listed under England and Wales 
include cases with no known location, but from the originating court it is clear that they came from 
either England or Wales. 
 
percent of peers.
6
 The third largest category was dealing with business relations and the 
operation of markets, and provided around twelve percent of the total cases heard the Lords. 
The house reflected the interests of those capable of mobilising the resources to take a case 
there, encouraging a larger proportion of what could be termed ‘miscellaneous’ subjects, 
rather than being dominated by the disputes between individuals of lower propertied ranks 
that reached the lower courts in greater numbers. 
                                                     
6
 H. Horwitz, ‘Chancery’s “Younger Sister”: The Court of Exchequer and its Equity Jurisdiction, 
1649–1841’, HR, 72 (1991), pp. 160-82, at p. 171, Table 2.  
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Litigation is also an understudied means of how property and capital was distributed. 
From the details provided by petitions, an estimated income of £100,000 each year and a 
capital sum totalling £2.9m was adjudicated by the House of Lords between 1689 and 1720.
7
 
The distribution of capital is shown in graph two. This was the equivalent of raising an 
additional land tax at the rate of six shillings in the pound for one year. If these two figures 
are combined by ‘converting’ income to capital at a rate of eighteen years purchase, the total 
is £4.7m, or more than two land taxes.
8
 This means an average of £156,000 was subject to the 
threat of re-settlement or direction by peers annually between 1689 and 1720. The Lords 
heard only a tiny minority of cases—Henry Horwitz estimated around 90,000 bills of 
complaint were heard by the Exchequer between 1649 and 1819, with Chancery perhaps 
experiencing levels four times as high. Whilst the Lords saw an average of thirty-four appeals 
introduced each session, the Exchequer heard an average of 740 bills each year during 
William’s reign.9 The economic impact of litigation was potentially huge—a simple (and 
flawed) estimate would be £3.3m was subject annually to the Exchequer court, if it simply 
copied the pattern in the Lords during William’s reign. This can be compared with annual tax 
receipts of between two and five million in the same period (around six to nine percent of 
national income).
10
As a further comparison, around £400,000 was estimated by the board of  
                                                     
7
 For around a tenth of cases, the values are unknown. For cases where the sum was in dispute, an 
average figure has been taken. 
8
 Land was commonly sold at a rate of eighteen years purchase in the 1690s, see C. Clay, ‘The Price 
of Freehold Land in the Later Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, EcHR, 27 (1974), pp. 
173-89. The land tax was usually raised at the rate of four shillings in the pound.  
9
 Horwitz, ‘Exchequer and its Equity Jurisdiction’, pp. 168-9. The annual totals for the Court of 
Chancery are more difficult to establish, see Ibid, pp. 166-7. 
10
 P. O’Brien, ‘The Political Economy of Taxation, 1660-1815’, EcHR, 41 (1988), pp. 1-32, at p. 4, 
Table 2. 
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trade to be spent annually on poor relief in 1696, rising to £700,000 in 1750, redistributing 
around one percent of national income.
11
  Litigation is likely to have been a far more 
important means of redistributing national income—or at least threatening to do so. Access to 
the law, custom and pre-statutory legal conventions were potentially more significant as taxes 
set by parliament. When it came to ruling Britain, the legal system played an important role 
in negotiating political and economic life, and the statutes passed in parliament.  
The remainder of this section focuses on specific appeals to the Lords. Because of the 
relatively small amount of Scottish legislation in the first decades of union, these remarks 
focus on Scotland in the first instance before turning to the nature and significance of English 
appeals. In both kingdoms, litigation was an effective avenue for interests and minorities to 
seek redress.  
 
A. Negotiating Scotland: Scottish Appeals after the Union. 
 
Accounts of Scottish attitudes towards Westminster have tended to focus on what divided 
Scots from Britain in the eighteenth century. Protection for Scots law, the Presbyterian 
Church and Convention of Royal Burghs suggest a relationship built, at best, on mutual 
disengagement, with empire the site where a British identity was created. But the presence of 
appeals to the Lords offers a further explanation for the survival of union, one not based on 
the autonomy of Scottish domestic institutions. Scottish appeals were significant not only for 
the number, in the absence of much legislation originating from the county, but also because 
they impacted on the articles of union.  Attitudes from English and Scottish appellants 
                                                     
11
 P. Slack, The Invention of Improvement: Information and Material Progress in Seventeenth-
Century England (Oxford, 2015), pp. 63, 176.  
91 
 
towards these articles suggest these were perceived as far from ‘fundamental’ laws and did 
not necessarily protect Scottish interests and institutions from intervention and alteration.
12
  
Striking at the heart of the articles was the appeal the Episcopal minister James 
Greenshields brought to the Lords in 1710. He had been imprisoned in 1709 for conducting 
worship without the authority of the Presbyterian church, who suppressed his reading of the 
English prayer book, occurring provocatively opposite the General Assembly in Edinburgh.
13
 
Greenshields was part of a wider movement, reflecting the suppression of Episcopacy that 
occurred after the Glorious Revolution in Scotland.
14
 By 1709, the English service was being 
set up ‘very busily in the north’ at Inverness, Elgin and Montrose.15 His appeal was a clear 
‘test case’ for the Episcopal interest.  An Episcopal minister from Angus was also put 
forward to appeal to the Lords, being ‘put upon it by others’, though the timing was not right, 
with the Presbyterian Robert Wodrow believing the appeal ‘at this juncture I hope...would be 
thrown over the bar with contempt’.16 A Fife minister in 1713 also considered a later appeal 
to the Lords but did not pursue it, having ‘scandals he is charged with’.17 William Dunbar and 
John Skinner also made attempts before Greenshields; Skinner having ‘pretended to appeal to 
                                                     
12
 Bob Harris shows the treaty could be used to protect Scottish interests from British intervention in 
his ‘Scots, the Westminster Parliament, and the British State’, in J. Hoppit, ed, Parliaments, 
Nations, and Identities (Manchester, 2003), pp. 130-2; 136-7. 
13
 PA, HL/PO/JU/4/1, James Greenshields, Appellant; The Magistrates of Edinburgh, Respondents, p. 
1. 
14
 The wider Scottish context can be found in T. Clarke, The Scottish Episcopalians, 1688-1720 (PhD, 
Edinburgh, 1987). 
15
 T. McCrie, ed, Correspondence of Reverend Robert Wodrow (2 volumes, Edinburgh, 1842), 
Volume 1, pp. 30-1. 
16
 Ibid, Volume 1, p. 82.  
17
 Ibid, Volume 1, pp. 457-8. 
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the queen and the House of Lords’.18 Although none of these appeals reached the Lords, they 
show the extent of division in Scotland over the issues raised by the case Greenshields 
brought. Echoing the English practice on legislation there was an already an agent for the 
Episcopalians at Westminster, James Gray, one of whose roles it was to answer attacks in the 
press on the broader campaign.
19
 Opponents mobilised ‘addresses’ in Edinburgh which were 
claimed to have been ‘subscribed by some thousands of hands’ against the case.20  
The Lords eventually heard the appeal, having delayed it because of proceedings 
against Henry Sacheverell and the slow response of the Edinburgh magistrates, peers 
ultimately deciding to reverse the judgement of the Lords of Session. The end result of the 
appeal of 1710 was legislative action, litigation having highlighted an issue requiring redress. 
Following further lobbying by Greenshields and the publication of fourteen pamphlets 
surrounding the case, the Episcopal Communion Bill of 1712 was introduced, one of the few 
Scots acts of the period.
21
 Episcopalians could now meet unhindered to use the English 
liturgy if their clergyman had taken the oath of allegiance. The bill relied on English support, 
with Bishop Nicolson writing to Archbishop Tenison that ‘they shall...be able to procure for 
them an act of toleration in the very next session of parliament’.22 Significantly, the related 
Patronage Bill found support from all sides, with only three Scottish peers voting against at 
the third reading.
23
 The stakes in the bill were clear with Mr Dod, an English lawyer arguing 
                                                     
18
 Clarke, Scottish Episcopalians, p. 492. 
19
 Bodleian Library, Ballard MSS 36, James Greenshields to Arthur Charlett, 27 December 1712, fol. 
48. 
20
 Wodrow Correspondence, Volume 1, pp. 30-1. 
21
 Nicolson, Diaries, p. 573. The figures come from the English Short Title Catalogue.  
22
 BL, Add MSS 6116, Bishop Nicolson to Archbishop Tenison, 13 October 1709, fol. 17. 
23
 Bodl., Ballard MSS 36, James Greenshields to Arthur Charlett, 13 April 1712, fol. 126. 
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against it in committee, stating ‘this is a mighty alteration from the Church of Scotland’ 
which ‘was to continue as before the union’.24 It was a significant act, being seen as 
‘preventing the disturbing those of the Episcopal communion in Scotland...weakening at 
least, if not altering...the laws made for its preservation and securing’.25  
But the ‘circular-process’ of decision-making did not end with these two acts. The 
appeal ruling and the subsequent legislation were strengthened by a later appeal to the Lords, 
involving a dispute over the church at Elgin. The Lords determined Episcopalians were free 
to use the church that they had begun to do ‘soon after the late act for tolerating that 
communion’.26 Greenshields saw the case as being ‘of mighty use to us’.27 Like his case, the 
appeal divided Scots peers, but not above ten peers from any nation were for the Presbyterian 
cause in the case, Greenshields was told by a peer.
28
 The jurisdiction of the Presbyterian 
Church had been weakened by an appeal to English peers at Westminster, given authority in 
statute, and strengthened by further appeal. The toleration did not violate completely the 
union because Presbyterianism remained the established church; but it lost many of its 
privileges and its monopoly on tolerated faith in Scotland, clearly breaking from acts passed 
before 1707 to secure its position. These decisions further divided Scotland into two 
                                                     
24
 PA, HL/PO/JO/5/1/48, Manuscript Minutes, 13 February 1712. 
25
 PA, HL/PO/JO/10/6/221/2896, Petition of William Carstares and Others, 11 April 1712. 
26
 PA, HL/PO/JO/10/3/203/11, Petition of George Innes and the Bailiffs of Burgh of Elgin, 17 April 
1713.  
27
 Bodl., Ballard MSS 36, James Greenshields to Arthur Charlett, 15 July 1713, fol. 153. 
28
 Bodl., Ballard MSS 36, Same to Same, 15 July 1713, fol. 153. 
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confessional groups, but after the 1715 rising the tory and jacobite climate declined to create 
a more stable, but still divided, religious culture in Scotland.
29
 
These appeals formed two of several that impacted on the articles of union, being a 
‘prize’ of integrative union for some interests in Scotland. Economic issues were also 
commonly dealt with through litigation, and altered the articles relating to the power of the 
Convention of Royal Burghs. Article 11 of the Treaty of Union stated ‘that the rights and 
privileges of the Royal Burghs in Scotland as they are, do remain entire after the union’, but 
through interest groups bringing appeals challenging local magistrates and their attempts to 
resolve disputes in the convention, the Westminster Lords did alter its decisions. The case of 
the Edinburgh Butchers v. Candlemakers (1715) covered similar issues to acts of parliament, 
such as an Act for Making Billingsgate a Free Market for the Sale of Fish (1698), both 
dealing with authorities not being allowed to set the price of a certain good.
30
 By arguing the 
‘old laws’ of the 1540s and 1550s ‘are much altered by increase of trade’ and ‘inconsistent 
even with the British acts since the union’, the butchers’ counsel persuaded peers to reverse 
the judgement of the Court of Session and the decision the Convention had supported.
31
 The 
case of the butchers lay on an act of 1695 that meant they could not sell their tallow ‘until the 
candle makers and burgesses of Edinburgh had been served’, and it was this that was 
                                                     
29
 A. Raffe, ‘Presbyterians and Episcopalians: The Formation of Confessional Cultures in Scotland, 
1660-1715’, EHR, 125 (2010), pp. 570-98.  
30
 PA, HL/PO/JO/10/3/206/29, Petition of Members of the Company of Butchers of the Burgh of 
Edinburgh, 11 May 1715; HL/PO/JO/10/6/254/3880(b)(c), Petitions of Butchers and Tallow 
Chandlers of Edinburgh, 19 May and 9 June 1715.  
31
 Corporation of Butchers in Edinburgh: The Appellants Case (Edinburgh, 1715), pp. 1-2; Mayor, 
City Council, and Corporation of Tallow Chandlers: The Respondents Case (n.p., 1715), p. 3. 
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overturned.
32
 The Court of Session had enforced this act previously, ruling in a similar case 
in 1698 that magistrates could set the price of wine, and the decision of the Lords meant the 
price-setting policy of the Edinburgh magistracy was temporarily halted until the 1730s, 
when again the candle makers returned to the Court of Session and lost over the question of 
profit margins.
33
 The Lords had for the medium-term altered the direction of Scottish political 
economy, as it had been set and regulated by the convention.  
Challenging the power of the Convention of Royal Burghs was also the case in a later 
appeal in 1758 to the Lords, one of many that subjected their decisions to British legal 
oversight and challenge. It was held to be the privilege of freemen of the burghs to undertake 
foreign trade in Scotland, which had been confirmed by Scottish acts of 1672 and 1693, and 
by the Lords of Session on several occasions.
34
 There were persistent attempts by unfree 
traders to challenge this from the Restoration onwards, but their attempts to abolish their 
monopoly on the export of salt and leather were defeated in the late 1670s, and the Glorious 
Revolution saw the restoring of the privileges of the burghs.
35
 As in England, smuggling 
would have undermined their effectiveness, but the legal situation went unamended until the 
late 1750s. A dispute between the Burgh of Kirkwall and 110 inhabitants of Stromness, led 
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 PA, HL/PO/JO/10/3/205/29(a), Petition and Appeal of Company of Butchers of Edinburgh, 11 May 
1715. 
33
 W. Gray, ‘The Incorporation of Candlemakers of Edinburgh, 1517-1884’, The Book of the Old 
Edinburgh Club, 17 (1930), pp. 91-142, at p. 103; R. Houston, Social Change in the Age of 
Enlightenment: Edinburgh 1660-1760 (Oxford, 1994), pp. 364-5. 
34
 Decisions of the Court of Session from February 1752  to the end of the Year 1756, Collected by Mr 
Thomas Miller (1760), p. 279; The Petition of Thomas Loutit of Tenston, Merchant in 
Kirkwall to the Lords of Council and Session (Edinburgh, 1758), p. 1. 
35
 T. Keith, ‘The Trading Privileges of the Royal Burghs of Scotland (Continued)’, EHR, 28 (1913), 
pp. 678-90, at pp. 681-2.  
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by John Johnson and Alexander Graham, had seen the Orkney Islands dividing into two 
parties.
36
 The unfree merchants of the town of Stromness sought to challenge the monopoly 
of Kirkwall Burgh, and the Lords determined the burgh could not confiscate their goods, 
enabling Stromness to legally trade overseas. A legal appeal to Westminster, therefore, 
challenged the interpretation of the acts of the Scottish Parliament and the established powers 
of burghs.  
There was a second reason why the case was a question of ‘high interest to the state of 
the burghs’, who spent more than £400 defending their rights.37 This sum was second only to 
the sum expended on procuring a linen act in the same decade, being its most substantial 
spending between the 1730s and the late 1760s. The impact of the appeal was not only to 
overturn the monopoly of freemen of the Royal Burghs of overseas trade, but also the 
collection of taxation in Scotland, the merchants of Stromness exempting themselves from 
taxes collected through the burgesses of Kirkwall. The situation before the union was that the 
land tax was collected from the Royal Burghs in return for their legal monopoly on trade, and 
this remained unaffected by the union of 1707. Lower court cases regarding the payment of 
customary taxes to the burgh had also been fought in the mid-1740s, but failed.
38
 The result 
of the appeal to the Lords was that around sixty unfree burghs went untaxed, with no means 
to seize their goods or limit their economic activity. This remained the case well into the 
1790s, with failed attempts to address the inequality of the tax burden between free and 
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 Decisions of the Court of Session for the Year 1752 to the Year 1768, Collected by a Member of the 
Court (Edinburgh, 1780), pp. 123-4. 
37
 J. Marwick, Convention of the Royal Burghs of Scotland (7 volumes, Edinburgh, 1870-1918), 
Volume 6, p. 523; Municipal Corporations (Scotland) Appendix (London, 1836), p. 16. 
38
 Information for John Johnston and Others, Inhabitants of Stromness in Orkney (n.p., 1744). 
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unfree burghs in legislation throughout the century.
39
 Their legal victory helps to explain the 
low yields of taxation in Scotland in the eighteenth century, and another power of Scottish 
institutions altered after 1707 by Scottish interests engaged at Westminster. 
Edinburgh was one of the common points from which Scottish appeals came, with 
litigants seeking to challenge the decisions of the local magistracy over economic regulation. 
William Paterson, a businessman also involved in the Darien scheme, sued the magistrates 
over the farming of the city’s tax on beer and ale.40 This was a fund used to finance the 
building of harbours and roads.
41
 The appeal resulted from tensions in Edinburgh that were 
unable to be resolved through negotiation with the magistrates; Paterson having ‘repeatedly 
[visited] all the members of council...at the doors of the council chamber’ and their houses, 
arguing his loss of the right was ‘illegal’.42 The lease to farm the debt had instead been 
offered to Sir William Johnson. Magistrates petitioned for an act at Westminster in 1717, but 
the struggle continued into the 1720s between the ‘opposite interests’ of ‘Mr. City and Mr. 
Two-Penny Duty’.43 The Lords of Session were appealed to again in 1721 regarding the 
collection and use of the duty, the dispute continuing to threaten the viability of Edinburgh’s 
finances and its social policy.
44 
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 W. Ward, ‘The Land Tax in Scotland, 1707-1798’, Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, 37 (1954-
5), pp. 288-308, at pp. 292-3; Keith, ‘The Trading Privileges of the Royal Burghs’, p. 688.  
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 PA, HL/PO/JO/10/3/201/13, Petition of Alexander Paterson, 2 February 1712. 
41
 PA, HL/PO/JO/10/6/217/2851(b)(c), Petition of Alexander Paterson and Answer of Magistrates, 
1712. 
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 A. Chambers, Part of the Sequel of the Historical Account of the City of Edinburgh’s Duty on Ale 
(Edinburgh, 1752), pp. 5-7. 
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 CJ, xviii, p. 546; A Historical Account of the City of Edinburgh’s Duty upon Ale and the 
Management of Thereof (Edinburgh, 1752), pp. 18-19.  
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Another appeal from Edinburgh dealt with the interpretation of the acts of union in 
terms of free trade to England on the implementation of a crown patent regulating printing in 
Scotland.
45
 The dispute over the monopoly of printing had its origins in the Restoration, with 
the patent renewed at the death of each monarch. It was established during the reign of Queen 
Anne that the licence to import paper and print official bibles, acts of parliament and other 
government papers, would be shared amongst three printers.
46
 This had only been established 
after a long period of litigation, but the uneasy truce was broken by the removal of James 
Watson from the shared patent at the accession of George I. Watson’s case was upheld by the 
Court of Session and the House of Lords in 1718, being part of a process of achieving greater 
liberty of trade and competition in the Scottish printing industry, and illustrating the 
weaknesses of crown patents in this period. It was held the patentees had the sole right to 
print books, particularly bibles, making English imports into Scotland illegal, but ‘all this 
[was] to be waved, the treaty of union has undoubtedly superseded the patent’, with a ‘free 
intercourse of trade’ meant to be occurring as a result of the fourth article of union.47 It was 
seen as a test case of whether ‘Edinburgh is now a much a part of Great Britain, as Oxford 
was a part of England’, seeking to move towards an English model of printing.48 Peers 
decided the words of the patent that enabled Watson to ‘sell and dispose them in any part of 
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his majesty's United Kingdom or elsewhere’ would be struck out, enforcing the union 
articles.
49
 
Scottish appeals throughout the eighteenth century involved communities, not just 
individuals, and complicates the picture of a Scottish identity relying, in part, on a separate 
legal system. In contrast to the English union with Wales, Scotland retained some of the 
aspects of a sovereign state, but not as far as has been stressed.
50
 Forms of integration were 
sought. The perusal of Scottish aims and interests occurred within a British framework, being 
far from a situation dominated by ‘mutual neglect’. This pace of interaction was unprovoked 
from England, rather advanced by communities and interests in Scotland and ensured the 
institutions that dominated Scotland after 1707 could be challenged, aiding the maintenance 
of a pluralistic politics. But, this was a system that retained a respect for national differences, 
and the pace and nature of change reflected the strength of interests in different kingdoms.  
 
B. English Interests, the ‘County Community’ and Litigation.  
 
In England the ‘circle’ of deliberation was most complete, appellants being able to take 
policy issues from their establishment as customary rights, to the courts, and into statute. Like 
Scottish appeals, local and interest-group rivalries resulted in many of these appeals against 
dominant elites and interests south of the border. The nature of litigation, being demand led, 
meant local or regional identities remained a powerful force in shaping and giving meaning to 
disputes, maintaining political pluralism despite the relative decline of party.  Local 
jealousies continued to be a key cause of conflict during this period, and as will be shown in 
later chapters, interacted with petitioning to ensure those ‘out of doors’ could influence 
politics and the state. As Keith Snell has written, this ‘culture of local xenophobia’ is likely to 
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have been on the increase during the eighteenth century, with state structures conducive to 
the representation of such communities.
51
  
Many cases originated in the desire to move from relations dependent upon custom 
and convention to written law. Counsel in one case stated they had gone to Chancery to 
‘establish customs by decree’, and many of these cases were attempts to move these practices 
from customs existing only in mind, to something that would survive and be enforceable in 
law through the institutional record of the court.
52
 These cases over small sums were often 
about social standing, and a means of highlighting social differentiation based on influence 
over tenants. Andrew Huddleston in Cumberland was one such landowner who attempted to 
maintain his ‘feudal’ rights through several disputes with his tenants. He successfully 
defended his right to collect fines from 400 tenants who had ‘infringed the ancient customs’, 
but his enclosure of lands to compound his cattle was struck down by the House of Lords.
53
 
The appeal had been brought by fifty-four tenants, only two of whom were literate, 
successfully maintaining the access they and their predecessors had ‘from time out of 
mind’.54 Huddlestone also lost a case against another of his tenants, William Todhunter, when 
he attempted to enforce fines and ‘ancient rents and [the] perform[ance] [of] such services... 
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[as the] custom’ dictated.55 The landowner, therefore, largely failed to continue patron-client 
relations and paternalist mode of labour, with the law forming a means to negotiate their 
terms of relations.
56
 The sums at stake were insignificant, and the case was rather about 
authority, with John Mounsey writing that Huddleston was ‘wonderfully offended at it and 
threatens that Mr Huddleston shall yet spend £500 in revenge before the suit rests’, having 
already spent £700.
57
 These disputes were occurring elsewhere in the country. Graziers sued 
Thomas Joyce for ‘damages’ to 123 sheep, who had been confiscated for three days to 
underline their claims to grazing.
58
 The case between Herbert and Le Brune revolved on the 
question of whether duties demanded by the lord of the manor on every tenant were valid, 
arguing they were ‘singled out of the whole lordship’ and the majority of the duties were 
‘acts of kindness done by some tenants...and not obligatory’.59 The respondent’s counsel in a 
case in Yorkshire where the inhabitants were forced to ground their corn in one mill, argued 
‘these poor people are run through the expense by a rich lord’.60 Peers did defend the rights of 
landowners in the case of Ranger v. Ashmead (1702), reversing, but only by eleven votes to 
ten, the decision of the Exchequer that tenants could hold the Lord for trespass if timber was 
cut down on their property, making the tenant subservient to the Lord.
61
 The same trend was 
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present in Scotland, where James Haliday seized the property of David Keltie in lieu of local 
duties, but through the tenants never submitting an answer, no judgement was possible.
62
  
This was also echoed in the large number of tithe cases peers heard. By clergy suing 
over tithes, the gentry were reminded to support the established church. The case of 
Goodridge v. Crossmann (1689) saw William Goodridge appealing a payment of forty-eight 
pounds, having already spent sixty in costs.
 63
 Thomas Dent, a vicar in Lincolnshire, 
successfully defended his right to the ‘ancient modus’ his predecessor had, worth eleven 
pounds a year.
64
 The parson Tench in Sussex unsuccessfully attempted to recover tithes that 
had been ‘quietly enjoyed’ from the vicar on land worth twenty-six pounds each year.65 This 
enforcing of paternalism was also seen in relation to charity and poor relief. The attorney 
general sued Thomas Arnold to ensure all profits from a Northampton estate were sent to 
charity, holding Arnold to his father’s will of 1675.66 A similar attempt was made on the 
behalf of the poor of Harlington. The defendant, Francis Wingate, argued the five pounds 
paid annually was ‘a voluntary gift, and had been employed for mending the clock... [and] 
catching moles’, but his appeal was dismissed and found liable to pay charity.67   
The collection of tithes in Scotland also reflected the trend in England. The division 
of tithes after establishing a new parish in East Lothian led to the minister attempting to 
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recover his original stipend, and he succeeded in ensuring local elites continued to honour 
their commitments.
68
 These cases could create serious disputes at a local level, just as cases 
concerned with liturgy or the status of the established church. Disagreements over tithes to 
the value of three pounds in Montrose found the attorney general arguing ‘the peace and quiet 
of Scotland depends upon [its] determination’.69 The magistrates saw John Scott as pursuing 
his ‘unjust design of lessening the said tithes’, but they were ‘for the sake of peace... willing 
to acquiesce’, the case perhaps reflecting the growth of the English service in the town.70  
Litigation was about maintaining a proactive or responsible landholding class. It was 
perceived by some, including the attorney generals who brought these cases, that the gentry 
must live up to their obligations and act in a trustworthy manner— and it was the Lords, as 
the high court that could defend these conventions. This was reflected in the fact peers 
themselves were sued. The Duke of Devonshire found a mason, Benjamin Jackson, suing him 
‘for payment...[the lack of being] to [the] utter ruin of himself...and of many families 
dependent upon him’, though no further action was taken after it was sent to committee.71 
Several English appeals illustrate the importance of local rivalries to mobilising 
communities to pursue litigation on economic issues. The dispute over the right to hold a 
market between the two Kentish towns of Rochester and Chatham offers an example of how 
peers influenced the wider economy, and that the same local rivalries that motivated 
legislation were also part and parcel of litigation. The case began when Sir Oliver Butler was 
awarded a patent to hold a market which was successfully challenged in Chancery, but he 
appealed to the Lords in 1685. The City of Rochester, particularly its butchers, were afraid 
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the loss of the market would ‘certainly ruin one of the most ancient and loyal city of all 
England’, sending their mayor to wait on peers in support of their cause.72 Others argued that 
20,000 people were forced to get provisions from Rochester, and this would continue if no 
market at Chatham was allowed.
73
 The House of Lords confirmed the judgement given by the 
Lord Chancellor ‘and so that grant was destroyed before any market kept...’74 Neither party 
sought an act to resolve the dispute, and it was only the exhausting of the financial resources 
of Rochester in 1710 that meant they eventually surrendered their cause.
75
 This dispute over 
the holding of markets was also present in an appeal from Hampshire. Ewelme Hospital and 
the Borough of Andover fought over the right to hold Weyhill Fair, to the result ‘the fair...one 
of the most considerable trading fairs in England, will be...diminished’.76 Daniel Defoe 
believed it to be the ‘greatest’ fair kept, with 500,000 sheep sold in one alone.77 This local 
dispute had resulted in ‘tumults’ and counter-petitioning during the Restoration and was not 
resolved before 1689, despite appeals to the crown.
78
 The affair was complicated by Andover 
gaining a new charter under Charles II allowing it to change the site of the fair, resulting in a 
lawsuit in which the hospital and Queen’s College in Oxford, being a patron of the land, took 
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an interest.
79
 Legal disputes occurred at the local assize and Exchequer that found the town 
had no right to move the market.
80
 Once coming to the Lords, peers judged the hospital, ‘who 
during the late wars, infringed the respondent’s rights’, had the right to hold the fair on its 
land and ‘all profits’ from it.81 
A dispute between Carlisle and merchants in Cumberland over the level of tolls set by 
the city also reflected the ability of regions to divide into hostile camps. The appeal 
eventually led to violence, with ‘a beating’ of litigants as the legal proceedings continued.82 
Pressure on the case continued to grow and Sir John Lowther believed the ‘resolving of 
relations with Carlisle’ would have to occur before the impending election in order to 
maintain his control of the parliamentary seat against the farmer of the tolls, Mr Haddock, a 
member of the corporation.
83
 The tolls, raised historically for the defence of traders against 
hostile incursions by the Scots, were attacked as ‘a toll for going on the king’s highway’, but 
both the Exchequer and the Lords upheld the right of the corporation to collect the duty.
84
 
None of these three cases came to legislative ends in this period—they were resolved and 
fought within the legal system, and mobilised the same ‘clash of interests’ as those bills that 
came to parliament.  
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Legal appeals, therefore, covered a wide range of issues. Public and private acts were 
capable of being replaced by litigation, and were.
85
 This allowed the wide range of groups 
engaged in litigation to affect the policies being advanced by social and political elites. Their 
origins meant appeals were an important part of political culture too, capable of creating 
divisions in wider society. But this was not a constantly growing process, but one that 
fluctuated overtime. It is likely that litigation against the central state was strongest in the 
1690s, for two reasons—the relative weakness of the treasury, and that the growth in statutes 
that characterised the eighteenth century was only beginning. 
Attempts by merchants in the lower courts to challenge the policy of the treasury were 
aided by a crisis after 1689 in the lack of personnel to manage and undertake litigation. The 
excise office complained that 
penalties have not been duly adjudged, levied, nor accounted for, [and] nor [has] 
the king had the benefit of the laws from time to time... [with causes] not [being] 
hear[ed] until two or three years after such information [had been] brought [to 
court].
86
  
 
Even in December 1690, a report on the state of cases in the Exchequer expressed the 
‘difficulty, and disappointment, and so little encouragement’, to litigate on the part of the 
treasury and its agents.
87
 As a result of ‘Mr. Guy [the solicitor for prosecuting suits of law] 
absent[ing] himself’ after 1688, ‘there [were] many and unaccountable delays in the 
prosecution of suits at law’, meaning treasury policy (and the acts behind them) was not 
enforced.
88
 This meant the ban on vessels trading with France was not enforced in the courts, 
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with it being ‘apparent all the customs house officers in England for ten years did not 
condemn five’.89 Equally, there were around forty cases dealing with excise duties that still 
awaited judgment in the courts.
 90
  The failure to pursue these cases were said to be the result 
of ‘great neglects and miscarriages, to the prejudice of the revenue’.91 The state of the 
treasury and its weak capacity to litigate meant many policies went unenforced. The lack of 
treasury control over the voting of finance in the Commons during the 1690s, encouraging a 
wider range of projecting schemes and innovations, was paralleled in the law courts. 
Ultimately, the significance of litigation, at least in England and Wales, is likely to 
have decreased, given the ‘great litigation decline’ of the eighteenth century.92 John Brewer 
has shown appeals over the valuation of the excise tax avoided the traditional legal system, 
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and this practice may well have increased as other statutory bodies were created in the 
century—though more research is needed to establish the extent this occurred.93   
 
II: The Decline of English Litigation 
 
On an institutional level, the presence of an active high court had a disruptive impact on the 
lower courts across the ‘British Isles’, for it added another court to which litigants could 
appeal and continue legal disputes. A standing high court meant more legal avenues to 
appeal, but with no streamlining of the lower court system only added to the destabilising 
effects of litigation, both real and threatened, on property rights. This is likely to have 
influenced the decline of litigation and the rise of legislation during this period, as interests 
sought certainty in statute.  
 The increased and stable presence of the Lords necessarily lengthened disputes. The 
uncertainty added by the presence of the Lords meant John and Francis Deye were ‘unable to 
find purchasers, while the order for a new trial hangs over their title’ to lands in Essex, eight 
years after their appeal to the House of Lords.
94
 A dispute over lands in Derbyshire saw the 
house judge the case in 1685, on which landowners acted, only to see the dispute return again 
after the Glorious Revolution.
95
 The case dealt with around 15,000 acres of land in 
Derbyshire and the 1685 ruling had encouraged ‘many persons, hearing that the said decree 
was affirmed by the supreme and definite judgment of this grand judicature...[to] purchase... 
divers quantities of said ground [and] made good improvements thereof'.
96
 The case returned 
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in 1689, and despite winning the appeal, uncertainty had been created. Christine Churches 
has shown the Lowthers of Cumberland were unable to improve disputed lands of the 
Wybergs, another landed family, as a result of competing claimants and creditors acting as 
‘stalking horses’ on the property throughout the seventeenth century. The case was finally 
heard by the Lords in 1699, with ‘the exercise involv[ing] at least sixteen Chancery and 
twelve Exchequer cases’, and despite this, the Wybergs were still in debt.97 This was not the 
case with the longest history, with an appeal brought from Chancery that ran from 1647 to 
1690. The Lords rejected the appeal, so as not to disrupt the ‘several settlements made since 
the decree and marriage’, despite arguments by counsel that ‘redemptions have been [made] 
after a longer time than this’.98 The presence of the Lords necessarily lengthened disputes, but 
it should be emphasised that once a case reached the house it was generally quickly dealt 
with. As shown in the previous chapter, only 162 cases took more than one session to be 
resolved, with ninety percent of cases determined within 100 days and ninety-seven percent 
within two sessions. Lowther’s case was resolved in nine weeks. The House was by early 
modern standards, an efficient court, dealing quickly with appeals in all but the most complex 
of cases, such as those involving fraud, disputed wills, or the jurisdiction of courts, that 
necessarily required time to understand and settle.  
Through cases coming to centre on questions of authority and social standing, rather 
than the property or point of law involved, disputes were lengthened and negative perceptions 
of litigation were strengthened.  We have seen above the hostility between the tenant 
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Mounsey and the landowner Huddlestone. Sir Edward Blackett reckoned if he took a case to 
the Lords it would cost his opponent twenty times the value of the disputed case, using the 
presence of the house as a further layer of the legal system as a threat against proceedings in 
lower courts.
99
 The criticisms of Thomas Baston, a tory printer writing in 1716, that ‘it is 
endless to tell the astonishing instances of the ruin of families for trifles’ taken through the 
‘labyrinth’ of courts, would have fitted the perceptions of many.100  In the manner of Bleak 
House, legal cases could continue for so long as to ensure that lands could not be improved 
out of fear of loss, or costs to run so high as to eliminate all profit. Henry Cary, Viscount 
Falkland, even though he won his case against James Bertie before the Lords, found himself 
‘left in such circumstances that he has nothing.’101 Baldwin Leighton, who appealed to the 
House of Lords in three separate cases for his claim of the office of the fleet, believed one 
case had cost him £2400 for an office with an income of £1000 a year.
102
  Philip Burton was 
harassed by Henry Muschamp for sixteen years in Chancery at the expense of £2000, for a 
debt of the same amount.
103
 
These problems were recognised by peers. From 1693, English and Welsh appeals to 
the house could no longer halt proceedings in lower courts when parliament was not sitting, 
and from 1726 a time limit of five years for appeals being brought up from all courts under 
the Lords jurisdiction was introduced.
104
 A bill was proposed to protect mortgagers against 
redemption ‘often twenty or thirty years after they had been in possession’ and instead for 
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suits to be brought within two years, but the bill was opposed by the judges.
105
 Similar 
proposals had been suggested in Scotland during the 1690s, but also encountered 
opposition.
106  Despite these reforms and the relative efficiency of the Lords, issues of 
uncertainty, cost and length of appeals continued into the mid-eighteenth century. When one 
of his opponents considered an appeal to the Lords in 1747, John Lowther thought ‘such 
proceedings...will make him so detestable; nobody will have anything to do with him’, and 
that an appeal of his own would only reduce his own standing. Appeals were said to have 
been ‘practised by very few,’ and those that had ‘were looked upon as bad as bankrupts’.107 
William Blackstone in his commentaries on English law also criticised the Lords, citing a 
case from Scotland that ran from 1745 to 1749 in the house, believing that ‘no pique or spirit 
could have made such a case in the Court of King’s Bench or Commons Pleas have lasted a 
tenth of that time or have cost a twentieth part of this expense’.108 The case centred on an ox 
worth three guineas. The destroying of both financial and social credit by appealing to the 
Lords created a more hostile attitude to litigation, and is likely to have encouraged the search 
for alternative means of resolution. 
The extent the Lords impacted on the legal system is shown by the high proportion of 
cases it reversed the judgement of lower courts, shown in table four. A reversal rate of 
between twenty-four and forty percent for different parts of the ‘British Isles’ shows a house  
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Table 4: Variation in Reversal Rate of Appeals, 1685-1720 
 
 
‘British Isles’ 
England and 
Wales 
Scotland Ireland 
‘No Action’ 
(Withdrawn/No 
Report/To Lower 
Court) 
193 141 17 35 
Rejected 662 525 60 77 
Reversed 264 184 52 28 
Percentage 
Reversed 
(Excluding no 
Action Cases) 
28.5 25.6 46 26.6 
Source: LJ, xi-xii.  
 
far more active in the legal system than had been the case in the seventeenth century, 
certainly given the lack of reversals before 1667. Although the high rate of reversal in 
Scottish appeals may be explained by use of Scots law and little aid for Scottish litigants, 
with only one instance between 1707 and the 1740s of all counsel being Scots, it is not a 
great deal higher than cases where the judges had decided the case in the courts at 
Westminster Hall and who were sitting as judges in support of the business of the house.
109
 
Equally, once the forty cases from the forfeited estates commission presented in 1719 and 
1720 are taken out, the proportion of reversal in Scottish cases falls to twenty-three percent, 
similar to the proportion of English cases. Only sixty-six cases were determined by division, 
suggesting the reasons for these reversals must had been shared by the house as a whole, and 
presumably not dissented to by the judges or reflecting the lobbying of a particular group or 
individual. This pattern of judgements in Scottish cases remained, with nearly a third of 
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appeals reversed between 1756 and 1793.
110
 I know of no comparative data for the lower 
courts at this time, but a comparison with the House of Lords in the late twentieth century, 
where around a third of cases were reversed between the 1970s and 2000, suggests this rate 
of reversal is not high for the highest court.
111
 
However, the early modern rate of reversal would have been more unusual by modern 
standards because appeals to the Lords in the modern period were chosen because they were 
likely to be wrong or controversial. No mechanism existed for eighteenth-century peers or 
lower courts to select cases other than the writ of error, which provided only twenty-two 
percent of the reversals. Even this was ineffective at restricting business, as the Lords 
declared that ‘a writ of error is not a writ of grace, but of right’ and to refuse one was 
‘contrary to magna carta’.112 The committee for petitions, which could be used to sift appeals, 
also fell into disuse as a tool for managing legal business in the 1690s.
113
 
This meant that in the early modern period peers were reversing cases that later Law 
Lords would not hear, pushing their reach further into the staple subjects of litigation than 
would later be the case.  By reversing such a high proportion of cases, the Lords was active as 
high court, differentiating its functions against the other central courts. In this, they had 
support from judges and litigants. Chief Baron Atkins argued it ‘was work proper for a 
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parliament’ and that the Lords’ role as high court ‘was a legal remedy having been long 
disused and laid asleep and wants a revival.’114 In the case of Smith v. Coleby (1685) counsel 
said the ‘Lords...have a most proper jurisdiction to rectify the mistakes of the judges...in 
Chancery'.
115
 The effect of this, however, was to reduce the ‘certainty of expectations’ that 
property rights required by the house reversing such a high proportion of cases on the wide 
range of appeals it heard—but, in turn, ensured appeal to the Lords was an effective 
mechanism in encouraging political pluralism under a system of agreed rules and 
procedures.
116
 
Peers also increased uncertainty through the specific judgements they came to, 
encouraging a shift towards statute in England. Disputes along rivers reflected local and 
interest-group tensions, given the complex nature of property rights along them. Any 
disruption to the flow of water could disrupt established interests lower down a river—and 
hence peers tended to strike down improvements that potentially impacted on those 
downstream. In the case of Smith v. Welch (1693), Edmund Smith was challenged on his 
right to fish in a stream which he claimed to have enjoyed ‘from time out of mind’. The 
respondent alleged his engine for catching fish obstructed the stream, affecting the 
functioning of their mills downstream. The issue ‘was tried by a special jury of gentleman of 
quality’ who determined they ‘could not grind so much by at least seven [hundredweight] of 
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log wood a week’.117 A case between a creditor and merchant in Surrey saw mills converted 
for ‘working iron hoops which required more water than corn, copper [and] brass’, but the 
law did not support this change of use.
118
 Corporations were also involved in these conflicts, 
with the Dean and Chapter of Durham being sued by the Corporation of Newcastle about the 
right to build wharfs on the river to advance the salt trade.
119
 The dispute was tried in the 
Exchequer in 1697 and was later confirmed in the Lords. Like other cases, the dispute had a 
long history, beginning in the 1640s and reaching the Exchequer once before in the 1670s.
120
 
Because the intention of the law was to defend the immemorial flow of water, the decisions 
of peers were not conducive to river improvement. 
This was one of the factors that forced a shift of projectors from prerogative-based 
improvements to seeking legislative resolution. As will be shown in chapter five in relation to 
petitioning, the numerous land rights and economic activities on a river and the lack of 
definition of ‘water rights’ meant negotiation with a range of interests was a necessary part of 
any attempt to improve navigation. River improvement schemes were further complicated by 
peers weakening the ability to use prerogative powers to pursue them, forcing projectors into 
parliament and the deliberative processes that involved. The need for legislation was not final 
until letters patents were seen as void in a 1694 case, and the powers of the commissioners of 
sewers were defined as insufficient to make rivers more navigable ‘beyond what it was 
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before’ in a lower court case in 1714.121 The rise in legislation after the Glorious Revolution 
was not just because of the increased capacity of parliament, but the legal uncertainty of 
prerogative-based rights. The ruling in Ashley v. Jemmat (1694) encouraged interested parties 
to shift towards statutes. The case, dealing with a patent of 1638 regulating the navigation of 
the Great Ouse came to the Lords twice, once in the 1670s, and again in 1694, with the 
counsel for the appellant successfully arguing that the ‘patent was condemned by the passing 
of an act of parliament...this act has damned and destroyed the patent in 1674’. 122 Investors 
would not wish to ‘sink’ funds into river navigation projects if they could not be certain their 
rights would be protected, and the Lords aided the creation of this uncertainty.  
This attitude towards non-statutory means of improvement was not only found in 
appeals relating to river navigation. The monopoly of groups to undertake overseas trade 
based on royal charters was struck down in Nightingale v. Bridges of 1689, which forced the 
African Company to rely on an act for its monopoly from 1690.
123
 The case between the 
college of physicians and the apothecaries of London in 1704 also offers an illustration of the 
tension over letters patent and older acts of parliament after the Glorious Revolution. The 
case was brought against the monopoly of the physicians to practice ‘physic’, challenging 
letters patents and statutes passed shortly after their granting in the reign of Henry VIII.
124
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The apothecaries had been ‘growing very numerous’ in the 1680s, leading them to demand 
new legal privileges.
125
 Their campaign formally began in 1694 when apothecaries went to 
the City of London to demand recognition of their role, which was followed by lobbying 
peers on a bill. This successfully exempted them from serving in several offices, achieved by 
arguing that apothecaries ‘were more necessary than physicians’ and should be treated as 
equal medical professionals.
126
 This was restated in an act of 1702, but the letters patent took 
precedent until 1704 when peers overturned the decision, allowing an equal right to practice 
‘physic’.  
These three factors of a further court of standing appeal, its high rate of reversal, and 
the weakening of prerogative powers, introduced incentives to pursue a legislative solution or 
avoid litigation (especially if the financial or social resources of the defendant were perceived 
to be sufficiently greater than the appellants). This could have been a cause of the decline in 
the number of English and Welsh appeals, shown in table five. The decline was found across 
all regions, including London. By 1701, fifty-six percent of English appeals to the Lords 
presented between 1689 and 1720 had already been heard. The increasing number of appeals 
from Scotland and Ireland suggest that English interests shifted to legislation, rather than 
their decline being the result of internal factors of the House as a court, such as cost or 
distance. As the average case in the Chancery lasted eleven terms in both 1685 and 1785 if 
depositions were taken (as sixty percent of cases did), the prospect of further litigation in the 
Lords was off-putting.
127
 
Some of the appeals to the House of Lords did end up in legislative form, as we have  
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Table 5: The Decline in the Number of English and Welsh Appeals to the House of Lords: 
Geographical Distribution of Appeals Across Three Decades, 1689-1720 
 
 
1689-1700 1701-1710 1711-1720 
Unknown Location 70 46 7 
Wales 32 14 3 
Midlands 33 13 16 
Norfolk 38 13 11 
North 23 22 6 
Oxford 34 32 11 
West 63 23 17 
London 96 44 20 
Home Counties 48 22 10 
Lancashire Cheshire, Durham 22 13 13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
seen in relation to two Irish cases in the previous chapter, ensuring policy did go through 
several stages of negotiation and challenge. A case brought between the old and new 
governors of Birmingham School in 1691 regarding a new charter for the school and its 
revenue was reversed by the Lords, and was sought to be altered by bill in 1692.  Its 
operation was questioned in a further case in late 1692 after ‘respondents petitioned for a bill  
in parliament... [but] were left to proceed [to a] court of equity’, being kept out of 
possession.
128
 Colonel Leighton, who brought three appeals over the office of the fleet, was 
also petitioning the house on bills which dealt with the question of the inheritance of the 
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office, arguing that the office had already been ‘legally and judicially determined’.129 The 
Borough of Malmesbury, after an appeal against the king, offered a proviso to a bill that 
removed leases made under the burgess who had been excluded from office.
130
 The Irish case 
between the Bishop of Derry and the Irish Society was also put into an act, ‘to confirm and 
settle an agreement that had been arrived at between them’.131 
The greater legal certainty offered by statutes looked even more attractive than 
Chancery decrees after 1689, resulting in the decline of English appeals to the House of 
Lords as propertied society shifted towards acts to settle their estates.
132
 The patent boom of 
the 1690s was short-lived and limited to invention, rather than grander schemes.
133
 The 
opportunity offered by the increased presence of parliament did not automatically result in 
legislative initiatives—non-statutory means to make policy had to be made unattractive, and 
this was a process the Lords performed.  The Lords was not unwilling to interpret statutes, 
with physicians complaining the ruling of peers in Rose v. College of Physicians (1704) was 
tantamount to a ‘break in upon [the act]’ that maintained their monopoly of practising 
physic.
134
 However, as statute law became more positivist and parliament claimed greater 
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sovereignty, the likelihood of reversal (particularly in lower courts) is likely to have become 
rarer.
135
  
 
III: Peers and the Rule of Law 
 
The extent of litigation and its importance meant the peerage was in a central position. This 
meant there was the potential that a ‘common sense’ or bias of the ‘landed interest’ could 
dominate interpretations of the law. If this was the case, then the law would simply become 
another tool of oligarchy and not conducive to meaningful participation and deliberation. 
This threat was certainty present. Edinburgh butchers did appeal to the ‘landed 
interest’, warning that the setting of prices ‘prejudice[d] the gentleman of landed property, 
since it might in a great measure lessen the value of the their estates’.136 Amongst the reasons 
put forward to support physicians over apothecaries was social stability, with ‘many thousand 
poor patients...every year receiv[ing] charitable relief from the college of physicians’.137 
Thomas Brown, in his response to Daniel Defoe’s pamphlet on the case of Ashby v. White, 
which he claimed ‘would persuade the people of England to leave the Commons and depend 
upon the Lords’ saw the peerage as manipulating their dominant position, even in public 
impeachment trials:  
To fact and long experience I appeal, 
How fairly themselves they justice deal.... 
It’s true, a most magnificence parade 
Of law, to please the gaping mob is made, 
Scaffolds are raised in the litigious hall, 
The maces glitter, and the sergeant bawl. 
So long they wrangle, and so off they stop, 
The wearied ladies do their moisture drop. 
This is the court (they say) keeps all in awe, 
Gives life to justice, vigour to the law. 
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True, they quote law, and they do prattle on her, 
What’s the result? Not guilty upon honour.138 
 
The King of Brobdingnag showed a similar concern once Gulliver had described the English 
constitution to him, asking him to explain 
What share of knowledge these lords had in the laws of their country, and how they 
came by it, so as to enable them to decide the properties of their fellow subjects in 
the last resort? Whether they were always so free from avarice, partialities, or want,  
that of bribe, or some other sinister view, could have no place amongst them?
139
 
 
The developments over the last centuries where peers had increasingly gone to law to 
solve disputes under a rule of law were threatened by the fact they themselves now stood in 
judgement as the highest court on an increasing number of cases. One of the fears Scottish 
judges had of litigants appealing to a parliament was that ‘parliaments may seem more 
subject to passion and factions than the [Court of] Session, [as] great men have too much 
influence there’.140 Peers certainly did use their legal business to aid their interest and 
patrons. Peers were brought into the dispute between Chatham and Rochester even before 
instructions to MPs were given in the 1710s, with Edward Clark, rector of Chevening, asking 
the Duke of Dorset to ‘engage...as many of [his] friends as are members of that noble 
house’.141 Although Bishop Atterbury was crippled with rheumatism, he promised in 1721 to 
attend in support of an appeal on the debts accumulated during the building of Blenheim 
Palace, ‘provided I have strength enough to be carried to the House in a Chair’.142 In an Irish 
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appeal of 1706, Lord Digby desired Dartmouth’s attendance at a cause, ‘wherein your bearer 
Mr. Marden is concerned’.143 In the case of the Borough of Andover, their solicitor spent one 
pound ‘attend[ing] some Lords’ during their case.144 Lowther requested the Duke of 
Portland’s support over his case in the House of Lords, asking him to ‘honour my cause with 
your presence, and then I doubt not but it will appear to your lordships as just as it did to my 
Lord Chancellor, and I shall be delivered from a most vexatious man.’145 William Houghton 
recalled that ‘my Lord Halifax by your cousin’s interest was serviceable upon the last 
occasion, but if you have acquaintance with any other you may think fit to make use of 
him.
146
 Scottish peers performed a similar role. Cornelius Kennedy asked William Scott to 
gain assistance from ‘peers of your acquaintance’, especially the Duke of Argyll, ‘my 
neighbour at Kelso’, but eventually writing to all Scots peers and reminding them of their 
undertakings of support closer to the day the appeal was heard.
147
 The costs of appeal also 
opened up opportunities for direct patronage. Bishop Nicolson aided a landowner in his 
county, Andrew Huddleston, to appeal against his tenants, who gave ‘thanks to mitigating his 
costs in the House of Lords’.148 Both as individuals and as a collective, peers were able to 
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forge links with interests and extend a web of patronage across Britain—but potentially at the 
cost of the rule of law.  
Cases also served as proxy-party debates. A case concerned with the lands of a 
protestant heir to a catholic estate in May 1714 swayed in the protestant favour, having 
made some noise because it seemed to be a party matter... [with] the whigs who 
were very zealous to show their abhorrence of popery attend[ing] to a man, and 
several [others]... in prudence did not to care to appear for papists upon any 
account, and did endeavour to prevent a division.
149
  
 
A case was lost by the tory Bishop of Durham as a result of party allegiances, with his 
opponent ‘Sir Harry [Lyddale] [being] zealous for the government’.150 Additionally, the 
appeal of the jacobite Bishop of St Davids saw the House divide over his petition in 1704, 
with tories entering a protest on the rejecting of it and whig peers arguing the Lords had no 
jurisdiction over the issue.
151
 The appeal regarding the lands of the Edinburgh Herriot 
hospital had a physician who was a ‘violent jacobite’, being an Episcopalian critical of the 
Presbyterian church.
152
 Appeals from the forfeited estates commission should also be put in 
this category, but it is important to note both English and Scots appeals were subject to the 
intervention of party strife.  
However, if peers used law for their own interests, being ‘evidently partial and unjust, 
then it will mask nothing, [and] legitimise nothing’, as E.P. Thompson wrote in the 
conclusion to his study of the Black Act.
153
 It is notable that the surviving division lists 
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suggest most peers were not swayed by party or kinship, even in cases when other peers were 
involved.
154
 Several elements limited the capacity or desire of peers or interest groups from 
manipulating the law systematically. One was the diffused nature of enforcement and the 
number of institutions necessary to influence or control interpretation of the law. If an 
‘interest’ wished to dominate the law it was necessary to dominate the process through 
parliament and its committees for an act, then to the lower courts and the House of Lords in 
order to ‘capture’ property rights or a policy.155 The multi-faceted means needed to create and 
enforce a law meant it was more necessary to negotiate after 1688, increasing the likelihood 
of success of other interests and the need to woo them through print and other means. These 
other stages form the remaining chapters of this thesis. 
Structures existed that allowed a desire by one interest group to be opposed by 
another. However, this was not a sufficient condition to maintain a rule of law. As Douglas 
Allen has written, the role of trust was key for the aristocracy to gain consent to rule, they 
having more to lose by cheating than cooperating. Peers invested their income in estates as 
‘sunk capital’ which was protected from expropriation by the rule of law—and to undermine 
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it in the case of tenants or the lowly meant undermining it in theirs too, for if they breached 
their trust in one case, what was the law worth in another?
 156
 Their estates, credit relations 
and customary claims to land or profits rested upon legal judgements and precedents, just as 
the lower orders. One of the commissioners for the Hatfield level was alleged to have said he 
‘did not care for the House of Lords’ and its judgement, and had gone against it.157  Such 
sentiments would only have multiplied if local courts and magistrates began to perceive this 
too, as such attitudes would affect their social standing and local power. The House of Lords’ 
role as high court being the ‘life and soul of the dignity of the peerage of England’, meant 
what they did their affected broader perceptions of their role.
158
 
When they were challenged, both parties appealed to the law as an ideology of equity 
and logic, based on precedent and past experience. Through tying their estates to this logic, 
peers were ‘prisoners’ of the law and their own rhetoric if they wished the law to stand and 
were unwilling to rely on greater forms of force or coercion to maintain their hegemony, as 
this risked increasing the power of the crown.
159
 The discourse of the law and a sense of 
‘justice’ were not closed, with peers judged on the extent they maintained the impartiality of 
the law, and lower courts were criticised in appeals for failing to do so. Litigants appealed to 
the ‘well known rule of law’ and the need to ‘establish and confirm the same in all such 
cases... [otherwise it] will tend to the ruin of many great families’.160 The printing of appeals 
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to the Lords and reports of their proceedings and those of the lower courts, had led to a 
‘commoning’ of the law that meant it was known and understood by wider society who could 
hold some ownership of it.
161
 Precedents ‘locked’ in peers and judges, as their overlooking 
would be to undermine the legitimacy of the judgements of peers. Judges argued ‘precedents 
are very necessary and useful [and it would be] strange and ill, if we should…set aside what 
hath been the course’.162 Precedent was deemed sufficiently important to form part of an 
attack on ‘modern whigs’, they being accused through the alteration of laws on bankruptcy of 
breaking the ‘maxim of heathen Romans that justice ought to be administered in the face of 
sun’. Through their ‘arbitrary will’, it was claimed, whigs had shown ‘no manner of 
regard…to the fundamental rules of equity’.163 When peers decided on cases, precedents had 
to be interacted with even if they were dismissed, as they acted as an ‘authority’ whose 
existence framed decisions. They caused actors to proceed differently than they otherwise 
would have done, creating a degree of constraint through discourse, but not an absolute 
one.
164
 A similar process can be seen with the role of political arithmetic in political 
discourse, examined in chapter four. 
The division between ‘matters of fact’ and ‘matters of law’ further constrained peers. 
Writs of error resulted in cases centring on the question of whether certain ‘facts’ occurred, as 
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was the case in an appeal that was concerned with which parliament Mr Howe had made 
‘scandalous words’ against.165 This meant that when peers judged cases, they were deciding 
whether a certain ‘fact’ was true, rather than the law of the matter. The Lords overturned the 
charter of the college of physicians, because peers defined the nature of ‘physic’ in such a 
way.
166
 The same was true of establishing the existence of customs. Peers had to determine 
whether customs out of mind were actually true and a ‘fact’. These cases would involve 
examination of whether the custom existed, and peers had to determine which set of facts was 
true, not the law of the matter.
167
 The concept of ‘facts’ was well known to participants in 
courts, but also readers of history and literature, and this meant there existed a known and 
understood process of decision-making that was above aristocratic power.
168
 This rhetoric 
was found in appeals from Chancery too, and only very rarely do petitions contain details on 
the precise legal issue at stake, and rather focus on the facts, history and circumstance of the 
case, despite being written by counsel and with judges present to aid peers on the 
interpretation of the law. It was the perception that ‘facts’ were what peers judged the case 
upon, and manuscript records of debates suggest this was the case. In the trial of Lord 
Mohun, Halifax told the house ‘the law is not always to be...equity must be admitted’, 
suggesting there were other determining factors to make the judgement other than the letter of 
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the law.
169
 In Tooke v. Atkins (1692), the house ‘debate[d]... the points of fact, not [having] 
agreed [to] how it was stated by counsel’, believing them to be central to the case.170 
The law was not mechanical, in being applied regardless of circumstance, and often 
peers were judging the facts of an event rather than the law. This was important, for the rule 
of law did potentially conflict with the culture of ‘particular improvements’ which avoided 
raising more general or principled questions in general acts, and was important in avoiding 
‘parliamentary absolutism’.171 Whilst acts of parliament provided ‘improvements’ to limited 
geographical areas in order to avoid raising general questions, legal judgements established 
general principles for future cases. Contemporaries certainly saw the threat, with counsel in 
the case of Macclesfield v. Fitton (1685) arguing the ‘judgement of your lordships is of a 
universal concern, being to introduce a new law to make...havoc of mortgagers’ estates’.172 
But through considering circumstance as well as law, peers avoided the threat of ‘scientific’ 
law and ‘parliamentary absolutism’, but neither were they able deviate too often from the 
discourse of the rule of law and expected outcomes of cases with similar circumstances.  
 
IV: Conclusion 
 
Studies of the House of Lords have argued that it performed a declining role as the early 
modern period continued, sidelining the peerage to become manipulators of elections and an 
economic, rather than a political, force. This chapter shows the Glorious Revolution and the 
subsequent union with Scotland transformed the Lords’ role as high court from an occasional 
point of redress for a small number of litigants, to a standing court with a great geographic 
and social depth to its activity and impact. The Lords made significant interventions in the 
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structures of governing, integrating all parts of the ‘British Isles’ into a multi-layered process 
of decision-making that limited the power of elites and dominant interests. 
This means that legal historians have overlooked a significant disjunction in legal 
structures, with the effective creation of a new court after 1688 that met annually and 
determined cases like the lower courts of Chancery or Court of Session. The presence of a 
high court with a high level of efficiency increased the standing of peers and the extent they 
could influence policy and stability, but increased the ‘cost’ and uncertainty of the 
enforcement and application of the law. There was now a longer, more expensive and 
uncertain legal process, with the Lords reversing more than a quarter of the appeals presented 
to it. If peers and lower courts had not struck down letters patent, charters or customary law, 
making these uncertain means to protect property, individuals and groups would have seen no 
reason to rely on parliamentary, rather than prerogative power. Direct participation in law 
making did not disappear as a result, rather shifting to a different form. As will be explored in 
the following chapters, as legal decisions struck down or limited powers based on these non-
statutory means, those seeking to affect change were encouraged to make policy though 
statute in parliament, strengthening a different form of political culture and ensuring there 
was a circulation of power through different layers of the state. 
Apart from its significance for legal history, this chapter has also explored the role of 
the high court in the functioning of Britain as a composite state. There have been unionist 
‘moments’ in Scottish historiography, though many have stressed the botched, unequal, and 
steamroller nature of the union on Scottish interests.
173
 This chapter demonstrates that some 
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Scots were attempting to place their institutions and society on the same path as those in 
England, and many more who saw appealing to Westminster as a worthwhile act. Support 
and legitimacy for the union were reinforced by a greater number of avenues to advance the 
interests of minorities, and the opportunity for whiggish-minded Scots to overturn the 
perceived feudal nature of Scottish institutions.
174
 This questions the importance of ‘legal 
nationalism’ to Scottish identity, as Scottish law and institutions did not exist in their own 
separate sphere of autonomy after 1707. This sphere was compromised by Scots in the 
eighteenth century through their interaction with British institutions after 1707.  
Litigation in the Westminster House of Lords was an important tool in enabling those 
outside the political and social elite to be effective actors in the political process, able to 
challenge their superiors and the nature and direction of policy—though far more for men 
than women, and English and Scots more than the Irish and Welsh. Legal disputes were 
imbedded in the ‘clash of interests’ and provincial rivalries of this period, reflecting the 
extent the state was ‘porous’ and could be shaped by outside interests. The fact that all groups 
were locked into this system and its discourse created more a reasoned and deliberative 
policy-making process. Partisans could ‘misrepresent’ arguments and others during elections, 
but when it came to the functioning of the state they had to adhere to legal norms of 
reasoning and justification. 
This means the nature of the eighteenth-century state needs to be reconsidered. The 
interpretation of a statute in a court could be radically different from what a reading of that 
act suggests, providing evidence as to the intention and reception of acts that are otherwise 
lost. Once acts had gone through the process of arbitration in parliament between interests, a 
further negotiation occurred as it was enforced. To understand the true totality of what a 
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policy or law meant in reality, necessarily requires a consideration of litigation. Acts of 
parliament were ‘reserve’ powers—they put limits on what could be done, but the extent they 
were actually enforced and used on the ground in practice could vary significantly from what 
a reading of the act would suggest (as has been shown in relation to the ‘bloody code’). 
 This meant there was a national culture of involvement and engagement with policy- 
making. The authority and policies of elites were continually at stake, with the negotiation 
between rulers and ruled a constant feature in society. The Lords was a ‘public’ institution 
that, due to the consequences of the Glorious Revolution and the wars that followed it, was 
‘captured’ and limited by its legal role and legal discourse that ‘checked’ the dominance of 
the landed elite. It was possible for economic resources to be redistributed to the detriment of 
elites, reflecting the presence of a rule of law. The decentralised nature of the eighteenth-
century state meant that no interest group can be argued to control ‘policy’. This was 
primarily not the result of the law itself, but rather the institutional framework which created 
and enforced it. Oligarchic dominance was not complete, but something that could be 
repeatedly challenged and negotiated with, locking those that participated in institutions—
parliamentarians, interest groups and the public—into a structure of law and legal precedent, 
from which they could not easily dominate over other competing voices. Legislation was as 
porous, completing this circle necessary for deliberation—something to which we know turn.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Spectators or Participants? ‘Popular’ Access and Engagement with Parliament. 
 
Nothing is more usual than to print and present to them [parliamentarians] proposals of 
revenue, matters of trade, or anything of public convenience, and sometimes cases and 
petitions. 
 
Andrew Marvell, MP for Hull 1661-1678, in A. Patterson and M. Dzelzainis, eds, The Prose Works of 
Andrew Marvell (2 Volumes, New Haven, 2003), Volume 2, pp. 50-1. 
 
This would be against the known rules of all public shows; where the spectators are always 
more in number than those that make the spectacle. 
 
Lord Poulet on the creation of the Lords Gallery in 1704, in C. Jones, ‘Seating Problems in the House 
of Lords in the Early Eighteenth Century: The Evidence of the Manuscript Minutes’, HR, 51 
(1978), pp. 132-45, at p. 135.  
 
The British state in the eighteenth century was one that was heavily decentralised, where 
considerable initiative lay with those who did not hold political power, and the crown was 
only one of the interests active in policy-making and the enforcement of law. Michael 
Braddick, Phil Withington and others have shown the extent that the growth of the state 
rested upon actors in the localities, whilst historians of the eighteenth century have shown the 
dynamism of local communities, with changes to ‘social policy’ achieved through local acts 
of parliament.
1
 The idea of the late Stuart and Georgian period being dominated by the 
middling sorts and ‘propertied Englishman’ has been well established. In addition, litigation 
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awarded initiative to a wide range of social groups over the power of the state and its 
direction. The participative nature of politics away from the centre has also been established. 
Frank O’Gorman has demonstrated the participative nature of parliamentary elections during 
the ‘age of oligarchy’, whilst many others have explored the growing regularity of 
commentary in politics occurring in coffee houses and print after the Glorious Revolution.
2
 
Early modern Britain had a relatively open political culture, with a substantial ‘public 
sphere’.  
The historiography of parliament, however, sits uneasily apart from this. Our mental 
images of the institution remain dominated by the closed, static, and ordered world portrayed 
in the images of parliament by Peter Tillemans in the reign of Queen Anne—and less of that 
shown in the woodcut of parliament shown in figure four. The occasional actions against 
those who printed records of parliamentary debates and the attempts of parliamentarians to 
maintain ‘confidentiality’ in their affairs have also marked them out from the wider 
participative culture of the state, though historians have increasingly shown the porous nature 
of parliamentary business.
3
 The authority and legitimacy of parliament, it is argued, was 
constructed through elections. Clearly, representative ideas were important to parliament 
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Figure 4: The Happy Return, or Parliament’s Welcome to Westminster (November 1685). The image 
was reused in 1689 in Great Britain’s Glory, or the Protestants Confidence in a Free Parliament 
(1689). The woodcut shows a figure addressing parliamentarians, with a public audience in the 
foreground.  
 
and print culture, with MPs and peers acting on behalf of constituents or interests, but 
participatory mechanisms are an important and underexplored means of how parliament and 
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the central state functioned. 
Considering participatory methods in parliament highlights three important features of 
politics in this period. Firstly, it demonstrates the legacy of the revolution of the 1640s on 
everyday participation in parliament, through print, physical access and lobbying.
4
 Secondly, 
considering the reasons why parliamentarians welcomed the involvement of outside forces 
gives new force to the concept of ‘interest’ to the functioning of the state, not only being a 
means of explaining and imagining society, but also having a direct impact on policy-making 
and encouraging the search for the true ‘public interest’ amongst competing groups. This 
‘clash of interests’ maintained many of the partisan features of the ‘rage of party’, which 
would be built on by the later ‘political’ campaigns of John Wilkes and parliamentary 
reformers. Thirdly, it allows us to examine the extent and means that the wider ‘informal’ 
public sphere interacted with ‘formal’ deliberative political institutions, and show how 
important deliberative institutions were to encouraging wider adherence to impartial and 
‘rational’ norms in political discourse. 
Whether to give greater emphasis to representative or participative modes of politics 
is an issue of particular importance to the Lords, given the absence of the negotiation found 
in the election and selection of MPs to sit in the lower house. The lack of printed material 
compared to the Commons, particularly the absence of printed votes, has meant historians 
have tended to echo contemporaries in implying the Lords ‘do nothing at all’ during 
parliamentary sessions, being isolated from broader political culture.
5
 The effect of these two 
concerns has been to mask the role of the peerage in policy-making and their ability to act as 
a ‘point of contact’ for outside interests. Through focusing on this,  this chapter seeks to 
address the question of the autonomy and separateness of ‘high politics’ from broader 
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political culture, and is, in part, an attempt to ‘bring parliament back in’ to accounts of 
political and print culture.
6
 Parliament has not featured prominently in accounts of political 
culture, which has suggested the audience of print was the broader public; this chapter 
suggests parliamentarians were an important audience and stimulators of such material. Print 
and participation were part and parcel of the everyday functioning of parliament, with the 
increased presence of parliament after 1688 proving a decisive intervention in the nature, 
rhythm and language of politics, and the role of the public in the making of policy.   
In order to redress this imbalance, the primary focus of this chapter is on direct 
engagement with parliament and its business. It considers this via a rising spectrum of 
participation—beginning with physical access to parliament and information coming out of 
the chamber, towards the ability of those ‘out of doors’ to lobby and inform parliament, and 
concluding with formal access to the legislative process through the presence of witnesses 
and lobbyists at committees. These features were not necessarily new—indeed, the intensive 
use of print had a strong precursor in the civil war period, and some, such as committees and 
the use of witnesses, can be traced back the late Tudor period. But their scale, intensity and 
regularity were greater when parliament met annually after the Glorious Revolution, marking 
out a distinct period when parliamentarians and elites sought to ‘manage’ and direct the 
public into deliberative processes and procedures to create stability and resolve partisan 
disputes.
7
  
                                                     
6
 As Braddick advanced in relation to the state in his State Formation in Early Modern England, p. 8. 
7
 For earlier print culture, see Peacey, Print and Public Politics, especially Parts 2 and 3, and his 
‘Print Culture and Political Lobbying During the English Civil Wars’, PH, 26 (2007), pp. 30-
48. For committees and witnesses in the late Tudor period, see D. Dean, Law Making and 
Society in Early Modern England (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 137, 148, 151. For the development 
of committees in the Tudor period, see M. Graves, “[B]y Committinge of a Bill of the Howse 
137 
 
These processes may strike us as unsurprising aspects of parliamentary business, 
parliament being a forum where external parties could pursue argument and policy, but the 
social groups present, the arguments they made, and their ability to be participants as well as 
spectators, was not inevitable—and is still not, with concerns about the ‘fall of the public 
man’ and the heavy regulation of access to the Palace of Westminster today.8 The explosion 
of legislative activity and the greater predictability of parliamentary sessions after 1688 
increased the frequency and regularity of access, whilst the intrusion of the language of 
‘interest’ from the mid-seventeenth century meant the nature of political debate was different 
on a qualitative level. Reflecting the tolerant attitude and needs of parliamentarians, the role 
of participants as credible witnesses and lobbyists increased, and their engagement 
regularised during this period. Together these issues highlight the extent that parliament, like 
the state, was a recourse ‘for all social groups...to be used by one class against another’.9 The 
control of knowledge of events within it was not limited, rather growing outside the 
boundaries of government and parliamentarians, with an increasing ‘lay’ audience for its 
proceedings—who significantly became more than just spectators, but active participants. 
The effect was a lack of division between state and society, with the activity of the state a 
combination of the efforts of office-holders, projectors, and interest groups as part of a 
culture of shared ‘governance’, rather than directed from a defined ‘government’. 
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Richard Ross in his ‘Commoning of the Common Law’ asked who knew, could 
know, and was supposed to know the reasons, fictions and judgment of the law?
10
 This 
chapter is designed to ask these questions in relation to parliament, in order to show it 
‘belonged’ to a wide part of the political nation. This meant that policymaking was relatively 
open and responsive, and those that attended could come from a range of social groups.  
 
I: Creating an Audience: Physical Access to Parliament and the Recording of News 
 
One means to examine the form that increasing public access and activism took is to explore 
the possibilities of physical access to the Palace of Westminster. Although Chris Kyle and 
Jason Peacey have shown that between the early Stuart period and the Restoration public 
access was possible, little has been written on the physical presence of the public to 
parliament during the ‘long eighteenth century’, despite its centrality to lobbying and the 
diffusion of knowledge of its proceedings.
11
 Many of the features present in the 1640s were 
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continued and public access was increasingly regularised and adopted into the procedures of 
parliament, parliamentarians seeing participation as an inevitable part of their business. 
It is perhaps tempting to read back the current inaccessibility of parliament, assuming 
that peers and MPs in the pre-democratic age were more restrictive than their modern 
equivalents. However, the ‘historicization’ of the Palace of Westminster is a modern 
phenomenon and has removed the extent in the early modern period it was a living building, 
part of the rhythm of daily life and accessible to all.
12
 Since the late nineteenth century the 
senior law courts have been removed, committee rooms and offices moved to a purpose-built 
office building at Portcullis House, the use of Westminster Hall restricted to ceremonial 
occasions, and security barriers erected. Despite the standing orders of the eighteenth century 
that banned all but peers and their servants from entering the lobby and the chambers of the 
two houses, the attitudes of parliamentarians to the presence of ‘strangers’ were far more 
open in practice. Far from the Restoration settlement, in particular the Tumultuous 
Petitioning Act of 1661 or the later Riot Act of 1715 resulting in a closing down of access to 
lawmaking, either with regard to petitioning or knowledge of events in parliament, physical 
access to Westminster was a growing trend. 
The commonality of access to the Palace of Westminster is important not only for 
Habermasian notions of the ‘public sphere’, in terms of providing a space for the ‘public’s 
use of their reason’, but also the role spaces have in the creation of civic activism and their 
enabling of participatory processes of policy making.
13
 The ability of citizens and interest 
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groups to influence politics was reliant on their easy and free access to sites of decision-
making, such as Westminster Hall.
14
 This was of particular significance for citizens of 
London, who through public access to the hall had a significant point of contact with 
parliamentarians. But as Tony Wrigley estimated, a sixth of adults had direct experience of 
London at some point in their life, suggesting this was important far beyond those who 
inhabited the metropolis, not to mention those who arrived for the opening of parliament or 
the ‘London season’.15 Although it is not the intention of this chapter to argue the ‘spatial 
turn’ needs to be more widely applied to the study of history, it nonetheless highlights issues 
of significance for the functioning of politics, namely the need for such spaces for the 
diffusion of ideas and interaction with parliamentarians, and reflective of changing 
expectations about accessibility and participation in governing.
16
   
This section will consider the possibilities of public access of the areas around 
parliament, beginning with Westminster Hall, and gradually moving up and into the 
chambers themselves. A map of the Palace of Westminster may be seen below. The majority 
of the public would have entered parliament through Westminster Hall, an expressly public 
space. The hall played a crucial role as the ‘cockpit’ for political culture, being a physical 
space in which many could congregate, comment and collaborate on policy-making. It was  
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Map 2: Plan of the Palace of Westminster in the 1640s 
 
From J. Adamson, The Noble Revolt: The Overthrow of Charles I (London, 2007), p. xxi. This is only 
a conjectural plan for the early modern period, with no reliable plans existing. A more detailed plan of 
the Palace can be seen in Nicolson, Diaries, pp. 70, 82. 
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the site of public spectacle, with the trials of Henry Sacheverell and Lord Derwentwater and 
parading of Titus Oates occurring in the hall. During the trial of the Seven Bishops in 1687, 
the hall ‘thronged with an infinite number of people’ who gave ‘loud shouts and joyful 
acclamation’ to them.17 By 1712, 160 battle standards from the War of the Spanish 
Succession were displayed in it, whilst heads of the regicides were placed on spikes within it, 
being blown down in the great storm of 1703.
18
  It was impractical to ban public access in 
this space—Westminster Hall being the site of the courts of Chancery, Exchequer, Common 
Pleas, and King’s Bench, which meant there was a constant throng of lawyers and litigants. A 
dispute between Reginald Marriot and Lord Wharton saw more than seventy witnesses 
appearing one day, with the Court sitting late into the night.
19
 Large numbers attended the 
trial of the plotters against William III in 1696, shown in figure five.  
The Hall was also part of the rhythm of daily London life. Its forty-two shops—some 
of which can be seen in figures six to seven—sold a variety of ‘knickknacks’, including 
prints, books, hats and toys, to women and men alike.
20
 Grubstreet books were also sold and  
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Figure 5, above: Extract from the Triumphs of Providence over Hell, France and Rome (1696) 
Figure 6, below: The First Day of Term: Westminster Hall (1758, republished 1797/8) 
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Figure 7, above: From One House to Another (18 February 1742), BM Number 1868, 0808.3691. In 
the background are two stalls—‘Deards from St. Dunstans’ selling trinkets and ‘Dent's Snuff Shop’. 
Figure 8, below: Extract from The Merry Campaign, or the Westminster and Green Park Scuffle, A 
New Court Ballad (1732) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
God prosper long our noble peers, 
And eke our Commons all, 
A woeful scuffle late there was, 
Near litigation hall. 
.... 
The peer enraged, returned the same 
Full fraught with fury dire, 
His breast glowed with indigent shame, 
To be drubbed by a squire. 
 
Then thwick thwack fell the blows like hail, 
On head, back, sides, and all 
Good lord: how echoed then the rooms, 
Near litigation hall. 
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shared.
21
 This was an old practice, with a boy ‘that sold papers and printed books’ killed in 
1556 after being hit ‘under the ear with a stone’ in the hall.22 ‘Gaming’ also occurred there.23 
An Indian man was said to have been ‘surprised to see in the same place...baubles and toys, 
and the other [side] taken with the fear of judgement’.24 The fact the Palace of Westminster 
had multiple uses aided accessibility, as the shops and courts made parliament seem more 
approachable and less isolated from wider society. The hall was clearly ‘open to the entire 
world’ and attempts to add guards to police addressers were refused by the Commons, being 
‘not the way to make friends for the king’.25   
As a result of this ease of access, the hall was a site of news-mongering and political 
lobbying, with information flowing quickly out of the two houses. Lobbyists, including 
catholics, clothiers and fishmongers, paced the hall whilst waiting for committees. 
Occasionally tensions between witnesses were raised, with one witness ‘threaten[ing] to stab’ 
others and fights broke out between members of both houses in the hall, illustrated in figure 
eight.
26
  It was also a site for more radical groups seeking to influence events. During the 
Convention of 1688 republicans ‘dispersed papers for establishing a commonwealth’ in the 
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painted chamber.
27
 Pamphlets over the Bangorian Controversy on the nature of church 
government could also ‘be found in Westminster Hall’, with a ‘loud and successful’ debate 
occurring there during the late 1710s.
28
  It was one of the ‘four cardinal corners’ of news in 
London where the ‘best news was made’, though Charles Davenant did describe the ‘false 
news invented there’ in 1701.29 A little further from the chamber, the court of requests was 
also an important point of news gathering. The Countryman was able to gain information 
from people there at the time of debates on the union, whilst the Observator ‘heard the same 
thing from other hands’.30 Ralph Bridges ‘with much difficulty, screw[ed] out of Sir Gibert 
Dolben’ proceedings in the House of Commons on the public accounts in the same place.31 
The hall eventually lost these functions. Coffee houses and public houses were 
removed to New Palace Yard in 1806, having been ‘long complained [of]...as defacing and 
disgracing the great north entrance to Westminster Hall’, the space being taken up with the 
records of the Court of Exchequer.
32
 Excluding the temporary removal of shops for 
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coronations and trials throughout the medieval and early modern period, booksellers seem to 
have become absent from the hall by the 1780s, whilst the law courts were gone by the 
1880s.
33
 In 1884, the tradition of open public access was ended as a result of the Fenian 
bombing campaign. Under pressure in 1894—with some MPs echoing the ancient demand to 
allow the public to present ‘monster petitions’—the public were allowed in for six hours on 
Saturday and at other times when the houses were not sitting, but the free and unrestricted 
access of the early modern period was gone.
34
 
In the early modern period the public could penetrate further into parliament itself, 
though the ‘seasonal’ nature of their attendance should be noted here. Forming ‘bookends’ to 
parliamentary sessions were the speeches delivered by monarchs, an event which drew great 
crowds. Bishop Nicolson noted the house was ‘so crowded with ladies and other strangers, it 
was indifferent in what we appeared’, when Queen Anne addressed both houses in 1702.35 
After a great number of people attended the Lords when the Queen was present in 1703, 
peers asked Christopher Wren to design a scheme to ‘prevent the great inconveniences of 
crowds’, not choosing to simply ban their presence.36 
Parliamentarians increasingly formalised the ability of lobbyists and petitioners to 
come to their lobbies, reflecting the expectation that large flows of people to both houses was 
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an inevitable result of its business. Parliamentarians provided a ‘skeleton’ of future business, 
most notably through the Commons printing its votes, but also gave advance notice to 
petitioners. The Commons ordered that ‘no petitions be received after ten o’clock in the 
forenoon’, establishing a ‘petitioning time’ each day.37 Appeals were also to be heard ‘as the 
first business after twelve of the clock, and no other matter [was] to intervene’.38 These 
developments made participation easier and highlights important changes in the attitude of 
parliamentarians towards informing and fostering the involvement of outside interests. Both 
houses informed petitioners of its orders by displaying them on their own doors or those of 
the courts of Westminster Hall, underling its closeness to the two houses and the acceptability 
of the public in the lobbies.
39
  
This process was not new in the 1690s, with these orders also present during the 
Restoration, but there was a more intensive attempt to organise and inform participation after 
1689.
40
  The orders of the Lords that all legal appeals should be introduced within fourteen 
days of a start of a session, most likely in November and first ordered in 1678, was applied 
more strictly after the revolution.
41
 This meant those appearing for legislative business came 
to the Lords in February and March when legislation came up from the Commons, helping to 
control both levels of business and influence the profile of participants present at different 
times of year. Scots would come to London towards April after the Court of Session had 
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risen.
42
 Appeals were also restricted to three days of the week.
43
 Partly these changes were 
about increasing the efficiency of the two houses, but in doing so they made parliament more 
useful to a wider range of interests and increased opportunities for public involvement. What 
this meant was hostile reaction to the presence of the public near both houses was primarily 
limited to moments when their participation became violent—something that will be explored 
further in relation to the Tumultuous Petitioning Act of 1661 in chapter five. 
It was also possible for lobbyists and visitors to hear debates in the chambers. The 
committee on the London Orphans Bill of 1691 saw ‘enquiry [being] made at the door 
whether any attend to be heard’, suggesting it was normal to listen.44 Philip Floyd, who did 
not appear formally at the committee on the Popish Plot in 1679, did hear some of the letters 
relating to it being read.
45
 The events of 1688/89 drew considerable interest. John Evelyn 
heard the debate in January 1689 on the succession by placing himself ‘by the prince’s 
lodgings at the door of the lobby to the house’.46 The dissenter Roger Morrice was also able 
to watch proceedings the next month.
47
 His references to Lord Delamere ‘who always spoke 
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with great vigour’ and the Earl of Lincoln, who ‘also spoke (who does not use to do so)’, 
suggests he was a regular viewer of proceedings and was knowledgeable of the habits of 
individual peers. Spectators were common in more ordinary matters too, with an appeal 
witnessed by Samuel Pepys in May 1664 seeing a ‘great crowd, from ten o’clock till almost 
three’ listen to a case in the Lords.48 A Norfolk squire was also able to ‘place himself so well 
at the door of the House of Lords’ in 1714.49 Women were also present. Sarah, Duchess of 
Marlborough, followed debates in 1739 when she ‘bore the buffets of the stinking crowd 
from half an hour after ten till five in the afternoon’.50 The trial of Lord Oxford in 1717 also 
saw ‘some of the great ladies come to the bar of [the] Lords to hear the debates’, and there 
was a ‘great attendance’ of ‘ladies in distress’ to petition in support of the jacobite Earl of 
Derwentwater in the same year.
51
 Not all were impressed by what they saw, however. The 
author of The Interest of England as it Stands in Relation to Ireland (1698) wrote that he had 
‘come into the House of Lords....when your Lordships were hearing counsel’, motivating him 
to write his pamphlet to improve the quality of debate.
52
 A west country squire who also 
visited the House of Lords ‘neither heard nor saw anything remarkable, but some folks in odd 
habits’.53 
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Access to the chamber of the Lords was for a brief time regularised in this period, 
increasing opportunities for formal access. Wren’s solution to the ‘great concourse and 
crowds of persons’ who arrived to see Queen Anne was the construction of a gallery that 
consisted of four benches, and was present between 1704 and 1711.
54
 Although created in 
response to demand to view the monarch, it was used throughout parliamentary sessions to 
view debates, and occasionally to drop papers into the chamber.
55
 Access was relatively free, 
with Peter Wentworth, the brother of Lord Stafford, writing ‘I knew I could get in with them 
[MPs] without troubling any Lord’.56 The writer Abel Boyer also used the gallery and had 
been sent debates and speeches by others who had been there, sometimes written by ‘three 
hands’.57  During the debate on Spanish affairs in 1711, Boyer had the ‘happiness’ to be one 
who stayed to watch the ‘remarkable debates’.58  
The pattern in the attitudes of peers towards public access to the chamber is an uneven 
one and could change several times during the same session; strangers being excluded and 
included in the same week, presumably reflecting the sensitivity of the issues being discussed 
and relations between the two houses. Whilst Peter Wentworth had been able to hear the 
Queen in January 1712, when ‘the Lords and we intruders waited’, later the same month he 
wrote ‘they have much a stricter order....there’s no getting into the House of Lords to hear 
their debates’.59 By February he was able to be ‘an eavesdropper at the door...and have stayed 
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so long to hear how matters went there that I cannot post you the particulars I have 
gathered’.60 Ralph Bridges had the same issue in May 1712 when he was not able to get into 
debates that he usually expected to view.
61
 But even when ‘the Lords won’t admit any body 
to hear their debates’, news still came out. Wentworth ‘gathered it from the third and fourth 
hands’ with the problem being that ‘one tells it one way, another another way’, rather than 
silence.
62
 Neither were these restrictive actions necessarily against ‘strangers’. One order that 
‘nobody should come into the house but lords’ was a response to the ‘great many’ MPs there, 
whilst the removal of the gallery may be linked to complaints it made the house dark.
63
 The 
fact that it was briefly resurrected between 1737 and 1741 also suggests a lack of a general 
principled objection.
64
 Nonetheless, whilst it was present the gallery proved useful to 
outsiders through increasing ease of access, but its removal was not fatal—at least to non-
political reporting and knowledge of proceedings.  
Although getting into parliament to view proceedings or to lobby was relatively 
unhindered, the flow of more politically-explicit material out of the house was more 
restricted.
65
 The reporting of parliamentary debates was explicitly banned, resulting in the 
famous ‘printers case’ of 1771, but blanket secrecy was not the practice. The access to the 
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lobbies and chambers meant printers and lobbyists could react to events in parliament. The 
printing of some speeches was possible, if relatively rare before 1720. The conference of 
February 1689 was reported by 'Mr. Blaney [who was] in a private place to take down all that 
was said.’66 He had earlier recorded the trial of the Seven Bishops.67 The notes of a peer in 
1688 found their way to Laurence Echard, John Oldmixon, Matthew Tindal, James Ralph and 
James Macpherson, who used them to write accounts of the period.
68
 Abel Boyer, whose 
Political State of Great Britain published many speeches of peers (though with names 
redacted), met with others in the ‘lobby of the House of Lords’ to ‘produce a few written 
lines’ for his books there.69 He had also been in the Commons lobby, where an MP ‘beat him 
I suppose for some of his old faults’.70 This was not just the case for the main chambers, but 
also at committees, with Bishop Nicolson noting a ‘newsmonger’ was detected at one.71  
At the centre of the debate over parliament’s relationship with print culture is the 
absence of printed votes from the Lords. Whilst the Commons printed its votes continuously 
from 1689, the Lords were far slower in this respect, not beginning to print its journals until 
the late 1760s. We should not ignore manuscript circulation, however. In 1707 a committee 
of peers uncovered the circulation of its manuscript minutes. The testimony of witnesses 
shows at least seven coffee houses in London sold or made available manuscript copies of the 
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Lords minutes for two pence, for ‘every day the house has sat this session’.72 It was also 
available to individual subscribers. The activity had been going on for some time, as one of 
the several writers had made it his livelihood, getting fifteen or sixteen shillings a week 
during sessions of parliament.
73
 Even without this activity the manuscript journals themselves 
were also circulated and accessible, well before their printing in the 1760s, though they do 
underline the importance of the interested party having a physical presence or contact in 
London. The Earl of Orrery  ‘bequeathed to Oxford all his library, except the journals of the 
House of Lords...which he left to the present earl his son’ when he died in 1731.74 Humphrey 
Wanley noted in his diary in 1724 that he ‘has a completed set of the journals of the House of 
Peers...to the dissolution of the last parliament, all fairly and regularly written in one hundred 
volumes’.75 Samuel Molyneux saw the ‘journals of both Houses of Parliament’, which were 
owned by Mr. Dale, a London clothier, as early as 1712.
76
 A book catalogue printed in 1764 
recorded that between two reverends, the accounter-general, a surgeon, and ‘many others 
lately deceased’, were a journal series of the Lords from 1660 to 1740 and one from the 
1540s to the 1740s.
77
 By the ‘interest of Mr S-, a bencher at the Temple’, one writer was able 
to carry the journals held in the Temple library to his own house, whilst the author of the 
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opposing tract had ‘only pursued [them] by snatches at the library hours’, suggesting law 
libraries had good collections of the journals.
78
 
 The historical availability of Lords journals was certain, and it is likely contemporary 
availability was also possible. In 1722 the City of London said it was ‘by the inspection of the 
journals of this House [of Lords]’, that they had resolved to petition.79 Clothiers and 
gentlemen of Chard in Somerset wished to be heard at the same time as others they learned 
had petitioned.
80
 The references to the learning of events in parliament by lobbyists or 
petitioners were generally indirect references to the journals and votes, being ‘informed’, 
‘hearing’ or ‘finding the bill’ in the Lords, but are nonetheless signs they were learning and 
reacting to events in the Lords as they occurred.
81
 The local nature of much legislation would 
have supported greatly this process, the initiators and opponents of bills being found in the 
same locality, aiding the understanding and knowledge of any policy proposals and how far 
advanced they were.  
Public understanding of the progress of bills and litigation was also improved by the 
increasing use of print in their passage. Whilst early Stuart parliaments had, at least in theory, 
banned the printing of petitions, the legacy of the print revolution of the 1640s can be found 
in the use of print in everyday parliamentary activity.
82
 In 1705 the Commons ordered that all 
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private bills had to be printed before their first reading, later made a standing order in 1722 
for both houses.
83
 The Lords, meanwhile, had ordered that petitions on legal appeals should 
be ‘published in print, to the end that all persons concerned may take notice thereof’.84 But 
neither house specified how many copies were required, allowing lobbyists and litigants to 
include an appeal to the public in their campaigns for redress. The legal dispute between the 
physicians and the apothecaries of London saw the physicians printing 500 copies of their 
case.
85
 Another case saw 460 sheets delivered, both being more than the membership of the 
House of Lords.
86
 This was also the practice with legislation. The Duke of Rutland’s bill of 
1717 had 500 copies printed, and London curriers printed 300 Cases, then 850 copies of their 
Reasons for getting a drawback on leather duty.
87
 In order to support its petition, the Russia 
Company ordered 300 cases to be printed for presentation to peers.
88
 Commissioners 
undertaking the navigation of the River Weaver printed 400 copies of their case to give to the 
doorkeepers of the Lords.
89
 These developments echoed the practice of the 1640s when the 
Commons had ordered cloth workers to print their petition because the ‘business [was] of a 
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general concernment’.90 This legitimation of a parliamentary-centred print culture did create 
some tensions—the MPs John Milward and Andrew Marvell both complained the 
presentation of papers was ‘too frequently done’, but in 1667 a motion to ban the presentation 
of such papers at the door of the Commons was defeated, and print remained an important 
everyday feature of parliament.
91
  
This printing of appeals as single sheet also aided the promulgation of the decisions 
the Lords made as a high court. Historians have argued that the absence of printed collections 
of Scots appeals ‘allowed the Court of Session to ignore the Lords decisions as precedents’.92 
However, four aspects suggest the house was less ‘closed’ than argued. The first was the 
small number of lawyers active in the house. Relevant information could be distributed 
quickly, with the number of counsel actually falling from twenty-four to twenty-one between 
1680 and 1720, despite the explosion of business after 1689.
93
 
The second factor was the order of peers that appeals should be printed when they 
were presented. This meant there was a potential for them to be collected and sold to 
outsiders. Robert Wodrow wrote to the MP Sir Robert Pollock for papers relating to the 
Greenshields appeal, asking him ‘to pick them up in the streets for me’.94 By the 1760s, one 
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of the doorkeepers had collected ‘a set of private acts, in ten large volumes’.95 The extra 
copies were collected by house officials ‘who sell them in lots every session’.96 The Duchess 
of Marlborough in 1739 used ‘an officer who belongs to the House of Lords’ to bring her 
papers, suggesting those with contacts could follow these proceedings in detail.
97
 Single 
sheets of appeals could be brought, with a continuous run between 1729 and 1753 being sold 
in the 1760s.
98
 In the 1740s, another catalogue advertised bundles of appeals, with several 
sets running from 1716 to 1742, one of which had been owned by one of the masters in 
Chancery.
99
 Abridgements and alphabetical accounts of Lords appeals were produced.
100
 
Scottish appeal cases were also part of this circulation. The library of the Scottish Faculty of 
Advocates in 1744 had records of cases heard before the Lords between 1734 and 1739, ‘with 
a full and proper index’ to earlier manuscript cases.101 The library also had a table of cases 
heard by the Lords since 1701 in two volumes, and a five volume work detailing appeals 
between 1772 and 1785, acquired later in the century.
102
 Standing orders relating to appeals 
were also printed in Edinburgh and London in the late 1720s.
 103
  
                                                     
95
 Osborne, The Catalogue for the Year 1764, p. 82.  
96
 Method of Proceeding in Order to Obtain a Private Act of Parliament (1767), p. 21.  
97
 Jones and Harris, ‘Sarah Duchess of Marlborough’, p. 259.  
98
 Osborne, The Catalogue for the Year 1764, p. 420.  
99
 idem, A Catalogue of Thirty Thousand Volumes of Several Libraries Just Purchased (1749), p. 20. 
100
 idem, The Catalogue for the Year 1764, pp. 83-4, 290. 
101
 J. Pinkerton, ed, Minute Book of the Faculty of Advocates, Volume 2: 1713-1750 (Stair Society 32, 
Edinburgh, 1980), p. 198. 
102
 Appendix to the Catalogue of the Advocates Library (Edinburgh, 1787), p. 5.  
103
 Orders Relating to the Bringing and Proceedings on Writs of Error and Appeals in the House of 
Lords (1728). This was reprinted in 1734 and 1739 in London and Edinburgh respectively. 
159 
 
Thirdly, members did see a purpose in printing cases, especially those relating to the 
law. Chief Baron Atkins feared the consequences of ‘having few or no reports of cases 
adjudged in the supreme court, since those that are printed by Ryley’ in 1698.104 These 
collections were actively used by peers to aid their judgements, with Bishop Nicolson 
discussing with Dr Gibson ‘Sir Bartholomew Shower’s reports from the House of Lords’.105 
Shower’s work was not the only account, with cases appealed to the Lords from the Court of 
Chancery printed in 1701 ‘with a variety of useful precedents throughout,’ whilst Praxis 
Alma Curia Cancellaria, a selection of ‘cases of great difficulty’ heard by Chancery and the 
House of Lords ‘for more than thirty years past’, was printed four times between 1704 and 
1725.
106
  
The establishment of the provincial press during this period and the local origins and 
context of much legislation also aided the diffusion of knowledge of events in parliament. 
Newspapers such as the Ludlow Postman gave advance warning that the house was to ‘hear 
others on Saturday’ on the Weaver Navigation, allowing other groups to organise in 
advance.
107
 Committee meetings were also reported. The same paper in 1720 reported on 
‘John Gurney, a Quaker, [appearing] for those of Norwich’ alongside others in a committee 
examining the state of manufactures, providing for its readers ‘an account of what was said at 
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the bar of the House of Commons’.108 The role of provincial newspapers in encouraging 
petitioning will be examined in greater depth in chapter five, but they were an effective 
means of supporting participation in debates on the many local bills of the period.   
The Lords should be seen as ‘half-closed’ in this period. What peers and MPs feared 
from print was its use to distribute parliamentary debates, which would turn them into 
‘delegates’ and increase personal accountability, weakening their own ability to deliberate. 
This is why parliamentarians attempted to restrict printing of events in parliament, in order to 
maintain the ‘freedom...for his free voting in parliament’.109 A desire for collective or 
institutional ‘accountability’ meant that action against printers was focused against those 
printing proceedings and lists of votes, such as a list of peers ‘fit for the pocket’ on the 
Sacheverell case.
110
 This echoed the practice in committees, with witnesses withdrawing 
when the act of voting occurred and only told the decision of the committee as a whole.  
This situation meant that the reporting of parliamentary debates remained an 
uncommon and controversial feature in this period. However, parliamentary deliberations on 
legislation could be accessed by a wide range of interests in a relatively low-cost manner.  
Although many of the changes outlined above can be interpreted as attempts by 
                                                     
108
 Ibid, 29 January 1720, Issue 17. 
109
 PA, HL/PO/JO/10/1/401/461, Petition of Earl of Anglesey, 19 June 1685. 
110
 Evening Post, 7-9 December 1710; Knights, Politics and Opinion in Crisis, 1678-1681 
(Cambridge, 1994), p. 182. For examples of action taken against printers, see Orange Gazette, 
1-5 February, 5-8 February; 8-12 February 1689; PA, HL/PO/JO/10/1/403/10(d), The Names 
of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, Who Deserted (Not Protested) Against the Vote in the 
House of Peers, 11 February 1689; LJ, xiv, p. 123; The Names of the Lords Spiritual and 
Temporal Who Deserted (Not Protested) Against the Vote in the House of Lords…Against the 
Word Abdicated (1689); A List of the Lords That Entered Their Protests Against the Vacancy 
of the Throne, February 7 1688 (1689), was also published. 
161 
 
parliamentarians to manage their business and the demands of ministers, or the inevitable 
consequence of parliament being a ‘legislative marketplace’, the way that print or physical 
access was managed suggests that there was an expectation that all groups were entitled to a 
voice or presence at Westminster. Seemingly low-level participation and the use of print 
enabled the public not just to spectate, but participate in the business of parliament. Further 
reasons for this will be explored in the second half of this chapter, but now we must turn to 
consider some of the ways that people became active participants in governing.   
 
II: From Spectators to Fellow-Legislators: Lobbying Parliament 
 
The explosion of print in the late Stuart period was not solely result of the lapsing of the 
Licensing Act in 1695, but changing political structures.
111
 Due to the presence of parliament, 
the need to lobby and convince a larger public audience, rather than a court centred polity, 
was increased. The use of print affected the political process, helping to alter the shape and 
pattern of political engagement, and provided a lost-cost means for individuals and 
disenfranchised groups to put pressure on parliament.  
 Beyond the official and semi-official documents which were ordered to be created at 
the behest of the house and then circulated more openly, were documents presented to the 
Lords that served to comment on or influence events occurring within the house. An 
important focal point and motivator of print-culture after 1689 was the business of the two 
Houses of Parliament, print being a means to inform and convince parliamentarians and other 
participants. Many pamphlets were printed with the aim of reaching the widest possible 
audience within parliament, not the wider public. Pamphlets on economic issues were 
presented to committees, whilst copies of petitions and proposals were ordered by peers to be 
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spread amongst the counsel present at the leather bill committee in 1689.
112
 Parliament was 
the primary determinant in the appearance of these papers. When Bishop Nicolson printed his 
case on the cathedral bill, he did so only the day before the bill was introduced, and on the 
same day his opponent printed his ‘pretended reasons against the church bill.’ He printed a 
fresh batch for the Commons when the time came.
113
 When the Russia Company drew up a 
printed paper, they chose not distribute it, such was the nature of proceedings in the Lords.
114
 
The primary aim of these pamphlets was to open up dialogue with a larger number of peers, 
and give lobbyists a more permanent voice in proceedings than oral communication in the 
hall or lobby could achieve.  William Hodges, a financier of government during the 1690s, 
used these methods to protect his interests.
115
  He printed 600 sheets on the ‘ruin and 
destruction of our money’ when reform of the coinage was proposed in 1694.116  He also 
distributed a further 400 books in the same year. Another William Hodges, a mariner on a 
campaign to improve naval wages, ‘gave away’ 500 printed accounts on the fate of the 
seamen in 1698.
117
 Both Hodges gave the sheets ‘to a great number’ of parliamentarians, but 
sold none. These non-commercial and projecting documents addressed ‘national’ issues, 
highlighting and advancing ideas and ideology, but were produced in support of specific bills 
in particular sessions of parliament.  
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The importance of events in parliament as a context for the production of texts may be 
seen with the writings of leading economic thinkers. Charles Davenant printed his Essay on 
Ways and Means of Supplying the War (1695) and Discourses on the Public Revenues (1698) 
to coincide with changes to the land tax, and his Essay on the East India Trade (1696) to 
influence the amending of the East India Company charter.
118
 His Discourse on Grants and 
Resumptions (1700) matched the chronology of parliamentary criticism of William’s land 
grants, whilst the Reflections on the Constitution and Management of Trade with Africa 
(1709) was to correct ‘points of facts’ that the ‘wisest of council, even parliaments...have 
been mistaken in’ during proceedings regarding the African Company’s monopoly.119 His 
unpublished works, such as on coin in 1695 and on the council of trade, were also produced 
to coincide with crown and opposition manoeuvres.
120
 This was also true of Nicholas Barbon, 
the speculative builder and economic writer. His Apology for the Builder, defending the 
growth of London, was published in 1678 and republished in 1685, both being reactions to a 
parliamentary debate on taxing new foundations in London. In 1685 Barbon was present in 
the Commons on the day MPs decided to investigate the tax, whilst a fellow speculative 
builder, Mr Parsons, sat on the bill committee.
121
 The economic writer Edward Chamberlayne 
was also prepared to ‘contribute his utmost service, and to be ready [to] be called by any 
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committee appointed to debate or consider any of the…proposals’ he had suggested in his 
pamphlet.
122
 John Locke was also part of this culture, circulating ‘advantageously in the 
House [of Commons]’ a tract against a bill for lowering the statutory rate of interest.123  
These were practical, projecting documents produced for a parliamentary audience, 
imagined to have a short shelf-life. By printing them whilst parliament was sitting, lobbyists 
aimed to maximise their impact, with a group of Quakers in 1698 avoiding times when minds 
were ‘cooled’ and instead publishing as an ‘open provocation’ to the bills undergoing 
debate.
124
 The Ballad of the Weavers Complaint was printed ‘on doomsday’ alongside The 
Manufacture, also on the case of the weavers, around 9 November 1719 to coincide with the 
Calico Bill of that session.
125
 Many printed works were not intended to be read by a wider 
‘public’ audience. They instead sought to convince a far smaller audience, namely 
parliamentarians and the interest groups campaigning there, and are a sign of individual 
agency in the legislative process.   
This is further suggested by the fact that the lobbies of the two chambers of 
parliament were clearly used for ‘lobbying’ purposes, and acted as the end-point for many 
printed papers. Bishop Nicolson was given a paper on the East India Company whilst 
there.
126
 One sheet referred to an ‘account of the African Company’s exports given out in the 
lobby two years ago’, when there had been allegations ‘hired writers’ were behind the 
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papers.
127
 In 1713 merchants trading to Africa referred to their five ‘printed papers, given out 
at the door of your house’ during proceedings on the African Company Bill.128 The 
exclusionist Stephen College and others spread their libel in the lobby of the House of Lords 
on at least two occasions when parliament met at Oxford during the Exclusion Crisis.
129
 
Petitions from dissenters in the same period, were said to have ‘never travelled further than 
from the close committee to the lobby [of the House of Lords]’.130 In the midst of the trial of 
Sacheverell ‘a swarm of pamphlets’ were printed, ‘one [being] sold at the door of the house, 
with the title of King William’s exorbitant grants’.131 Printed material was produced for 
influencing events at Westminster and enabled a greater intensity of lobbying to a wider 
range of parliamentarians. It allowed interest groups to move beyond petitioning or 
commentating from afar and actively influence proceedings as they were occurring, 
something that will be examined further below.  
Direct interaction between parliamentarians and lobbyists was the result. In 1699, 
twelve Quakers ‘every day solicit[ed] the members of both houses’, whilst their opponents 
waited upon the bishops.
132
 During the Restoration, a female Quaker dispensed ‘scandalous 
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libel[s] in the hall and at the door of the Commons’.133 Francis Bugg, a lobbyist against the 
Quakers, saw a peer ‘come out and call for G Whitehead’ who had already delivered 100 
books to the house. Bugg himself echoed this practice, giving away 100 papers to peers and 
received one printed testimony in return in the Lords’ lobby.134 Local legislation also saw 
similar practices applied. John Clement, a fishmonger, said in committee his fellow witnesses 
had ‘told several lies’ in the lobby to peers, and was attested in this fact by Mary Ralph and 
Elizabeth Briggs who had also been in the lobby on the bill for regulating Billingsgate 
Market.
135
 Lobbyists on behalf of the Sion library in London were able to wait at the doors of 
the Commons and ask MPs to ‘represent so effectually’ their case.136 Robert Crossfield also 
had a peer ‘send one of the doorkeepers to me...desiring to send him my petition’, having 
‘attended near a month’.137 Through print, these individuals were able to become regular 
‘voices’ in parliamentary events, and through ease of physical access, to deliver papers 
directly to MPs and peers.  
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 This process of interaction was becoming more regularised in the late Restoration 
and late Stuart period. This was reflected in the orders of parliament that bills and petitions 
presented to it must be printed, but was further established as part of parliamentary practice 
through the erection of a post box at the door of the Commons. In 1695 the Commons 
ordered this should be established at the door of their house and suggests any person could 
drop off a pamphlet or letter to an MP without disturbing the house’s proceedings. Although 
it did result in Richard Fraggat stealing letters addressed to MPs by breaking into ‘the boxes 
at the lobby door...every-post day’ in 1698, reflecting the widespread desire for news from 
parliament, it enabled parliament to act as an efficient recipient of papers from lobbyists and 
projectors.
138
  
Nor was it only the literate who were able to capitalise on this ease of access and 
knowledge of parliamentary events to influence events in parliament. Popular forces and 
ideas could also find their way into the Palace of Westminster, enabling those ‘out of doors’ 
to be part of the political process and for others to observe this. The speed that Londoners 
learned of events in parliament is revealed by the publishing of the lists of the names of the 
opponents of the Exclusion Bill only one day after it was rejected in the Lords.
139
 Popular 
protest could react immediately to parliamentary events, as a group of weavers did in January 
1697. When Gabriel Glover (possibly a London ironmonger) told weavers in New Palace 
Yard of the state of the Calico Bill, the news quickly spread.
140
 Travelling to the Kings Arms 
                                                     
138
 CJ, xii, pp. 287-9; House of Commons Information Office, The House of Commons Post Office: 
Factsheet G20 (Revised September 2010), pp. 2-3.  
139
 Knights, Politics and Opinion, p. 183.  
140
 The List of the Poll for John Ward, Esq; Thomas Scawen, Esq; Aldermen (1713), p. 21; J. Nicholl, 
Some Account of the Worshipful Company of Ironmongers (1851), p. 489; CJ, xi, pp. 667-8, 
681-4. 
168 
 
in Covent Garden, the information was passed to another group of weavers, whilst the clerk 
of one MP told other journeymen in another public house. Women were then ‘hired to a ring 
a bell...to raise the weavers...’ to petition parliament. Within a day there was a ‘tumultuous 
crowd of people coming into the Palace Yard and Westminster Hall...and into the lobby’ for 
the second reading of the bill. This was not the only time such large groups congregated in 
parliament in this period. In November 1696 ‘some hundreds of weavers’ had petitioned 
against the East India Company.
141
 In the same year ‘all the halls, painted chamber, speaker’s 
chamber, and the lobby and the coffee houses [were] full of people, waiting for the result the 
house would come to about guineas’.142 The Toleration Act of 1689 saw a group of ‘common 
people’ attending in Westminster Hall to follow proceedings.143 Sacheverell’s trial saw ‘over 
a hundred other clergymen throng[ing] the court’ to organise his case, whilst in the 1710s the 
MP Peter Shakerley reported that ‘thousands of shoemakers, curriers [and] cobblers’ had for 
several days been ‘shouting against the drawback’, in such large numbers that 
parliamentarians had to ‘run the gauntlet through them.’144 MPs whose names had been 
printed as voting against the declaring of the throne vacant in 1689 also found that they were 
‘pointed at in Westminster Hall’ by baying crowds.145  
This use of parliament as a site of pressure and protest is more likely to have impacted 
on MPs rather than peers, as the latter could ‘escape’ through the prince’s entrance rather 
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than exiting through the hall as MPs had to do. Nonetheless, protest could occur directly next 
to the site of decision making, and petitioners and protesters gained dignity and prestige by 
meeting in a widely-known and recognised site such as Westminster Hall. There were limits 
to what these protesters could do, however, and if they began to intimidate either house their 
petitions would often be rejected—an issue which will be discussed in greater depth in 
chapter five.  
It was not only parliamentarians who increasingly sought to manage public access in 
this period but lobbyists themselves, reflecting the heightened importance and status of 
witnesses. Because of the length and frequency of parliamentary sessions, organisations and 
interests also became more focused around London. The Borough of Nottingham selected its 
witnesses who were ‘thought fit to go... to prove’ their petition against the Derwent 
navigation.
146
 The Corporation of Dover selected and paid for its witnesses, and spent ninety 
pounds getting them to London.
147
 Once in London, leading lobbyists would seek to control 
the witnesses to ensure their presence at the house, paying them to ‘keep the witnesses 
together all day’ and for ‘dining’.148 The soliciting of witnesses was done over ‘three dinners’ 
for the Dover-Rye Harbour Act of 1722.
149
 This control reflected the key role witnesses 
would play in influencing the opinions of peers, with some clearly desperate to avoid the 
presence of hostile witnesses. The Creditors Relief Act in 1697 saw an attempt to bribe 
witnesses, with Anne Hancock offered 200 guineas ‘not to come in against Mr. Tilley’.150 
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The necessity of lobbying parliament over consecutive sessions meant the 
organisation of witnesses became more closely controlled as legislating became more 
predictable and intense after the Glorious Revolution. Such was the increase in legislation 
and associated lobbying after 1689 that the City of London had to reduce the spending of the 
Remembrancer, who attended parliament on their behalf.
151
 This control principally occurred 
through the development of parliamentary agents who did put unspoken limits on who was 
attending parliament, helping to control and select witnesses sent on the behalf of companies 
and localities. Other localities were also present, if only on a more intermittent basis.  Bristol 
tanners organised the meeting of their agents and petitioners in coffee houses around St 
Paul’s, whilst the agent for Cardigan was to be found near Chancery Lane, of which ‘all 
ministers, churchwardens and others [were] desired to take notice’. 152 People would also 
come to parliament to follow proceedings. Supporters of the Don navigation employed an 
agent to keep sight of proceedings and held a committee at Gill’s coffee house in 1722, where 
papers were sent and collected, and Quakers appointed three men to perform a similar task, 
basing themselves at a coffee house in New Palace Yard.
153
 London curriers visited eight 
coffee houses in 1711 whilst lobbying for a bill, and the Russia Company met at coffee 
houses in February 1699 when the Russia bill was being discussed.
154
 The company the 
previous year had attended the Mermaid Tavern ‘to attend sundry lords’ and sent letters to 
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other peers from there.
155
 Clearly the ‘London season’ was more than the provincial gentry 
arriving for the social season, but also swathes of lobbyists, petitioners, and pamphleteers 
arriving for the ‘parliamentary season’.  
The examining of the accessibility of parliamentary spaces and the flow of 
information in and out of the house challenges our mental images of parliament in the early 
modern period and highlights the possibilities of engagement in what was a lively and 
bustling environment. But it is also important for considering the functioning of the state. 
Through enabling the open and clear participation of outside interests ‘publically upon the 
stage’ at a central point of decision-making, parliamentarians contributed to the legitimacy of 
the eighteenth-century state.
156
 The accessibility of parliament meant interest groups, 
pamphleteers and crowds were meaningful participants, being part of the narrative of a 
political event. Their use of print and protest meant they were able to balance some of the 
trends towards a closing of access and the restriction of those appearing formally at 
parliamentary committees. They too could be ‘fellow members of a political community’.157   
 
III: The Institutions and Culture of a ‘Deliberative Assembly’: Committees, Interests, 
and Majoritarian Rhetoric 
 
The physical presence of the public at Westminster reflected, in part, the impracticality of 
suppressing access at a time when the business of parliament was increasing and courts 
continued to operate in Westminster Hall. However, parliamentarians also desired the 
presence of the public at Westminster. A consideration of their presence at committees, for 
which the records survive for the Lords, can offer evidence why openness—both in 
committees and more widely—was the policy of parliamentarians. Committees were the 
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formal end-point of public participation, in which it had long been the norm for witnesses to 
be heard. But different forms of committee attracted (and expected) different profiles of 
participants—the ‘democratisation’ of those attending parliament remained incomplete in this 
period. After a discussion of the nature of committees, this section then considers the reasons 
for encouraging participation, in particular the language and concept of ‘interest’, the 
‘majority’, and the demand of parliamentarians and participants for ‘facts’. 
There were two sorts of committees, each with different attitudes to public 
participation, though both will not be discussed in detail here. The first were semi-judicial in 
nature—such as the one investigating the Popish Plot in 1679, the death of the Earl of Essex 
in 1689, or the conduct of admirals during the Nine Years War. These had the broadest range 
of participants, taking witnesses from all ranks of society. The second form of committee was 
legislative, meeting to determine the merits of any given bill, and could either as a 
‘committee of the whole’ or as a ‘select’ or ‘bill’ committee, meeting in a room around the 
chamber. Depending on the nature of the bill, these could range from being, in effect, 
‘closed’ (estate bills, where primarily only consents to the settlement were taken, are the 
prime example of this), to more open ones determining wider ‘public’ issues (even if in the 
form of private bills), and where the focus in this section will primarily lay.  
A brief sketch will first be made of the most open committees, the extraordinary 
‘judicial’ committees, before examining legislative committees. These semi-judicial 
committees were explicitly participatory, with printed notices fixed at ‘public places’ in 
Westminster and London to encourage ‘any person’ to present themselves at the committee 
for examining the Popish Plot in 1679.
158
 Witnesses drew considerable public interest and 
were actively reported in print—and on playing cards, as can be seen in figure nine. The Brief 
Account of Most Remarkable Transactions of the Last Two Parliaments saw the role of 
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witnesses and participation of outsiders as essential to the narrative of the exclusion 
parliaments, with nearly a third of the entries in its index relating to the participation of 
witnesses and informers.
159
 Three silversmiths and four watermen appeared before the 
committee together, suggesting a workplace-based pattern of participation.
160
 Servants ‘that 
attend[ed] the door’ in the same period were also heard.161 These committees tapped 
successfully into broader features of the criminal law, resulting in a wider demographic group 
involved in their business.  
The second and more common form of committee was the more open legislative 
committee, occurring at the second reading of a bill in the house, and immediately after it, in 
a smaller bill committee, held often in a room near the chamber. In these committees, 
participation primarily reflected interest groups seeking to influence legislation that affected 
them or the state’s lack of knowledge of the economy in the localities, witnesses being called 
to provide information (though there was considerable overlap between these two groups). 
Francis Bugg, lobbying against Quakers in the 1690s, reflected this express desire for 
information, recording that: 
when a bill for the regulation of the tanning of leather was brought into the Houses 
of Parliament, one of the peers of the Lords’ house being willing to inform himself 
in the nature of that affair, he applied himself to a cobbler, discoursed with him 
about this, that, and the other in leather, and what ways might be found to remedy 
the abuses thereof, for the public good. The cobbler tells his honour what he knew, 
by many years experience, and told his lordship how it might with ease be 
remedied, insomuch, that when the bill came under debate in the house, his 
lordship was so well skilled, not only in the means to be used, but in terms of the 
art, that his lordship spoke like some experienced tanner... in other cases it is 
frequent [for these interactions to occur].
162
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Figure 9: Captain Bedlow examined by the secret committee of the House of Commons during the 
Popish Plot (c. 1679), from BM, Number 1896,0501.915.1-52 
 
These exchanges may have been frequent, but for the historian are not possible to 
quantify in any reliable form for the early eighteenth century. Unlike the number of litigants 
or petitioners it not possible to be systematic about the scale of involvement using the 
surviving records of the Lords (only later in the century were committee records printed). The 
175 
 
primary sources are the manuscript witness book (a list of sworn witnesses) and the 
committee records, found in committee books and the manuscript journals.  These are 
unfortunately at odds with one another. The witness books contain a total of 4000 names 
between 1685 and 1720.  However, if a comparison is attempted between the sources, one 
tobacco bill has no witness recorded in the witness book, but has eight listed in the 
manuscript minutes. Neither is it the case the witness book can be taken as an underestimate, 
for one calico bill has twenty-seven sworn witnesses, which only appear as ‘several’ in the 
committee book.
163
 Equally, the remarks by witnesses can vary enormously, running from 
single words to many pages, with some speeches on the French Commercial Bill of 1713 
running to around 4000 words in length.
164
 These sources can only offer a very partial record, 
dependent on the whims and attitudes of clerks of the time.  
 Nonetheless, the hearing of such large numbers of individuals, the receiving of 
pamphlets and the viewing of crowds, raises the question of why parliamentarians desired 
and tolerated such a large number of people attending. There are three main reasons—wider 
societal practice, the importance of the ‘culture of fact’, and the language of interest and an 
imagining of a society organised by it.  
Parliament was accessible because it reflected how wider society and the state 
functioned, gaining its legitimacy from sharing the practices of society. The demand and 
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necessity of the participation of outside interests and individuals was present across a range 
of state bodies. The board of trade opened its doors twice a week, with advance notice given 
to interest groups. In 1711, 175 members of the Virginia trade were able to attend in single 
session.
165
 As part of debates on the Calico Bill of 1719, the same board sent for merchants, 
members of London companies and dyeing interests.
166
 In 1685, the treasury had also been 
subject to such pressure. The merchant Ralph Hardwick told its ministers he ‘had done his 
majesty a great service’ with his proposals for taxes on calicoes in 1685.167 The treasury was 
also ‘directed’ to hear Thomson Hutchinson’s proposal on a revenue on spirits in October 
1685, with taxes on wines suggested when parliament reassembled in November.
168
 Outside 
the ‘executive’ sphere, London’s common council was also subject to outside influence, 
receiving a petition from cheesemongers against navigation schemes in 1720 and 
‘inhabitants’ attended it in support of a bill in 1707. In 1717, 120 men attended the council to 
support their petition.
169
 These participatory elements were a means for influencing and 
shaping policy, and common to several areas of the wider state. Parliamentarians, having 
experience in local assizes, corporations, courts and parish government, had no reason to act 
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any differently when it came to their sitting at Westminster, all these institutions being reliant 
on a wide range of social groups to function effectively and consensually.  
Whatever the precise scale, the nature of the state and the need for information and 
‘facts’ to inform legislative action formed a key pillar to enabling, justifying and shaping 
participation.
170
 The period after the Glorious Revolution, as is well known, did experience 
an expansion in the fiscal-military state. The inspector general of customs or the treasury are 
significant examples of new or empowered offices that impacted directly on the process of 
legislation. The lack of financial innovation after the land tax was settled in the late 1690s 
would have further reduced the ability of outside interests to influence the central state. But it 
is important to stress the limited extent of this growth and the few areas of social and 
economic life the state had readily available knowledge of, but which interest groups still 
demanded parliament legislate on. The professionalization of some witnesses, especially from 
the mid-1690s did occur, but this did not mean that the house was ‘closed’ from wider advice 
and pressures. Because local offices were held by the middling sorts and below, and there 
were no offices that would have readily available knowledge of, for example, the Turkey 
trade, woollen manufactures in Devon, or the state of Parton harbour in Cumberland, 
merchants, manufacturers (with at least one woman attending in this role) and local surveyors 
were used to fill this knowledge gap.
171
 Several surveyors of highways were called on the 
Kensington and Brentford Road Act in 1717 in this role.
172
 Their participation on this basis 
was quite explicit—being called to ‘make out the facts’ relating to industries and society, 
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Figure 10: William Hogarth, The Gaols Committee of the House of Commons (c. 1729). This was one 
of the rare ‘social’ inquiries launched by parliament, this one dealing with imprisoned creditors, and 
met between 1729 and 1730. Thomas Bambridge, Warden of Fleet Prison, is shown on the far left. 
 
although committees themselves were rarely set up solely to inquire; these questions being 
raised in the context of a specific bill.
173
   
The informative and fact-finding role of participants took two forms. The first is data 
that commissioners of customs, the navy, or clerks from the board of trade were able to 
present to parliament, generally using central records from London and presented formally as 
papers. The second was evidence provided by witnesses, which was either ‘international’ 
(frequently relating to Ireland or Holland) or local, perhaps even limited to their business or 
personal experience. This was also frequently numerical and could detail the local production 
of certain goods or prices.  If current information was required, it was often these witnesses 
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who could provide information parliamentarians required. The Salt Prize Act of 1691 saw 
‘discourses with several merchants and agents’ who informed peers of the number of salt-
ships in the Thames, rather than customs commissioners.
174
 Such groups were able to answer 
questions government simply had no knowledge of, such as the numbers of throwsters, the 
quantity of raw silk production, and the length of time people remained in work.
175
 Clothiers 
were able to provide details of cloth manufacture in Bristol, Norwich and Salisbury.
176
 This 
was because they had access to local and specific records, with the curriers able to provide 
data on the leather duty from work that they had done in tax offices.
177
 Shoemakers in 
Southwark presented to one committee the customs receipts of leather duty in 1685 for the 
1670s.
178
 In 1704, the Russia Company had written to the Governor of Newcastle to gain a 
regular account of convoys coming and going from the port, whilst the bill for the Dunn 
navigation saw reports from shipmasters based on their examination of custom books at Hull 
to demonstrate the importance of the project.
179
  
This activity reflected the wider participative culture of the state and the culture of 
information collection. Even when customs commissioners or a similar body presented 
information, it was often based on the participation of outside groups in non-parliamentary 
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bodies, which was then combined and presented to peers.
180
 This pattern was echoed in the 
Commons, though its committee records for this period are now lost (some of the records for 
the committees of the whole house are in its printed journals). In March 1698 a bill on the 
export of wool saw the attendance of cloth workers and locals, who were able to discuss the 
importation of wool through Romney Marsh.
181
 In an inquiry of 1702, Judith Pacheca, ‘a Jew 
and slave’ appeared before the Commons, whilst the Aire and Calder navigation also saw 
witnesses who ‘know the river’ attend in order to describe its flow and the possible impacts 
of sluices.
182
 This was also true for finance matters, for when a bill for the imposition on 
sugar and tobacco was read a second time in 1685, the Commons though it was necessary for 
…the merchants who petitioned…to [be] hear[d] [for] what [they] could offer. 
Alderman Jefferys, Mr Levett and Mr Cary were called in and gave their reasons 
why the imposition on tobacco would be prejudicial to his majesty’s customs and 
the traders in tobacco. Sir Peter Clinton and others were heard particularly 
concerning the sugar. Aldermen Knight and other merchants of Bristol offered 
reasons against the bill. All which took up several hours and after a very long 
debate of the committee they returned into a house…183 
 
The significant role ‘experts’ could play in parliament was also echoed at a local level. A 
draft petition of the Corporation of Great Yarmouth to the Commons had advice attached 
from a range of people, including the collector of customs and a master at sea who provided 
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figures the mayor and corporation could not provide.
184
 In Bristol, the merchant venturers 
sought to ‘invite…all other merchants and traders of this city and adjacent counties’ to 
contribute to the writing of their petition.
185
 There was recognition at all levels of state 
structures that advice and expertise from those beyond formal office-holders was a necessary 
part of policy-making.  
In addition to the role of fact-finding as providing an impetus for parliamentarians to 
actively involve the public in their proceedings, was the idea of ‘interest’. Those who 
attended the committees of the House of Lords were not a limited to a fixed set of established 
institutions and corporations, 
 
but also included groups that nominated themselves. This 
language of ‘interest’ was a new intervention in political discourse during the mid-
seventeenth century, and helped to increase the significance of petitioning from non-elite 
groups.
186
  
The importance of the language of interest can be divided into three parts. The first 
role it performed was to increase the anxieties and reality of partisanship, by expanding the 
numbers who could claim to have a ‘legitimate’ interest in any bill or policy. Central to the 
intrusion of the language of interest from the mid-seventeenth century was the belief that the 
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use of self-interest would contribute to the public good.
187
  By arguing that this was in the 
‘national interest’, meant it was a necessity for policy-makers actively to seek interests out 
and allow them to influence change. This required seeking out ‘the whole’, which William 
Penn argued ‘takes in all parts’, within which ‘each person...has a claim to be secure in his 
rights and properties’.188 As a result, peers declared in relation to witnesses on the 
commercial bill of 1713, that they would ‘enquire who they are and then...move for a day for 
hearing of them’.189 The allowing of the expression of a diverse range of interests and 
attitudes, and acknowledging the crown was only one interest amongst many created a plural 
conception of society, in which conflict was an inbuilt feature of political and economic life. 
The means for stability in this model would be by ‘preserv[ing] industrious men in a 
peaceable way of improving their own interest’, allowing a plural politics.190 This balancing 
of wider interests would ‘make the chief magistrate strong, while he keeps his interest in all 
of them’, requiring those in power to seek out, identify, and quantify those interests who were 
of significance to the matter at hand.
191
 
Because elections did not provide the best means for this due to the restrictive 
franchise, parliament itself had to provide the mechanism for this through direct participation 
in committees or petitioning. The limited and partial franchise meant that the citizenship that 
was expected was not a passive one that deferred to representatives, but rather one that relied 
on and expected outside involvement. Therefore, peers identified participants on the basis of 
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interests they were perceived to represent. Peers gave advance warning to shoemakers and 
other leather manufactures in order to hear what they ‘have to object against the said act.’192  
The clerk in 1694 was ordered to let merchants and throwsters know they were expected two 
days before they were eventually heard and to bring relevant evidence, whilst on other 
occasions notices were fixed to the door of the chambers of the two houses.
193
 As a result, 
participants were self-defining, and parliamentarians encouraged private citizens to consult 
their own interests to decide the ‘public interest’. Because interest was the perceived means 
of how society functioned, it was believed that the enforcement of the law needed to have 
support of these interests, otherwise ‘it has not root enough upon the public utility to maintain 
itself against private encroachments’.194 Laws were recognised as requiring the support of 
private men in their own interest—legitimising the reality of the origins of many bills in the 
private and self-interested motivations of a locality or economic group. 
Closely linked to the recognition of the existence of interests was the increasing use of 
‘interest’ as a social identity, as an alternative to ‘class’ or ‘rank’. This will be discussed in 
more depth in the chapter on petitioning, the signing of petitions by large numbers being key 
to the process. The use of the language of interest in the pamphlets and papers issued and 
distributed by lobbyists meant the readers of these texts outside parliament could see the 
participants as representing their views and situation. The sharing of descriptive features with 
outsiders assured them the ‘correct’ groups had been able to influence ‘binding collective 
decisions’, awarding greater legitimacy to parliament’s decisions. 
Because the public participated within the framework of ‘interest’, parliamentarians 
had means of establishing whether what was claimed by petitioners was true. By arguing that 
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petitioner’s claims were based on their own self interest, rather than the public one, it was 
possible to dismiss their views and claims, controlling the pluralistic political culture the 
language of ‘interest’ had helped to justify.195 This was particularly useful in the context of a 
more diverse range of witnesses, who would not have shared the common conventions that 
William Temple noted existed between parliament and coffee houses.
196
 Shoemakers 
petitioned against the revival of an act for the transportation of leather, arguing that it sought 
to serve ‘the interest of some particular persons’.197 It was to ‘interest’ that counsel looked to 
legitimise their positions, unmasking opponents for pursuing self-interest and portraying 
them as undermining the ‘public interest’.198 Shoemakers petitioned against the revival of a 
leather act, blaming it for the decay of trade, done in order to serve ‘the interest of some 
particular persons’. On the Deeping Fens Bill in 1685 counsel argued ‘all the lords of the 
manor in the fens were for the bill’, whilst their opponents claimed the ‘bill was opposed by 
the gentlemen of the county’.199 Francis Winnington claimed that ‘they argue from private 
interest...they say nothing for the king in this’ in debates on the collection of alnage duties.200 
Opponents of the woollen manufactures bill in 1698 believed it to have been ‘calculated 
wholly for Exeter’, at the cost of the wider West Country.201 Meanwhile, opponents of the 
Aire and Calder navigation argued the scheme was ‘only to the private advantage of the 
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undertakers’, and the projectors of the River Dunn navigation believed they were opposed by 
‘private interests and views’.202 
The language of interest also encouraged the use of rhetoric that stressed the 
importance of the ‘majority opinion’ to judging the merits of policy. In the case of the Silk 
Importation Act in 1694 there were complaints that the ‘petition is brought in by a few 
throwsters [and] their main body disown it’.203  Supporters of the bill for weighing butter and 
cheese claimed ‘only twenty-two of the cheesemongers oppose the bill’.204 These calls for 
judging on a majority basis clearly have a whiggish hue about them, advancing a notion of 
the ‘general sense of this nation’.205 This language certainly marks the abandoning of any 
notion of unity within society and the recognition of the need for negotiation. Even with the 
restrictive membership of parliament and the limited electorate, individual judgement and 
active citizenry had its place when determining the merits of a bill.  Like the language of 
interest, the language of the majority offered the possibility of certainty—the majority could 
be (relatively) easily discerned and justified, whilst those who had the right credentials to 
judge based on merit or wisdom, were harder to establish and more easily contested.
206
  The 
declining confidence in the ‘people’ from the 1710s was perhaps ‘checked’ by the language 
of interest and the alternative means of establishing consent.  The language of interest was 
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more than a language of pamphlets and writers, but an everyday language used to imagine 
and discuss politics and helped to legitimise a dispersed state model.   
This is not to say that interests implied equality, just as participation did not equal 
power. Deference towards peers was still shown, and lobbyists and witnesses sought to play 
on older concerns and ideas during negotiations in committee. Social stability formed a key 
language of negotiation. Arguing for paper makers in 1690, their counsel warned if ‘these 
mills cannot work as usual, the several families in the town must starve’, arguing a clause 
would force fifty families to become ‘chargeable upon said parish’ of Chipping Wycombe.207 
The woollen bill of 1698 was seen as ‘falling on the poor’ and those who dealt in lace 
reported a ‘great decay of trading and of the manufacture itself’ in 1685.208 Mr Cooke, the 
treasurer of the Levant Company, said in the context of debates on the 1713 trade bill that 
peers had provided ‘many examples...of your ancestors’ patronage and protection’ and if they 
did not act, the ‘misery [of the poor] must be unspeakable’.209 The self-interest of peers was 
also appealed to. Supporters argued the right to export leather should be renewed in 1685, as 
it had been to the ‘great discouragement [to] the breeding and feeding of cattle and [resulting 
in the] fall of rents and value of land’, when its exportation had been banned.210  Alongside a 
newer language of ‘interest’, there continued an older discourse focusing on social stability as 
a means to set policy direction and interpret its success. 
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Legal languages also played a significant role in warning against innovation and 
disruption of property rights, as well as enabling popular legalism to be stated in parliament. 
With regard to the former, Justice Dolben informed one committee that questions raised in 
one bill on the regulation of corporations had already been raised in Westminster Hall, and 
should not be raised again by parliament.
211
 The committee on the alnage duty in 1692 saw 
reference to a ‘trial whether crapes were to pay the duty’, helping to determine the shape of 
legislation. The farmers of the alnage duty had obtained a decree in the Exchequer under 
James II, but claims that Norwich worsted goods were liable to the duty led to complaints it 
had proved ‘extremely grievous to all dealers’.212 A committee on leather exports heard it 
was a ‘judged case [that] leather is no made ware’, meaning that the curriers should not be 
allowed to buy and sell it.
213
 A bill for the fens in 1685 was an attempt to resolve the 
problems of the undertakers, arguing that they ‘brought in the bill to avoid filing the 
adjudication’ to allow the drainage to continue.214 Popular legalism was a common feature in 
larger enclosure acts, such as in the New Forest Act of 1698, where allegations were made 
that the felling of trees was being done against customary ‘fuel law’ to the detriment of 
tenants.
215
  ‘Immemorial’ water rights were also invoked during debates on river 
navigation.
216
 
                                                     
211
 PA, HL/PO/CO/1/4, Committee Book, 31 May 1689. 
212
 PA, HL/PO/CO/1/5, Committee Book, 24 February 1692; HL/PO/JO/10/1/444(c), Petition of 
Norwich Dealers of Worsted Manufactures, 18 February 1692. 
213
 PA, HL/PO/CO/1/4, Committee Book, 25 June 1689. 
214
 PA, HL/PO/CO/1/3, Committee Book, 24 June 1685. 
215
 PA, HL/PO/JO/10/1/506/1255(j), Report of Lords Commissioners, 25 May 1698. 
216
 PA, HL/PO/JO/10/1/507/1272, Mayor and Commonality of York, 3 May 1698. 
188 
 
The participation of a wide range of groups and the language they employed helped to 
define a framework of corporate, political and economic discourse, and suggests what was 
believed to ‘matter’ in policy-making. There were several rhetorical tools that weaker groups 
could use to influence parliament, and shows how far events within it were subject to a 
number of assumptions that did not have their origins in politics. This enabled political 
pluralism and participation to be a valued, rather than simply tolerated, part of the 
parliamentary process.  
 
IV: Parliamentary ‘Governance’: Deliberation, Negotiation, and Interest-Group Politics 
 
‘What good has your petitioning done you, have you got your money by it, let you and I kiss 
it out’. 
 
John Tilley’s attack on Elizabeth Leave, owed debt on a bond, from PA HL/PO/JO/101/509/1301 
Petition of Elizabeth Leave, 1 July 1698. This is the same Tilley referred to in note 149, p. 168.  
 
The presence of lobbyists, printed works and the possibilities of physical access to parliament 
raises the question John Tilley aggressively asked of Elizabeth Leave during the passage of 
the Creditors Relief Bill of 1698, namely their significance and impact on the policies that 
resulted from the legislative process. As Leslie Clarkson showed in relation to Tudor and 
Stuart legislation on leather, bills and acts that appear to be official measures can rather 
reflect the manoeuvrings of one interest group who were attempting to use statutes to gain 
advantage over their rivals.
217
 This conclusion was echoed by David Dean for the Elizabethan 
period and Joanna Innes in terms of eighteenth-century social policy, both arguing that the 
public-private division between bills is unhelpful.
218
 Much legislation cannot be seen as 
reflecting the views the crown or ministers had regarding political economy, and divisions 
between whigs and tories do not provide the dominant framework for providing or reflecting 
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such debates.
219
 Rather, it was common for public bills to reflect the victory of one private 
interest over another.  
The conflict between London companies on the regulation of the leather industry 
during the 1690s offers an opportunity to view the role and significance of interest groups. 
Leather was an important industry, being seen as providing the employment of ‘many 
thousand[s] [of] families…whose whole dependency is in manufacturing of leather’ and 
which claimed to support ‘twenty-six different trades’.220 With the exception of the leather 
committee of 1679 which was interrupted by the end of the parliamentary session, all 
committees dealing with this issue between 1679 and 1720 were subject to the influence of 
interest groups, with the Leather Act of 1689 resolved outside the committee by counsel, 
whilst peers accepted a clause from the curriers in 1685.
221
 Curriers on this bill paid the door 
keeper of the Lords more than five pounds to listen to the Lords’ committees on the days they 
or counsel attended the committee.
222
 Curriers spent around a fifth of their income in 1685 
lobbying the Lords on the apparently public bill. This activity was explicitly an attempt to 
weaken rivals. In 1693, the curriers wanted the ‘court tanners, shoemakers and others...to 
procure an act of parliament, to prevent the butchers, fliers, [and] skinners’ from cutting 
leather without penalties, and collected subscriptions of thirty pounds to do it.
223
 The 
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cordwainers also had a similar desire, spending ten pounds to ‘insert a clause in a bill for 
selling live cattle’ the same year.224 
In addition to influencing acts of parliament, interested parties were also able to use a 
combination of litigation, legislating and lobbying of state offices to amend or influence state 
policy. The career of John Gardiner, who can fairly be described as a ‘serial lobbyist’ for the 
mercantile interest, offers one such example in his campaigns against the monopoly of the 
African Company, though he was far from alone in pursuing the company. His opening was 
created by the judgement in Nightingale v. Bridges of 1689 which challenged the legal basis 
of monopolies, forcing the company to rely on acts of parliament to maintain its control.
225
 
Gardiner was active in the courts, the Lords and parliamentary committees throughout the 
1690s. He sued the African Company (unsuccessfully) in the Lords in 1693 when his ships 
had been seized by the company, who claimed to have ‘sole trade...and refused to let them 
trade for negroes, unless they paid thirty or forty percent for permission money’, his attempt 
striking at the heart of their monopoly.
226
 He was also involved in lobbying on the bills 
regulating the company. In 1698, he appeared before a committee alongside Peter Paggen, a 
tobacco trader, to argue against its monopoly.
227
 Gardiner was described by John Olmixon as 
having  
been their [the inhabitants of Barbados] constant and indefatigable solicitor for 
many years, and...[it] was in great measure  to him they owed the state they found 
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the African trade after the revolution; he having so fully proved the oppression of 
the royal company at that time, in parliament and elsewhere.
 228
  
 
The decision in 1698 to pass the Africa Trade Act, which opened up the Africa trade for those 
who were willing to pay a ten-percent duty, and the failure to renew it in 1712 was heavily 
influenced by the extensive campaigns by men like Gardiner, fought using the power of the 
state. Other merchants such as Richard Harris were also important, he attending the board of 
trade and presenting petitions to the Lords in 1712, where he ‘spoke a long time in general’ 
on the bill.
229
 Another merchant, William Dockwra, in 1704 had called into question the 
legality of the company’s charter through an appeal to the Lords, having lost two ships to 
them in the same vein as Gardiner.
230
  
Gardiner and the multiple methods he employed to undermine the African Company 
was not an isolated case. Some litigants used the Lords frequently to maintain their interests, 
as they would have the lower courts. Around 130 litigants appealed to the Lords as high court 
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more than once. Peers were a significant proportion of these, constituting thirty-four of this 
number, but around sixty-eight gentlemen and knights, seven merchants, and some 
companies and corporations also appealed the Lords on more than one occasion, as well a 
pauper, tenants, and a linen draper.
231
 This meant for some, the law was a means to manage 
their business and would have come on top of wider activity in lower courts and campaigns 
pursued there. Many of these traders were never members of institutions other than 
mercantile companies, yet were able to be familiar and important figures to policy-makers 
and sustain battles with established institutions across multiple platforms. They were able to 
take opposition from protest and print to appearing before parliament on legislative 
committees, and to further amend policy through litigation.   
Also active, but on behalf of a specific locality on a wider range of issues, was the 
economic writer John Cary. Originally a linen draper, by the time he started lobbying 
parliament was a whig and member of the Bristol Society of Merchant Venturers, being 
provided with up to £100 a session to finance his role as their agent.
232
 Cary sought to bring 
Bristol’s influence to a range of national issues, but also used his presence at Westminster to 
influence Bristol’s MPs, sidestepping local leaders. His Essay on State of the England in 
1695, which argued against the monopoly of the African Company, had been reprinted by the 
‘managers’ on the East India Bill and ‘delivered to both houses’.233 Cary had been ordered in 
1690 and late 1694 to consider a petition to parliament on the Africa bill by the company of 
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merchant venturers, perhaps motivating him to write his pamphlet in 1695.
234
 He was active 
lobbying Bristol’s own MPs, drafting instructions to MPs in the same year to encourage them 
to act against the Irish trade.
235
 In the instructions, he recommended to Bristol’s MPs ‘to do 
what I say on that head of my essay on trade, page 139’ on the creation of a council of trade 
in 1695.
236
 Cary had also been active on the Silk and East Indies Bill of 1696, speaking ‘only 
for Bristol’ during the committee (having been in contact with the local merchants leading up 
to this), and in the same year had he lobbied for a workhouse bill for Bristol that he had 
drawn up and presented to the corporation.
237
 The board of trade had also taken evidence 
from him on this issue, his actions influencing policies on poor relief elsewhere.
238
 Cary was 
also involved in the woollen bill of 1698, having attended a Commons committee on it. He 
published his Vindication of the Parliament of England in response to Molyneux’s Case of 
Ireland Being Bound by Acts of Parliament in England only five days after the Commons had 
judged Molyneux’s pamphlet to be libellous.239  
Earlier, Cary had lobbied against tobacco duties in the Commons in 1685. Copies of 
the bill were ‘brought in and read and went abroad, and from then on the tax continued to be 
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undermined, with a rebate of fourteen percent if tobacco was classed as ‘waste’, introduced in 
July and August 1685.
240
 This proposal came from several importers of tobacco who had 
been present in the Commons in June, eventually managing to gain the concession of paying 
duties over eighteen months.
241
 Again, Cary did this at the behest of the Bristol merchants.
242
 
Cary, Jefferys and nine others had continued to lobby with Virginia tobacco merchants during 
the summer of 1685, using the treasury as a forum to pursue their aims.
243
 Ultimately, Lord 
Rochester’s decision would mean that around a quarter of imported tobacco was marked as 
damaged in the 1680s, with legal imports stagnating between the 1680s and 1730s, 
weakening the impact of these new taxes.
244
 Despite the public and national nature of these 
bills, localities constantly attempted to influence and initiate policy in a way that was 
advantageous to them.  
The ability of these interests and individuals to influence the state and its policy was a 
key feature of Britain in the early modern period. The roles of Gardiner and Cary echo the 
life of William Payne, a protestant carpenter active between the 1760s and 1780s studied by 
Joanna Innes.
245
 Payne had been influencing public policy through engagement in policing, 
giving evidence to a House of Lords committee, petitioning, pamphleteering, and initiating 
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prosecutions, just as Cary and Gardiner had been a half-century earlier.  The ‘clash of 
interests’ between communities on legislation was a fundamental part of political life. The 
competition for legislative protections and the desire to ‘capture’ economic activity only 
multiplied after an avenue for the advancement of local and interest-based groups was greatly 
expanded after parliament’s ‘coming of age’ after 1689. At a local and national level, 
decision-making and enforcement was diffused and open to a range of individuals and 
interests.  
 
V: Conclusion 
 
The efforts of Paul Langford and the work it has inspired over the last two decades has shown 
the extent propertied society in the eighteenth-century was active in ‘public life’, with a 
significant role played by associations, voluntary organisations and other non-statutory 
bodies and individuals, in what used to be characterised as the ‘aristocratic century’. This 
chapter has sought to show the extent that even at the centre elements of the local 
participatory state and the legacy of the print revolution of the 1640s could be found. 
Parliament was more than an institution or an event, but an active functioning and interacting 
of different groups in society. Parliament and the peerage were embedded in and part of the 
wider social fabric, and its power legitimised by reference to practices and the languages of 
society outside parliament—focusing on the law, interest, stability, and participation.246 
Parliamentarians recognised the positive role those ‘out of doors’ could play as peaceful 
participants, seeking to regulate public participation in this direction, rather than eliminating 
it. 
This chapter has also addressed the operation and nature of the state. In the account 
advanced here, the state appears less autonomous and ‘modern’ than others have 
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characterised it. Interests were not separable from the state and the ‘government sphere’; 
instead they were central to the development of the state and its coercive powers on economic 
regulation throughout this period. Rather than following Jürgen Habermas’s theory that 
mercantile and commercial groups and the private mode of production were strictly separate 
from the ‘public’ state institution, this chapter shows that they were very much intertwined.247 
These interest-based manoeuvres and decisions means we should see parliamentary politics 
occurring on the basis of compromises adapted to interests.The state as defined by statute was 
not regarded as ‘other’, but an extension of society. 
This meant the ‘state’ was constituted of legislation that was the result of decisions of 
a range of interests, each of which claimed to represent sectors of wider society. Historians 
have highlighted the difficulties of the enforcement of law in the past, such as the growth of 
smuggling and, as explored in this thesis, the importance of litigation. This conclusion 
stresses the existence of a state functioning through a culture of ‘governance’, rather than by 
a defined ‘government’. Binding decisions were made, formed and inspired outside the 
legislature by networks combining bureaucracies, politicians, corporate and interest groups, 
with the lack of the ability (and desire) of the central state to ‘steer’ policy.248 This reiterates 
the extent the governance of the early modern state was dispersed, and ensured much of its 
activity and perceptions of it were locally conditioned and arose from local circumstances.  
The reality of participation and the importance of interest groups in legislating and 
creating divisions means it would be wrong to describe parliament as a ‘theatre’ or ‘pre-
eminently a place of performance’ as it has been in recently, even if this is part of 
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rehabilitating parliament’s centrality to political culture.249 A ‘theatre’ suggests that MPs and 
peers were a ‘spectacle’; something people viewed as individuals within a crowd rather than 
participating as a group and interacting with other lobbyists, petitioners, and 
parliamentarians.
250
 There were set piece trials and speeches—Lord Haversham printed his 
speeches of the early 1700s and impeachments drew huge crowds, but this is not the sum of 
what parliament did, or perhaps the most significant in terms of participation and the meaning 
of parliament to wider society.
251
  To focus on these moments of theatre is to overlook the 
nature of the day to day business of the house. In a theatre environment, people may feel that 
they are part of a greater collective, but rarely do they encounter and interact with one 
another. Neither do the actors respond—they stick to the script, perhaps altering the tone of 
its delivery, but the play is already written. A theatre play focuses on the actors, but 
governing early modern Britain required less differentiation between parliamentarians and 
‘spectators’.  To see people as ‘spectators’ rather than participants is to overlook the role that 
people and outside interests did play as co-creators of legislation; related with one another 
and parliamentarians through a shared activity, rather than solely through the shared 
consumption of an event or its representation in print.
252
 They engaged with the functions of 
parliament, as well as its symbolism and its performances. These were not, in the main, 
tourists, but fellow members of the political community. Those excluded from formal 
presence at committees could resort to protest, petition and print as alternative modes of 
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participation that were directed to policy-making itself, not just providing broader 
commentary. 
This has consequences for the history of parliament and the nature of politics in the 
early modern period. That the oligarchy was less strong and complete than used to be 
assumed is well established, with parliament functioning as a ‘legislative marketplace’. But 
the nature of this oligarchy and its ‘rules of the game’ can begin to be sketched out as a result 
of this chapter. The participation of the public and the terms on which they did so, allows us 
to suggest that parliament was a deliberative assembly, one that sought, recognised and 
welcomed the need for the involvement of outside interests. The interaction of these interests 
and parliamentarians with ‘rational’ quantitative methods and ‘facts’ will be shown in the 
next chapter, this being a further necessity to any deliberative system. Nonetheless, this 
chapter shows that contemporaries from a range of backgrounds regarded the second chamber 
as relevant and useful, and one that should be responsive to their grievances and concerns. 
They found a parliament that shared these expectations.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Fact Finding and Political Arithmetic. 
 Nothing is so important to a noble man, than a true knowledge of the manufactures, trade, 
wealth and strength of his country. 
 
Charles Davenant to John, Lord Marquis of Normanby, 1697, in C. Davenant, An Essay on the East 
India Trade (1697), p. 6. 
 
By political arithmetic, we mean the art of reasoning, by figures, upon things relating to 
government. 
 
Charles Davenant, Discourses on the Public Revenues, and on the Trade of England, in C. Whitworth, 
ed, The Political and Commercial Works of Charles Davenant (5 volumes, 1771), Volume 1, p. 128. 
 
 In order to encourage a political arithmetic all the world over, I am willing....to keep 
correspondence, and hope my papers will reach [ingenious men]. 
 
John Houghton, Collection for Improvement of Husbandry and Trade (1696), Issue 207. 
 
Political arithmetic is a subject that has received more attention of late, but it remains true to 
say its importance, particularly after 1714, is not well understood and many questions remain 
about its reception, use and chronology.
1
 Here it will be examined in relation to the 
development of the ‘deliberative oligarchy’ during this period, highlighting the importance of 
parliament to its continuing influence. The diffusion of political arithmetic and its demands 
for ‘facts’ in the context of the weak information base of the early modern state provided a 
positive impetus to encourage the participation of those ‘out of doors’ in policy-making. 
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Important not only for encouraging reasoned policymaking, the method and language of 
‘impartially’ associated with political arithmetic also acted as one of the available means to 
manage and control disputes raised by interest groups and party passions. This enabled 
pluralism to act alongside, but not dominate, ‘reason’. 
The method of political arithmetic had its origins in the Restoration, being a project 
that sought to place policy-making on a numerical footing.
2
 The term was coined by William 
Petty in 1672, requiring its practitioners to express themselves ‘in terms of number, weight or 
measure; to use only arguments of sense... [and to study causes that] have visible foundations 
in nature’.3 Through the collection, organisation and analysis of data on ‘things relating to 
government’ such as national wealth, population, taxation, or the balance of trade, it was 
believed the method would inform discourse on the activities of the state and help eliminate 
disputes over policy-making.
4
 The art can be traced back to the thought of Francis Bacon and 
the Royal Society, but the first conscious works of political arithmetic were carried out in the 
1660s. John Graunt’s study of the mortality bills of London used his ‘shop-arithmetic’ to 
estimate the population of London, and Petty attempted to prove the utility of the method to 
both Restoration monarchs, to whom he hoped to be appointed ‘accounter-general’.5 After the 
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death of Petty in 1687, the prime practitioners of the art were Charles Davenant, John 
Houghton and Gregory King, focusing the fruits of their labours on parliament, instead of the 
court. Their work primarily focused on issues of state formation and fiscal matters. With the 
settling of public finance by the 1710s and the decline of the ‘projecting age’, it used to be 
assumed that political arithmetic fell into disuse. Although its role over the eighteenth century 
cannot be discussed to a great extent in the context of the chronological scope of this thesis, 
what will be suggested here is that the wide range of issues to which the method was applied 
and institutionalised in parliament meant political arithmetic remained a significant part of 
policy-making. Its methods and rhetoric was not just employed on issues of public finance 
and controversies on population, but applied in debates on the myriad of local and regional 
bills parliament dealt with in the eighteenth century. 
One question this chapter seeks to examine about political arithmetic is its use, 
reception and meaning to non-experts.
6
 As William Deringer has written, Scots during the 
debates on the equivalent were asked ‘to decide whether they were willing to put political 
faith in something they could not understand, and to believe that the calculations of itinerant 
financiers and mathematicians could decide what was best for Scotland’.7 This issue of 
reception and understanding has, in part, been answered in relation to MPs determining the 
nature of the land tax during the 1690s, who were no experts on quantitative matters. We can 
also look towards wider society and the witnesses heard by the House of Lords to examine 
this question. An important aspect of this is to consider the interplay between the wider 
culture of ‘facts’ and political arithmetic, and the use of such discourse and methods by these 
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witnesses. As Barbara Shapiro has argued, the growing use of ‘facts’—seen most clearly in 
the legal system, of which a large proportion of the population had some experience—created 
new expectations for the basis of judgment in the seventeenth century.
8
 This legal culture and 
the shift towards greater reliance on expert evidence during the Restoration (being also a 
response to the growth of professions) formed a key context in which the methods of political 
arithmetic were received in, and where it could gain wider significance and a greater 
audience. This ‘culture of facts’ meant a greater part of the nation did have some 
understanding and attachment to the possibilities of political arithmetic for policy-making 
and persuasion. In turn, this raised the status of witnesses and public participation in the legal 
system and parliament. 
Political arithmetic is commonly seen as contributing to the growth of the fiscal-
military state. This chapter considers its role in relation to the balance of trade, being a 
common preoccupation of contemporaries during the Nine Years War and the trade bills of 
the 1710s, and which peers played an important role in developing a quantitative evidence 
base.
9
 However, if the sources of quantitative information in parliament are considered, not 
only for that used during debates on local and specific bills, but general legislation as well, 
the fiscal-military state appears dependent on wider society and interest groups for its 
functioning. It was often the central state, not the wider citizenry, who lacked information. 
Lobbyists and witnesses presented parliament with extracts from customs books, parish 
records, as well as data from central offices—without being ordered to do so by 
parliamentarians. The hopes of Petty that political arithmetic would strengthen the central 
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state, with the method providing a means for the court to ‘balance parties and factions both in 
church and state’, could not be achieved whilst the method relied on witnesses and lobbyists 
to provide information. Instead, the demand of parliamentarians for ‘facts’ helped to give 
diverse factions more influence.
10
  This reflects the significance of the wider cultural 
importance of ‘facts’ and the continuing influence of ‘projectors’ on non-fiscal issues, being 
testament to the importance of the vitality of local politics during the ‘long eighteenth 
century’. 
In being heavily reliant on the participation of a range of interests, parliamentary 
demands for political arithmetic contributed to the development of the ‘deliberative 
oligarchy’ during this period. The method and demands for evidence justified the 
participation of a diverse range of interests, and provided a language and concept to evaluate 
and influence the actions of elites. As was shown in the previous chapter, the imagining of 
society as a collection of ‘interests’ meant parliamentarians were wary of the role of self-
interest in the making of policy and a need for a transparent means to resolve disputes. This 
was something that mathematical calculation seemed to provide, offering cold certainty as an 
antidote to the hot-headed partisanship of the era of the ‘age of party’ and ‘clash of 
interests’.11  The claims of the rising numbers of interest groups and petitioners influencing 
policy after 1689 could be tested against ‘facts [that] seldom lie’.12 In this way, political 
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arithmetic was a means of negotiating a society where demands for consensus, despite the 
growing trend towards oligarchy, was becoming more difficult to achieve.  
Political arithmetic could also be less conducive to this culture of deliberation, 
however.  The American scholar Michael Schudson has projected the rise of a ‘monitory 
democracy’ in the late twentieth century, where the capacity of the citizen and organisations 
to ‘fact check’ and scrutinise what politicians and others are claiming has exploded.13 
Although some have cautiously welcomed this, seeing it as democratising accountability, it 
may also be seen in a context of increasing cynicism, fitting in with climate of 
misrepresentation and mistrust that Mark Knights has shown was present during the late 
Stuart period. Rather than helping to calm the storm, debates over numbers and 
accountability may well have helped contribute to rising levels of adversarial politics, 
dominated by allegations of lies and self-interest that permeated into the choice of data used. 
Not only did political arithmetic not take the path that Petty imagined for it in terms 
strengthening those holding power and taking the ‘politics’ out of policy-making, it had the 
potential through its rhetoric and the ‘tainting’ of data and calculation by party and interest, to 
undermine deliberation. If both ‘sides’ held up their own data and experts presented their 
‘truths’ in the context of the (perceived) self-evident truth the other party were ‘lying’ or 
‘corrupt’, this did not contribute to reasoned debate. The reconciliation of political arithmetic 
with pluralism and a culture of competing interests was necessary to ensure a ‘deliberative 
oligarchy’ was maintained. This made the institutions for deliberation important, as they 
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ensured a dialogue between facts, interest and the law and encouraged a common means of 
resolution amongst different interests and partisans. 
This chapter begins by considering the wider culture of facts that political arithmetic 
operated in, before considering its use in parliament. It considers the collection of 
information relating to the balance of trade, and the use of data by partisans, interests and 
companies.  In both cases, it examines the use of political arithmetic by non-experts, and the 
extent this information was not restricted—it was known and presented by non-peers in an 
open forum, contributing to the growing pluralism and culture of deliberation on policy-
making.  
 
I: The Context for Political Arithmetic   
 
Facts being true, and publically known, the consequences resulting therefrom...are 
undeniable. 
 
Lord Haversham on proceedings against the Earl of Portland, 1701, to the House of Commons, in LJ, 
xvi, p. 761. 
 
A. ‘A Culture of Facts’ 
 
Political arithmetic was not created or received in a vacuum. It was part of a wider culture in 
which the role of ‘facts’, numerical or otherwise, was increasing in incidence and 
significance during the seventeenth century, giving the evidence and modes of argument 
offered by political arithmetic a wider audience and force than it would have had if it existed 
alone. Just as William Petty saw his policy proposals ‘grounded upon matter of fact and 
experience’, so did judges, theologians and antiquarians.14 The wider population, with its 
experience in the legal system and consuming pamphlets advancing ‘rational’ religion, could 
have a grasp of this rhetoric, marking a lack of separation between high and low politics, and 
between the concepts advanced by Petty and societal practice. This contributed to a wide 
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search for systematic knowledge across many issues, of which numerical data was one 
branch.  
Barbara Shapiro has shown the seventeenth century experienced a shift in the use of 
the concept of ‘fact’, moving ‘from a specialised term for a judicially cognizable human act 
to a general category permeating the whole of English culture’.15 Although present in many 
areas of society, its use in the legal system was an important point of the concept’s diffusion 
into wider society. Whilst ‘matters of law’ were left to judges, ‘matters of fact’ were 
increasingly reserved to the relatively-ordinary individuals of the jury and witnesses—they 
being the ones who judged the proofs offered and credibility of the evidence. In the 1680s, 
juries had been told to reach their verdicts ‘according to reason and the probable evidence of 
things’.16 John Hawles, a whig writer of the 1680s, believed that the ‘best judicatures of the 
world...utterly reject the use of rhetoric’.17 Not doing so, argued Isaac Burrow, would create 
the wrong decisions if participants were ‘bribed by profit...charmed by flattery...or by fine 
speech... [or] seduced by precedents or custom’.18 This reflected a wider intellectual shift, 
with William Sprat, the historian of the early Royal Society, writing its members ‘only deal 
in matters in fact’, preferring their ‘own touch and sight’—or experience—to second-hand 
evidence. Decisions were made on the ‘concurring testimonies’ of its members—not just 
using the rhetoric of ‘facts’, but expecting its members to act like a jury.19 This mode of 
thought was shared with Petty, who famously spurned the use of ‘comparative and 
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superlative words, and intellectual arguments’ for his ‘numbers, weight, or measure’.20 
Similarly, Davenant promised to ‘use his utmost endeavours to divest himself of all kinds of 
passion’.21 There were multiple sites of discussion over the nature of evidence across science, 
law and religion, all of which sought to create and apply ‘useful’ knowledge in a neutral 
fashion. An expectation that decisions would be taken on firm foundations was beginning to 
establish a culture that valued impartially and decision-making based on critically-assessed 
‘facts’.  
This increased use of ‘facts’ was paralleled by the changing use and increased status 
of witnesses in the legal system. Significant changes were occurring during the Restoration 
towards a greater role and reliance on expert witnesses. The use of expert witnesses had long 
origins, with their use as translators going back to the fifteenth century and special juries 
(typically merchants, but also juries of cooks and fishmongers to try those selling bad food) 
had been established in the fourteenth century.
22 
However, even though their origins were not 
in the seventeenth century, their functions were changing rapidly in this period. Whilst 
previously expert witnesses had been limited to translation (such as ‘what does this word 
mean?’), their role was transformed so they themselves were becoming judges, testifying on 
the nature of ‘things’ and the practice of industry. This practice was beginning to enter the 
central courts, with the first printed mention of an expert witness in Chancery not being until 
1698 in the case of Foubert v. de Cresson (later heard in the House of Lords), whilst the first 
appearance of expert witness in criminal courts occurred in 1678.
23
 This reflected a growing 
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recognition—aided also by the growth of professions—that when factual issues arose that the 
judge or jury had no knowledge of, there was a need to defer to others.
24
 Matthew Hale 
observed ‘if it be a question touching the custom of merchants...merchants are usually jurors 
at the request of either party,’ with a belief that expertise or direct experience was needed to 
understand evidence, not just those qualified by property ownership.
25
 As a result, members 
of Trinity House were asked to judge whether pirates were ‘perils of the sea’, and one of the 
defendants in a case asked for a ‘jury of booksellers and printers, they being the men that 
only understand our business’.26 In his study of medical witnesses present in Old Bailey 
trials, Stephen Landsman concluded that during the eighteenth century there was ‘a subtle but 
perceptible increase in the authority ascribed to medical evidence’.27 These changing legal 
expectations were increasingly echoed in science, with the Royal Society also seeking out 
‘experts’. Edmund Halley’s account of trade winds used navigators who were ‘acquainted 
with all parts of India, and having lived a considerable time in the tropics’, whilst Henry 
Stubbe attacked the society for relying on ‘negligent or inaccurate merchants, and seamen... 
[being] men of no reading’.28 The role of social status and property as a mark of credibility 
was offered an alternative in experience and expertise within this ‘culture of fact’.  
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Like Petty, those involved in law increasingly sought truth in a scientific way. Just as 
the history of law is not autonomous, the history of political arithmetic or of how 
parliamentary procedures and expectations were advanced and inspired should not be either, 
these intellectual developments being firmly part of both. These developments in the law 
courts of Westminster Hall were occurring in the same palace as parliament, with lawyers 
and litigants either experiencing parliament directly through appeals, service as MPs, or as 
users as the same spaces as parliamentarians. Cross-fertilisation between law and science was 
occurring, with Sprat noting ‘many judges and councillors of all ages’ were ‘ornaments of the 
sciences, as well as of the bar’, whilst Francis North, solicitor and attorney general, was seen 
as an ‘early virtuoso...he became no ordinary connoisseur in the sciences’.29 Members of the 
peerage who were involved in legal affairs due to the house’s role as high court were also 
active in the Royal Society. John Somers was the president of the society between 1698 and 
1702, having been solicitor general and lord chancellor; Charles Montague, Earl of Halifax, 
had held the role for the three years before Somers, being a treasury minister and later one of 
those sitting in judgement on Sacheverell.  
This awareness of the importance of deferring to expertise and professions could be 
shared by parliamentarians. There was a perception that judging on the merits of legislation 
could only be done with the advice and deliberation of experienced and interested 
individuals. The pamphleteer James Whiston argued in relation to apparent decline in trade 
during the Nine Years War,  
that if sick, we consult a physician, so when the trade of a nation is to secured or 
advanced, the merchants and tradesman’s advice is best able to accomplish the 
same: it is....impossible for noblemen and gentlemen not educated in trade, ever to 
arrive at a perfect understanding of the matters of question.
30
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This rhetoric was known to a wider public, and actively used in pamphlets to appeal to the 
Lords and legitimise their policy demands.
31
 The selection of MPs was subject to this 
argument, with the Englishman arguing in 1713 that ‘none ought to represent her [London] in 
parliament but traders’ to defend its interests during debates on the trade bills.32  This ‘culture 
of facts’ strengthened the legitimacy and need for witnesses and public participation in 
politics. During the debates on the trade bills of the 1710s, Edward Hatton published a guide 
on commerce for the public which began with two poems, advancing the importance of 
reason and arithmetic as a means to resolve disputes: 
By numbers powerful, and harmonious aid 
This stately fabric of the world was made... 
But tuneful numbers readily obeyed 
And the rude chaos, form and beauty had 
Since, to mankind subservient they become..... 
By reason’s compass, you have ventured over 
And taught us foreign truths unknown before..... 
 
The second poem explained the opportunities for practising ‘reason’ offered by the book: 
....and hardly the foundation better know, 
Or reason of their working numbers so, 
But mimic just as they see others do, 
This you my friend, alone, have took away, 
This cloud of ignorance, by the bright ray 
Of reason’s light, we now can walk and see 
Our practiced rules do with our sense agree; 
Safely we now on the foundation tread....
 33 
 
In his own address to the readers, Hatton promised it was a work constructed in the ‘most 
rational, plain, and compendious manner... being calculated for the improvement of trade and 
commerce’, and of particular use for the middling sort of people and ‘not a few of the 
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gentry’.34 His work, therefore, proposed a means through the partisan debates between whigs 
and tories on trade with France.  
Shorter pamphlets and printed petitions that were presented to parliament also used 
this legitimating tactic. The Supplement to Fault on Both Sides attacked whigs for continued 
difficulties during the War of the Spanish Succession, asking ‘where is the matter of fact?’, of 
evidence of victory or declining debts.
35
  The 1712 Answer of the Generality of Traders to the 
Royal African Company justified the ‘truth’ of the bill, the ‘facts’ stated in its preamble 
‘being true’.36 The East India Company argued their opponents needed evidence to support 
their ‘matter of fact[s].... rest[ing] upon them to prove it’.37  Likewise, The Interest of Great 
Britain in an Essay Upon Wool, Tin and Leather aimed to ‘prove by instances of fact’ the 
neglect of commerce.
38
 A pamphlet on the Calico Bill in 1719 announced that ‘in order to 
enter upon this affair with all possible clearness and plainness’ it limited itself to ‘evidence as 
to the proof’ of claims.39 Another stated that the ‘Turkey merchants have annexed no 
evidence, expecting to be taken upon their words’, in contrast to the Italian merchants who 
‘appeal to the custom house for their proof’.40 
The importance of witnesses for aiding judgment also led to attempts to increase their 
credibility through legislation. The 1696 Treason Act and the 1697 Blasphemy Act raised the 
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requirement for witness evidence, demanding ‘two credible and lawful witnesses’, in contrast 
to just ‘lawful witnesses’ of earlier legislation.41 In parliament, peers asked for evidence that 
witnesses spoke on behalf of their claimed interest or locality to ensure their claims to 
representation and hold of information was true.
42
 Although witnesses and experts were not 
new features in the proceedings of courts or in parliament, the perception of their role and 
their scope for influence was being enlarged. It is now necessary to turn to this consequence 
of a culture expecting policy to be based on facts, evidence, and expertise, namely the 
ordering of reports and papers.  
 
B. Towards More Systematic Knowledge 
 
Given the importance attached to facts for the judging of policy there was a growing need to 
be as systematic and thorough in their collection as possible, if it was to survive scrutiny from 
partisans and other arithmeticians. The House of Lords took a lead on this collection, 
particularly in the realm of the estimation of the balance of trade.  
In undertaking the collection of reports and improving state record-keeping, the Lords 
was part of a wider societal attempt to accumulate and organise knowledge. In law, 
collections of legal decisions were an innovation of the late Elizabethan and early Stuart 
period, and continued to gain ground in the early eighteenth century. William Bohun’s The 
Law of Tithes (1730) claimed to be the first to collect ‘all the statutes [and] all such adjudged 
                                                     
41
 Shapiro, ‘Law and Science’, p. 760.  
42
 For example, PA, HL/PO/JO/5/1/31, Manuscript Minutes, 4 April 1696. Peers also did not call 
those who had signed petitions, presumably so they did not have two ‘voices’—see 
HL/PO/JO/5/1/58, Manuscript Minutes, 12 March 1718. This meant that mayors, aldermen 
and the higher ranks who tended to be the lead signatures had to rely on lesser groups to make 
their case in committee. Those with a direct financial interest were also not supposed to 
speak—see HL/PO/JO/5/1/54, Manuscript Minutes, 20 May 1717. 
213 
 
cases’. Giles Jacob produced fourteen ‘self help’ legal manuals between 1713 and 1736 on 
the law, whilst Sir Geoffrey Gilbert published two collections of reports and fifteen works on 
different branches of law between 1730 and 1763.
43
 As shown in the previous chapter, 
appeals to the Lords were also printed and collected. Importantly, those who collated law 
reports saw no division between law and science. Matthew Hale’s Digests of Laws of 
England was an attempt to organise and systematise knowledge on which to base legal 
decisions, but he saw no divide between law and wider intellectual inquiry, having produced 
the Primitive Organisation of Mankind. Gilbert Burnet was able to argue that Hale exhibited 
‘his excellent way of methodising things...whatever he undertook, he would presently cast 
into so perfect a scheme’.44   
Interest in accumulating and organising information was a growing feature of 
parliamentary activity after 1689. Peers were actively pursuing this agenda, leading 
investigations and reorganisations of legal, mercantile and parliamentary records, with 
several investigations into archives and records between 1704 and 1728. In 1704, there was 
an investigation to consider the ‘method of keeping records in offices’, and which showed 
many ‘archives’ had not been explored in recent memory.45 Mr Petyt, the keeper of the 
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records in the Tower, described the ‘mountain of broken records... [with] cartloads of them’ 
rotting  in the office. Peers ordered him to carry out the ‘methodising and preserving the 
records’ of the Court of the Exchequer, to the end of ‘rendering them useful to the public’.46 
This would be done by Petyt leading the ‘digesting, putting in order, and making calendars’ 
of Caesar’s chapel and records in the Tower’, with Bishop Nicolson estimating less than a 
tenth of the records in the Tower had been organised.
47
  
In addition to organising and making useful legal records, other state records were of 
interest. The trade bills of the 1710s caused peers to examine port and customs records for the 
first time, the deputy rembrancer of the Exchequer reporting to the Lords the books ‘are in 
great confusion’ and some were in a room ‘which nobody used to go in’.48 In their 
investigations, peers found books detailing overseas trade from the 1660s on ‘the floor... 
[which] was covered for above two feet up with loose parchment books, bonds, and papers in 
the utmost confusion’. Books from the outports had been collected, but were ‘heaped together 
in the greatest disorder, all of which were carefully examined’.49 These port books were said 
to have ‘not [been] looked into for a great while... [the clerk] remember[ing] not that they 
have been used’.50 Peers discovered those books found wanting included substantial ports 
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like London, Newcastle and Bristol’.51 Equally, there were no regular reports for the outports, 
with ‘several wanting’.52 Significantly, parliamentarians and political arithmeticians looked 
to companies to fill this information gap, one pamphleteer hoping that the African Company 
‘by this bill may be obliged to make entries of all their exports and to keep a true account of 
all their charge’ to help make judgements on the trade and its regulation. 53 In 1700, a Lords 
committee wanted the Turkey Company to provide information on the balance of trade and 
proposed solutions.
54
 Charles Davenant also ‘did my utmost to procure a clause in some act 
of parliament to oblige the merchant to [make] a certain and regular entry’ of wool—though 
this attempt was defeated by merchants in the Commons.
55
 The impact of companies and 
corporations collecting this information on public participation is examined further below.  
The final archive subject to the interest of peers was that of parliament itself. 
Although the papers of the House of Lords were kept in the Jewel Tower by 1599 and for the 
Commons as early as 1552, they were not organised and so were of limited use.
56
 The 
parliament office itself was investigated in 1717. A report of William Cowper, the clerk of 
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the parliament, stated the records were subject to ‘constant resort’ and could not be accessed 
without ‘great difficulty and danger’. Parliamentarians recognised the ‘records...of later years 
[had] grown more numerous’ but they had not yet found a ‘methodical [and]...regular’ means 
of keeping them.
57
 The committee decided they would ‘inspect the keeping of the 
journals...and to recommend it to the house to direct an index to be made of such books in 
which there are none already’, making it easier to trace precedents and previous actions.58  
The journals, except those for the 1640s, had been ‘very disorderly bound’, but it was hoped 
that a ‘calendar in [a] separate book’ would be constructed.59 In a later report in 1725 it was 
found acts of parliament were also in need of re-organisation in order to stop the ‘scattering’ 
of records that were ‘lying in a room or rooms near adjoining to this house in great 
disorder’.60 This drive was in part the result of tensions with the Irish parliament during this 
period, leading to a search for evidence on the supremacy of the Westminster parliament over 
that of Dublin.
61
 However, it occurred as one of a series of innovative projects by peers that 
sought to make records of state and parliamentary activity ‘useful’.  
The incidence in the reports ordered by the Lords on legislative business and their 
subjects are shown in table six. This is a necessarily partial account, it not being possible to 
be systematic with the range of papers, both in terms of subject and depth, which were 
presented informally by witnesses, lobbyists and pamphleteers, and had not been requested 
by peers. These are not shown in this table. Neither is the incidence of witness evidence  
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Table 6: Reports Ordered by the House of Lords, 1689-1720 
Subject Number 
Military  
Army/Navy 42 
Army/Navy Debt 6 
Treaties 8 
Licence to come from France 1 
Economic 
Coinage 2 
Corn and Wool Exports 6 
Internal Communications 8 
Irish Manufacture 1 
Overseas Trade 22 
Taxes 4 
Governance 
Governing America 1 
Local Courts 4 
Public Accounts 12 
Jacobitism 
Forfeited Estates  11 
Society and Religion 
Poor Relief 1 
Riot 1 
Religion 3 
Source: LJ, xiv-xxi; PA, HL/PO/JO/10/1, Main Papers; HL/PO/JO/10/6, Main Papers; 
HL/PO/JO/10/3, Main Papers (Large Parchments). 
 
shown, despite the hearing of witnesses being a commonly used alternative to reports. They 
were often heard in order for the house to gain an idea of a wide range of local, and 
sometimes personal, views of a certain situation. This was the case with the bill attacking the 
Irish woollen industry in 1698, when data presented by the commissioners of customs was 
returned to them to be ‘perfected’.62 The absence of satisfactory ‘hard’ data on Irish industry 
led to nine witnesses being cross-examined on the nature of the Irish economy and English 
wool production.
63
 This was also the case on the more local issue of the Brookfield and 
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Newport Market Bill in Middlesex, witnesses being used to estimate the ‘abundance’ of 
cattle.
64
 This reflected a method Davenant was forced to employ due to lack of evidence, 
believing ‘in this art [a] variety of speculation[s] are helpful and confirming to each other’, 
though these individuals were ‘dark and partial’ in their conclusions, requiring additional 
advice from political arithmeticians or a state body like the commissioners of customs.
65
  
Because of the necessity of witness evidence, table six only reflects the knowledge 
state bodies could provide formally, rather than demonstrating the full range of interests and 
use of data by the Lords. Equally, this table has been created from counting all reports and it 
should be noted this does not mean the house ever acted on them. A report on woollen 
imports was presented to a committee on the protection of privateers in the East Indies in 
1707, and was not referred to by peers or witnesses.
66
  
In terms of subjects, military reports constituted a third of reports, a similar proportion 
to the number presented to the Commons in 1715.
67
 These were ordered on convoys and the 
conduct of admirals as elements of party disputes over the conduct of war and demands from 
mercantile interests for the better protection of their ships. Economic reports constituted a 
larger proportion of reports to the Lords than the Commons, peers receiving thirty-seven 
percent of their reports on these matters, compared to twenty and thirty-three percent in 1715 
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and 1720, respectively, for the Commons.
68
 Formal reports were presented on the prices of 
coal, iron, corn, wool production in Languedoc and Ireland, and tobacco production in 
Holland and Virginia.  Export and import details were provided for hundreds of individual 
products, as were their estimated prices, whilst attempts were also made for the colonies on 
occasion.  However, even these economic reports often had their origins in wartime—an 
investigation into the state of trade in 1707 had its origins in a petition of 200 ‘eminent 
merchants of the city’ and the losses resulting from lack of convoy protection for their 
ships.
69
 The prompt for the majority of reports were demands made in the context of specific 
legislation or in response to specific grievances of petitioners. Despite calls for ‘mercantilist’ 
policies on population by witnesses and lobbyists, reports presented on bullion exports 
generally went unused, as peers considered economic schemes through the lens of individual 
projects in legislative form.
70
  
In terms of their incidence, the occurrence of reports follows a peace-war split, with a 
boom between 1697 and 1704, before rising again in the late 1710s as lobbyists and 
parliament dealt with a wider range of legislative initiatives. The staple during wartime were 
military reports and examinations of the state of war rather than economic policy (at least in 
respect of reports formally ordered by the Lords). Reports were received regularly from the 
commissioners of public accounts and, from 1696, on the balance of trade. The purpose of 
these reports was not to provide conclusions for policy, but for ‘the picking out of select 
particulars in matters of fact as...seemed most worthy of debate’, with one report in 1703 
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having to be re-written for ‘drawing inferences and conclusions’.71 Because many papers 
were intended to be descriptive and purely ‘matter of fact’, this makes it harder for us to 
establish their reception and the precise ends that peers put these reports, given the absence of 
debates and diaries compared to our surviving records for the Commons. 
Nonetheless, it may be inferred from the incidence of reports there was an expectation 
that papers would provide a basis for evaluating policy. When a proposal was rejected in 
1721 for ordering papers on British fleets in the Baltic, twenty-two protesting peers claimed 
‘because of the want of such authentic papers and instruments’, there was: 
no sufficient foundation for any parliamentary inquiry, much less for such a one as 
tends to approve, excuse, or blame, the measures of those in power....
 72
 
 
This hints at a lack of confidence in individual ministers, but also suggests an expectation for 
decisions to be based on evidence, rather than partial accounts based on memory. The debates 
on the partition treaty saw a committee appointed ‘to state matters of fact’.73 When voting 
against the resolution on the Battle of Almanza in 1711, peers did so because they felt ‘the 
proofs which have been before the house were not sufficient to warrant the facts as they are 
stated in the question’.74 The house did use the papers it was presented with. In one debate on 
strengthening convoys, peers referred to the ‘one instance is given in the paper marked (A)’.75 
In 1703, the Lords undertook an ‘examination of more than two hours’ of the commissioners 
of public accounts and other officers.
 76
 The discourse of ‘facts’ was used justify protests, 
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with ‘no reasons more proper, than … [those] founded upon matter[s] of fact’.77 In a 
disagreement with the Commons, peers claimed their objections to a bill for preventing the 
export of corn were ‘ground…chiefly on a matter of fact; which if they are misinformed in, 
they shall be ready to agree with the Commons.’78 Especially when it came to justifying 
disagreements, the papers and data offered were a key tool in legitimising arguments and 
justifying disagreements. 
 It was also the perception by the wider public that peers made policy based on these 
statements of fact. Simon Clement wrote that having ‘come into the House of Lords’ when 
counsel were being heard against the bill for prohibiting the exportation of Irish woollen 
manufacture, he decided to provide his own ‘facts’, fearing the ‘partiality [of the] 
information’ from which ‘judgment is directed’.79 The same fears motivated Davenant, who 
sought to correct ‘misinformation as to points of fact’ during debates on the Africa trade.80  
Witnesses were explicitly called to committees to make out a ‘matter of fact’, or to be sworn 
‘to prove the fact, as to the merits of such bills’.81  In the Commons, witnesses ‘spoke...to 
facts’, with petitioners appealing to appear to ‘prove the said facts’. 82   
The most substantial ‘project’ the Lords led and undertook in this period was the 
estimation of the balance of trade.
83
 It had long been an issue for ‘mercantilists’, but in the 
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context of the Nine Years War and the trade bills of the 1710s, it became part of the clash 
between the whigs and tories. Its collection and estimation also shows the importance of 
interest-groups, who peers continued to rely on for information on overseas trade, raising 
concerns over the role of self-interest and its interplay with ‘objective’ political arithmetic. 
The creation of the post of inspector general of customs in 1696 is commonly seen as 
marking an important moment in the institutionalisation of political arithmetic in the activity 
of the state, being from this point a continuous series of customs data is available.
84
 The 
demand to set up this office did not come from the executive but from parliament, reflecting 
the impact of the growing legislative business on demands for impartial knowledge, as well 
as being a response to party conflict.  The context for the initial investigation into the trade 
balance in 1695 was the creation of the Scots East India Company, parliamentarians fearing 
the company would damage English interests.
85
 In response, peers asked the commissioners 
of customs to ‘make a return of the exports and imports of the trade’ for a three year period. It 
was at this stage they learnt ‘in 1674 there was a balance made up of what related to France 
only....this they had by tradition’, being the only account the Commons had had ‘at any 
time’.86 Davenant agreed, with the reports ‘laid before the lords, from the year 1692 to 1695’ 
the only source for the ‘divers branches’ of trade he could find, having ‘imperfect copies’ of 
them.
87
 Peers were also told by the commissioners that the state did not have the resources to 
estimate it, the task requiring ‘twelve able hands’ for both the outports and London for nine 
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Figure 11: Extract from Report on Imports and Exports. 
One of the most substantial projects the Lords undertook was an estimate of the balance of trade during the Nine 
Years War. This required examining twelve books of imports and exports, covering the period from December 
1692 to December 1695. This page is from PA, HL/PO/JO/10/5/4, 2 December 1694-December 1695.  
 
months, whilst other officials complained 1300 folios were involved.
88
 The result from this 
initial attempt to collate this information was a limited one, only producing a specimen 
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account of  trade to Holland and with warnings it was an approximate result, ‘perhaps not 
within forty percent of the real balance of trade’.89  
The judgement of the committee on these proceedings, however, helped to 
institutionalise the collection of trade data for aiding policy. Peers ordered: 
that the commissioners of the customs do make up an account every year of all the 
branches of the trade of this kingdom, outwards or inwards, to the end a perfect and 
particular balance of the said trade may appear; and the said account to be ready to 
be laid before this house when called for.
90
 
 
It was at this point that the commissioners wrote to the treasury, detailing ‘the usefulness of 
keeping a distinct account of the imports and exports of all commodities... recommending Mr 
Culliford for this special duty, under the character of inspector general’.91 Charles Davenant 
acknowledged the creation of the post was the result of parliamentary pressure when he held 
the post in 1704, writing that because of the ‘intention proposed by the lords’ a post had to be 
created in order to ‘serve the frequent orders of parliament’.92 He also praised the ‘excellent 
foundation’ that the House of Lords had in 1695, ‘which we hope some able head and good 
genius will so improve...to find out the balance of trade.
93
  
If the balance of trade was first raised in the context of competition with Scotland, the 
other incidences of its presentation also reflect the use and application of data in specific 
contexts. Between 1697 and 1702, concerns with smuggling and clandestine trade led to 
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peers returning to the subject. Peers ordered an account of the balance of trade for 1701, 
which ‘would be ready in a month’.94 This included estimates of the tobacco trade with the 
American colonies, the report arguing that the current governments were ‘nurseries of illegal 
trade...to the great prejudice of her majesty’s revenue and of fair traders’, determining an act 
be drafted for re-uniting the colonies.
95
 This pattern of demand for information in order to 
inform specific action was repeated again with more limited reports in 1702, when an account 
of trade since the last session of parliament was presented to the Lords to understand woollen 
imports between 1699 and 1701, and showing the ‘considerable increase in our exports of 
woollen manufactures’ compared to the 1660s. Demands for better information were a 
response to the clandestine trade with the colonies in 1697, Halifax using the report to claim 
the ‘plantations would eventually ruin us if they get the manufactures amongst them’, and 
complaining of the extent of smuggling.
96
 The policy result of these reports was improving 
the ability of government to increase tax yields and inform the deliberations of parliament on 
specific bills.  
When searching for data and information, peers first turned to members of the 
executive—particularly the treasury and the commissioners of customs. Despite the 
expansion of the central bureaucracy during this period, there still remained large gaps in the 
knowledge base of the state, especially in the realm of domestic economics and local 
conditions.  
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II. Political Arithmetic and Public Participation 
 
One consequence of the need of the state for information was the increased status and extent 
of public participation in governing. Whilst the nineteenth century saw the development of 
the modern ‘information state’ which reduced the need for non-experts and removed a point 
of contact with policy-makers, in the eighteenth-century parliamentarians and policy-makers 
were dependent on information provided by those whose only claims to knowledge were 
based on the locality they lived in or their occupation. This enabled an arena to exist for 
deliberation between ‘matters of facts’ and ‘interest’, and shows how far political arithmetic 
was a discourse of everyday. Whilst the later restriction of the sources of information to 
government had the effect of boosting its authority and status, the nature of the early modern 
state ensured private interests remained influential in the proposing and judging of policy. 
This highlights the key shift that Edward Higgs identified in state-sanctioned 
information gathering. It was not that the nineteenth-century ‘information state’ represented a 
new interest of government in statistics, but rather that information once held and known in a 
locality was transferred to the centre in the modern period.
97
 Knowledge previously found in 
local court records, papers of companies, parish books and local memory, rather than 
systematically in a central office or ‘database’, was transferred to the centre. This process 
reflected changing legislative practices. Whilst in the eighteenth-century legislation and 
regulation was based on local or interest-group initiatives, requiring public and interest-group 
participation, nineteenth-century central state activism was less compatible with extensive 
participation to the end of informing policy, at least in parliament.  
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A. Participation in Committees 
The profiles of witnesses and participants legitimised by the demands for facts and evidence 
can be divided into two parts, reflecting the nature of record keeping in early modern Britain. 
Whilst this section considers information formally present in committees, the second 
considers the role print played in enabling a wider demographic to influence parliament 
through the presentation of information and ‘facts’. 
The local dynamic to policymaking meant that in early modern Britain ‘local 
arithmetic’ was key to the process of fact-finding. Paul Griffiths has shown how local 
government collected data to inform its decisions from the beginning of the seventeenth 
century, with catalogues being made of the poor, the arrival of beggars, and the wealth and 
size of households in localities across England.
98
 Although these sometimes had central 
impetus—the demands set by the Elizabethan Poor Law, the Restoration Settlement Act or 
the Births, Marriages, and Burials Act of 1694, would be examples of this—record keeping, 
collection, and analysis of data would occur at a local level.  
This meant that although innovative schemes on public finance were in decline after 
the 1690s, the period having seen the instigation of the land tax, taxes on overseas trade and 
the establishment of a funded national debt, most other economic issues continued to rely on 
outside involvement, allowing political arithmetic to survive the more peaceful environment 
after 1713. However, much of this information was carefully controlled and regulated at a 
local level, with the access of the public to it operating on a ‘sliding scale’ of openness. 
Whilst acts and policies of corporations and companies would be relatively open and details 
of laws and fees publically displayed and announced, the spaces in which official records of 
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corporations and companies were held were far more restricted, mainly to clerks and 
principal members of the company or corporation.
99
 This reflected the political stakes of this 
information in the context of disputes between competing groups, and means that many who 
attended parliament to ‘make out the facts’ were part of established interests, or at least had 
good connections with them. As a result, it was the Russia Company who sent ‘copies of 
Russia goods at the outports for the year’ four times between 1703 and 1713 to parliament.100 
This was also true for legislation that was specific to a certain locality. The passage of an act 
for the construction of a turnpike road between Kensington and Brentford in 1717 saw the 
production of the ‘books of the land tax... [to] compute how much money might be raised for 
the repair of highways’ by three parish clerks, as well as ‘the window tax for Fulham, and 
other places in order to calculate how much money may be raised for six days work by the 
inhabitants’.101 When seeking to investigate deficiencies in 1696 duty on births, marriages 
and deaths, the Commons looked not to central collection as a solution, but ordered JPs to 
meet to ‘keep an exact register and deliver [it]...to the same petty session’.102 
The growth of legislative activity after 1689 would only have strengthened this 
secrecy. John Strype, when updating Stowe’s survey of London, found the bookhouse of the 
City of London ‘very difficult to obtain’, gaining access only with the help of ‘friends of 
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quality’.103 This echoed the experience of Davenant and King. Charles Davenant wrote he 
had to ‘grope in the dark, the common lights being withheld from him [on] some accounts of 
public revenue’, whilst the excise commissioners ‘refused any inspection into their books’.104  
This is not to say that the numerical information these books contained were inaccessible, 
rather that access was closely monitored. Lobbyists were often able to access and interpret 
state records, performing a role state officials would later perform—though this often 
required a helpful clerk. Henry Martin complained Daniel Defoe had better access to customs 
records in 1713, for ‘his interest is better...every office in the kingdom has been rummaged to 
equip him’.105 Luckily, Davenant had ‘recourse to a worthy gentleman of that company [the 
African Company]... [who] procured me a sight of their books...and accounts’ to aid his work 
on the Africa  trade.
106
  The leather bill in 1685 saw a certificate detailing the duty on leather 
taken from the custom house presented on the behalf of a group of leatherworkers to the 
committee.
107
 Meanwhile, the merchants of Exeter provided a list of customs for four years 
from the 1650s to the 1670s to argue French duties were prohibitive to their business.
108
 This 
practice echoed that of Gregory King, who discovered the produce of the land tax ‘from the 
Exchequer in King Lane’.109 
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Committees on national economic legislation were often supported with evidence that 
came from established individuals and companies. This meant data became intertwined with 
interests that were lobbying on bills before parliament. The Earl of Nottingham referred to 
the ‘confirmation’ offered to the house by ‘William Hodges and thirty other eminent 
merchants’ on the difficulties of trade after the Spanish trade bill passed.110 Witnesses and 
lobbyists recognised the gaps in estimating the balance of trade, with Mr Torriano knowing 
that for data on salt, the customs house ‘could not have it’.111 Some of the surviving records 
for the trade debates of 1713 can be particularly detailed. Mr. Cooke, the treasurer of the 
Levant Company, quoted the decline in exports of silks from Persia, with ‘whole streets left 
deserted’ during the 1690s and ‘comput[ed]’ details on the silk industry and the importation 
of silks into England.
112
 Mr Torriano’s speech on the trade bill provided the house with detail 
on brandy exports and the balance of trade, arguing that ‘the moral will still remain that the 
trade is destructive, unless it be carried on by high duties’.113  
But these companies and established interests could also lack information. This meant 
that parliamentarians often relied on the calling of witnesses to provide ‘thick descriptions’ of 
policy issues before it. The house ‘proposed to send for merchants who can inform the house 
as to the turkey trade... [and] that any merchants that please to come here shall be heard’, in 
order to understand the ‘state of the turkey trade...and particularly of the silk manufactures 
between years 1660 and 1678’.114 When searching for information on French trade duties, the 
commissioners of trade were told they ‘cannot find any English merchants to do so’, having 
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already failed to find data or printed records.
115
 An account of the economy of Languedoc 
was presented by ‘a merchant who has lived about twenty years in that province and 
constantly dealt in woollen manufacture’, due to the lack of official records or charted 
company.
116
 This practice had occurred earlier on the woollen trade with Ireland. This saw 
quantitative data offered on the amount of trade with Ireland on wool and a comparison of the 
costs of woollen manufactures.
117
 In this case, peers were reliant on correspondence 
merchants and clothiers had received from others and witness evidence heard by the house 
itself, who then ‘computed [details] on several sort of woollen goods’, including their prices 
and local circumstances in Ireland and Holland.
118
  
The absence of chartered companies in the domestic economy enabled more lowly 
and unestablished groups to participate in deliberations on the majority of the legislation that 
came before parliament. The Silk Importation Bill of 1694 saw weavers used to estimate the 
number of throwsters, the quantity of raw silk, and the length of employment in England.
119
 
Turkey merchants—rather than the company—provided the quantity of silk in London at the 
same time.
120
 The New Forest Act of 1698 ‘for the increase and preservation of timber’, 
required the attendance of twenty-two witnesses to establish the abuses that occurred there 
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and determine whether enclosure was necessary to preserve the woods.
121
 The Iron Act in 
1694 also saw ‘witnesses to make out the facts’ on the copper industry, whilst the Saltpetre 
Importation Act saw numerical reasoning occur on the use, trades and costs of saltpetre.
122
 
The Apothecaries Act in 1695 saw estimates made on the number of apothecaries, and the 
Fish Act of 1715 saw ‘Thomas Gosling examined to the price of fish...[and] Simon Kemp 
senior examined to the price and plenty of cobs and lobsters’. Others were heard on the 
numbers of ships and ‘even more on lobster prices’.123 As a result of this reliance on 
witnesses and lobbyists, much of this data was local and personal. During debates on wool 
from Ireland, a single sheet was presented on the ‘loss our nation sustains by the exportation 
of our wool’, using one pack of wool as its example.124 
It is important to note that in relying on witness evidence, peers were acting no 
differently to the professionalism of King or Davenant. Davenant had to rely on a 
‘manuscript written after the battle of Landen’ to estimate the crown revenue of France for 
his comparisons with the English war effort during the 1690s.
125
 Gregory King also needed 
data from local parishes in Staffordshire, London and Kent to estimate the national 
population.
126
 Indeed, the reliance on merchants and others for advice for political arithmetic 
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seems so widely known that Jonathan Swift satirised it in his Modest Proposal, having been 
‘assured by our merchants, that a boy or girl...when they come to this age [twelve]...will not 
yield above three pounds’ if sold.127  
 
B. Print and Participation 
 
Print was also an important means of informing parliamentarians of ‘facts’. In 1714, the 
Mercator referred to ‘the calculations and accounts....published by pamphlets and books, 
whether publically ordered, or privately procured from the customhouse, or from accounts 
kept in offices’.128 Print was an easily available and cheap mechanism for groups to lobby 
parliament with information, and a means of undermining the secrecy of information held by 
the state, corporations and companies.  
Significantly, print was used to provide a running commentary of debates in the 
Lords. The writer John Houghton noted that ‘according to the bills of entry, I can tell how 
much of every sort of goods came to London from each country, and from all countries last 
year, which perhaps may be useful to several persons who have business in parliament’.129 
This was repeated on 26 June and 9 October 1696, and 22 January and 5 February 1697, 
whilst parliament was considering trade issues.
130
 Charles Davenant’s Essay on the East 
India Trade was addressed to the Marquis of Normanby, ‘your lordship [being] pleased...to 
intimate, that you would willingly know my opinion in general of the East-Indies trade’.131 
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The same peer had also been sent work by Simon Clement on the balance of Irish trade with 
England in the late 1690s.
132
 The work of Lord Chief Justice Hales in his discourse on 
provision for the poor was used by the commissioners of trade in 1699 to show that wool and 
labour were cheaper in Ireland than England.
133
 Whilst following proceedings, Davenant 
hoped ‘their lordship[s] would be pleased’ to order more books from the 1670s to aid their 
work on the balance of trade.
134
 The pro-ministry publication, the Mercator, was able to print 
accounts of exports for debates on the French trade bill in 1713, and the Observator the same 
year was able to provide ‘exports and imports, as copied out of the custom house books in 
London’.135  
Fresh printed data was also presented to parliament and the wider public on these 
occasions, including for ‘local’ and specific acts of parliament. The author of an account of 
the Irish woollen industry claimed to have seen a  
whole discourse [that] takes up many sheets upon the trade of Ireland to all parts, 
and particular remarks upon every commodity exported and imported into that 
kingdom...and how it affects England. Some other things he reserved as secrets 
from me....for it was never seen by any but one beside myself. Out of the whole he 
has extracted an exact account of the exports and imports for one year in a medium 
out of six; and then distinguished what related to England, by what ships brought 
in, and out; then computed the value of each commodity.
136
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Another sheet provided an account of English goods traded with Ireland between 1692 and 
1697, and was advertised as being presented to parliament in the press.
137
  
In addition to the information from political arithmeticians and newspapers, short 
papers found their way directly into the hands of parliamentarians which provided them with 
information on which to deliberate. These could, in turn, flow out into the wider public 
sphere to inform public discourse. Echoing other uses of print explored in the previous 
chapter, this did enable a wider range of interests to offer information and ‘facts’ to the 
house,  undermining some of the secrecy that surrounded the data collected by companies and 
corporations. Like peers, Davenant found himself becoming dependent on these papers for 
his estimates, referring to ‘a paper printed in November 1675... [and] published...before the 
parliament’, to estimate the circulation of coin.138 He also used petitions from the inhabitants 
of Barbados and Montserrat to demonstrate computations by merchants in the case of the 
African Company had been wrong.
139
 He did the same when discussing the East Indies trade, 
with a paper printed ‘for clearing the debate, then before a committee of the parliament’, and 
again on the African Company through ‘printed abstracts...dispersed among the members of 
parliament’.140 Gregory King had to compare partisan accounts on the paper industry for 
information, having been ‘informed’ of the custom on paper via a printed paper of 1696.141 
The scheme of trade of 1674 was ‘reprinted at this time [1713], given about at the doors of 
our parliament houses and elsewhere, and made use of as the fundamental test or touchstone 
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of the French trade’.142 Even despite the absence of the votes for the House of Lords, 
pamphleteers and petitioners were able to know when to offer advice and detailed 
information to the house, and for non-established groups to participate in this discourse on 
facts. 
Davenant recognised the art of political arithmetic was ‘a sphere for lower capacities 
to move in, who can presume no further to find out and prepare materials’.143 Due to the rise 
of print and lobbying parliament after 1688, this proved to be the case. This meant the 
information produced by political arithmeticians would have been seen in a wider 
pamphleteering and interest-driven culture, posing a challenge to the trustworthiness of their 
data and its place within a divided and partisan culture.  
 
III: Political Arithmetic as a Challenge to the ‘Deliberative Oligarchy’  
 
If political arithmetic was a widespread discourse and part of partisan debate, then we need to 
consider its impact and attitude to political culture and how policy was made within its 
framework. Political arithmetic posed three challenges to the culture of deliberation. The first 
challenge was whether it became just another feature of the partisan culture of 
misrepresentation that Mark Knights has described, worsening divides as both ‘sides’ stood 
behind their numerical ‘truths’. Closely related to this was the second challenge, of whether 
the data was received in a rational public sphere (as Habermas assumed Britain was, before it 
‘decayed’ in the twentieth century), that would worsen the impact of the first, if it was not. 
The third challenge was the nature of the project that political arithmetic proposed. As a 
project, it sought to offer a more systematic and clear form of knowledge to ease decision 
making. But it was not implemented in that form, and if it had been would have challenged 
                                                     
142
 Mercator, 26 May 1713, Issue 1. 
143
 Davenant, Public Revenues, in Whitworth, Works, Volume 1, p. 143. 
237 
 
the extent Britain was a ‘deliberative oligarchy’ in this period. If it had truly eliminated 
disagreement in debate and resulted in a ‘tyranny of expertise’, this would have eliminated 
deliberative politics—which relied on engagement and compromise with a range of interests. 
Deliberative systems rely on the role of experts being balanced against experience and 
interest, rather than seen as above it.
144
 The failure of political arithmetic in this respect does 
not necessarily mean the method was completely at odds with the ‘liberal governmentality’ of 
the eighteenth century as Mary Poovey argued; but it needs to be recognised that apparently 
‘technocratic’ choices and arguments of logic are necessarily not neutral decisions, however 
much Petty believed them to be so.
145
 The taking of the ‘politics’ out of them proved harder 
than he had imagined, with a positive impact on engagement and participation through 
petitioning and local involvement.
146
  
In relation to societal attitude to numbers and arithmetic, these could create new 
disputes in themselves. As has been noted above, Michael Schudson has advanced the notion 
the late twentieth and early twenty-first century has developed into a ‘monitory democracy’, 
where unrepresentative bodies have increasingly taken to scrutinising the actions of 
representative institutions. This form of accountability may be seen in ensuring 
representatives voted the ‘correct’ way, and the voting lists of the early modern period are a 
well known element of the ‘rage of party’. But this feature may also be seen in those seeking 
to hold government and parliamentarians to account, whether this was by members of a 
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formal ‘government’ group, such as the commissioners of public accounts, or interested 
individuals in ‘crusades’ against corruption.  Although the spread of numbers and 
information could aid accountability, they could also be used to divide and contribute to a 
more divisive and mistrustful politics. This concern raises the question of whether there 
existed a self-evident truth that politicians were not trusted, leading to a system of ‘checking-
on, goading, and humbling’ those holding power, as part of the culture of cynicism and 
misrepresentation.
147
 The numbers and ‘facts’ that parliamentarians, ministers, and interests 
produced during parliamentary debates could be seen as the product of their self-interest. 
Mechanisms of parliamentary accountability of the state in this period have been well 
studied, particularly in relation to the public accounts and the persistence of a ‘country’ 
mentality. Historians have had a more positive interpretation on the work of the commission 
of public accounts work in recent years, but the perception of contemporaries was more 
mixed—particularly because the country mentality of contemporaries has been downplayed 
in recent works.
148
 Ideology, principle or party were part of the contemporary imaginings of 
politics, but interest, kinship, and ‘corruption’ also mattered. As a result, the idea of 
parliamentarians sitting on judgement on others appeared an injustice. John Toland attacked 
the ‘assembly of public robbers [who] will sentence one another...’ and questioned ‘whether 
the public accounts will be faithfully inspected by those who embezzle our money to their 
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own use?’149 Bishop Burnet said it was a ministerial plot to set up the commission, ‘for the 
bearing down and silencing all scandalous reports’.150 These demands for accountability did 
have the potential to undermine confidence in politics, as parliamentarians could not meet the 
expected standards of accountability. Toland asked 
whether a parliament filled with delinquents will ever call themselves to account, 
or what account would be given if they should? Whether an assembly of public 
robbers will sentence one another to be punished, or to make restitution? Whether it 
is possible our grievances can be redressed, [when they] are committed by persons 
from whom there is no higher power to appeal? Whether there is any hope of 
justice where the malefactors are the judges? Whether his majesty can be rightly 
informed in affairs relating to himself or the public, when they are represented to 
him only by such persons who design to abuse him? Whether the public accounts 
will be faithfully inspected by those who embezzle our money for their own use?
151
 
 
What were the sentiments that lay behind the ‘discoveries’ of facts and allegations of 
corruption, which the commission and ‘whistleblowers’ investigated?152 Robert Crossfield, 
campaigning against abuses in navy victualling, saw his activity as the ‘duty (which every 
man owes to his native soil) to bring [such] aggressors to open shame’.153  The commission 
of public accounts, far from being public ‘champions’, were seen as ‘by evasions and false 
allegations, on behalf of the criminals... [as having] delayed and stopped the laying open 
these grievances’.154 Crossfield also complained ‘all these enormous crimes were...hushed up 
the last session of parliament, by these gentlemen’s great ingenuity.155 He complained no 
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committee was appointed to examine the practices, because there were ‘diverse crafty and 
scandalous reports...that my design in bringing these complaints was not so much for the 
public good, as it was to cause heats and feuds in parliament to hinder the king’s affairs’.156 
Even Davenant perceived the work of the commission as picking up ‘only errors of the 
clerk...there has been no great mismanagement by the public officers’.157 Demands for 
accountability reflected cynicism towards parliamentarians, who despite having mechanisms 
of investigating corruption fell short of increased public expectations. Such mistrust was also 
possible within parliament, with Lord Haversham refusing to accept copies of letters during 
the investigation of the military conduct of Sir George Rooke, instead demanding the 
originals.
158
 Parliament was blamed for failing to uncover ‘facts’, with Samuel Baston 
arguing ‘the facts contained in the dialogue, are not yet examined in parliament’, forcing him 
to ‘print them again, to remind the parliament of the present miseries’.159 This suggests the 
answer to this distrust was to participate, rather than to withdraw from the public sphere. 
Toland argued the solution was not to blame MPs and peers, but ‘it’s our own fault if 
effectual care be taken not to manage whatever we given’, encouraging a shift to print to hold 
those to account; print becoming one means to circumvent and remind parliament of its 
duties, within a discourse where ‘facts’ helped umpire political passions.160  
The second threat political arithmetic posed was whether it contributed to a rational 
public sphere which would strengthen a culture of deliberation. Indeed, whether we can hold 
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up the public sphere as rational in this period is unlikely, even it was an established ideal.
161
 
Rather, we need to imagine reason and deliberation as existing alongside a culture of 
misrepresentation. Allegations of arithmetical lying and dubious accounting were part of 
party debates, particularly in relation to the trade bills of the 1710s. The use of fact was 
recognised as a useful political tool, contemporaries having found ‘that few particular 
instances in relation to fact...always makes a greater impression upon the minds of men than a 
general notion of things’.162 It was not surprising that party-politics intervened in this area. 
Because hired writers and interest groups presented such data, there were claims of lying and 
parliament being misled, ‘politicising’ political arithmetic. During debates on the French 
Trade Bill of 1713, the Mercator attacked the ‘accounts of the custom house’ and stated that 
it ‘proove[d] those accounts imperfect and false, and capable of giving no true estimate of the 
trade’, with all the papers presented being ‘amusements [or] appearances without any 
foundation’.163 They also questioned the report from the inspector general and the 
commissioners of customs, as they ‘are not upon oath, but they give an account which they 
are sure are right’, arguing the House of Lords ‘had good reason to suspect [them] for an old 
cheat’.164 Davenant claimed that merchants had provided ‘fallacious computations’ to 
influence their thoughts on the monopoly of the Royal African Company, and repeated the 
same in ‘taverns, coffee houses, and elsewhere...for battering men out of their senses,’ 
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highlighting the tension between self-interest and the data on which the executive and 
parliament relied.
165
  
These issues and concerns would not have gone away after the decline of party. The 
dispersed nature of government in Britain, the lack of central knowledge, and the local and 
interest-group origins of much legislation would only have meant these issues were constant 
in every bill or project. Even during proceedings on making Billingsgate fish market a free 
market in 1699, an argument occurred over the price of fish and led to ‘saucy’ remarks, 
resulting in insult and arrest.
166
 Both William Deringer and Perry Gauci concluded 
computational disputes over the French Trade Bill of 1713 were inconclusive, though the 
presence of such debates shows that numerical discourse was a common language, helping to 
govern civil conversation.
167
 Instead, the removal of the issue from the political arena 
removed the heats and tensions arising from the trade debates. The inability of numbers to 
resolve disputes in other situations when legislation was actually passed makes the 
circulation of power through several institutions more significant, as this would eventually 
create legitimacy when the policy was adapted to other interests and minorities. A statute 
passed by a majority (even of MPs and peers) was not enough to legitimise it and contribute 
to political stability—this required public participation in more extensive processes.  
This would mean that instead of fanning tensions, partisanship was worsened—or at 
least was so far reaching as to make numbers and arithmetic also questionable and weakening 
their capacity to provide ‘facts’ that both whigs, tories and interest groups could agree on. 
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What this highlights is the extent (perhaps unsurprisingly, though it did not stop 
contemporaries trying) that it was not possible to take the ‘politics’ out of arithmetic and the 
decisions that were to be made. This was a third challenge that political arithmetic made, 
indeed it was the central claim of Petty—that it was possible to explain and change the world 
‘by a very mean piece of science’, of which the greatest example was his plan for 
transplanting of the population  of Ireland.
168
 In his Political Anatomy of Ireland (1672), 
Petty argued: 
Sir Francis Bacon, in his Advancement of Learning, has made a judicious parallel 
in many particulars between the body natural and body politics and between the 
arts of preserving both in health and strength: and it is as reasonable, that as 
anatomy is the best foundation of one, so also of the other; and that to practice 
upon the politics, without knowing the symmetry, fabric, and proportion of it, is as 
casual as the practice of old-women and empirics.
169
 
 
This attitude towards politics was echoed by other practitioners. Peter Pett talked of 
becoming expert in the ‘science of politics’.170 Graunt desired ‘good, certain, and easy 
government...to balance parties and factions both in church and state’.171 Davenant hoped 
‘each man [would] submit his private interest and concerns to the common good of his 
country’, attacking those who had ‘more regard [to] the private interest’ rather than ‘the 
general good in public councils’ that ‘all the laws should tend to’.172 Davenant also attacked 
policies being ‘driven into the wrong measures by the majority’, rather than knowledge and 
experience.
173
 Part of this was a response to the ‘rage of party’, but it was also making a 
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broader attack on the language of interest and the pluralism involved in policy-making.
174
 
Each writer believed society was subject to ‘laws’ that could be discovered by inquiry, 
allowing government to reduce arbitrariness and its incapacity to act due to it being 
challenged by self-interested groups or those misled by ‘false knowledge’. The status of 
experts, therefore, would override the demands of interests. Self-interested groups that 
stopped reform would be relegated outside of decision-making to create ‘rational’ legislation. 
The attempt to make politics into a science was not without its critics. In addition to 
the reality of increased petitioning, pamphleteering, fears for property rights, and election 
activity that reduced the capacity of the central state to act this way, Jonathan Swift was one 
such figure who offered a critique of this project.
175
 In his Gulliver’s Travels, he praised the 
King of Brobdingnag for ‘not having hereto reduced politics into science, as the most acute 
wits in Europe have done’, instead ‘relying on common sense and reason’.176 He took up the 
subject again in his Modest Proposal, providing ‘computations’ to prove the advantages of 
selling children to ease the Irish economy, arguing, coldly, that the consequences of the 
calculations ‘are obvious’.177 By making a link between science and the undermining of 
religious and political life, he was arguing that the method sought to reduce the need for 
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wider debate and deliberation by this lack of compromise to interest and particularism. 
However, despite the ideology behind political arithmetic, the reality of a wider political 
culture that recognised the important role interest groups could play meant the method did not 
monopolise policymaking as it sought to do. Instead, it offered a partial means of conducting 
reasoned debate and judging the success and need for legislation. The rhetoric and methods 
of ‘facts’ and arithmetic provided an opportunity to balance the language of the ‘majority’ 
and ‘interest’, and to justify actions that seemed to be against these, but it was not capable of 
overturning it. 
 
IV: Conclusion 
 
Political arithmetic was an important means of imagining policy options and analysing them 
in the ‘long eighteenth century’. It may have been an imperfect method, Davenant describing 
it as ‘an art not yet polished’, but as William Deringer has shown, by ‘balancing 
probabilities’ the information was likely to be true and a recognition the information was 
partial, contemporaries were able to use it as one of the tools available to them.
178
 It was a 
language and method expected by peers and lobbyists alike, and if it was believed that others 
had not employed it, pamphleteers, writers and witnesses were keen to ensure ‘facts’ were 
evaluated for the service of parliamentarians. This culture shows the importance of the 
structural shifts in politics that resulted from the Glorious Revolution, the centrality of 
interest groups in the operation of the state, and the importance of the law and legal system as 
a force for innovation.    
Political arithmetic contributed to the maintenance of a plural political culture into the 
‘age of oligarchy’. The demands for information in the context of an early modern state that 
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lacked knowledge, especially on non-fiscal matters, had the opposite consequence of what 
Petty imagined the information itself would bring—namely a larger reliance on conflicting 
voices and interests. For parliamentarians to gain information they often had to use local 
officers and interests, transferring the culture of the participatory local state to Westminster. 
As has been seen, peers were firmly part of this political culture and showed no desire to use 
political arithmetic to silence debate or to allow the dominance of ‘professionals’ and 
‘experts’, enabling those with local or personal examples to stand alongside those with ‘hard’ 
data. Witnesses may not have been a new feature of parliamentary business after the Glorious 
Revolution, but wider cultural changes gave a new authority to groups unrepresented in 
parliament and a rhetorical tool to tie parliamentarians and participants to ‘facts’. This meant 
that witnesses, like petitioners, were not necessarily limited to established corporations, the 
propertied, or the titled—expertise and significantly, lived experienced, offered an alternative 
to these. The participation beyond those sharing common modes of ‘civility ‘and ‘politeness’ 
that Steve Shapin argued were important to establishing the credibility of those that sought to 
establish ‘truth’, suggests other languages and concepts were also used to understand and 
justify their role, especially given their commonality and continuing presence in 
parliamentary committees.
179
 
This culture meant arithmetic, especially when spread through print, did aid the 
moulding of a new political consciousness and created new expectations of parliamentarians 
and the parliamentary process. It provided a means for judging and evaluating their acts and 
the proposals of outside interests—even if resulted in an ‘expectations gap’, with complaints 
that ‘clear’ or ‘scientific’ arguments had not been followed by parliament. Not following 
these ‘facts’ heightened the awareness that interests, lobbyists, custom, and particularism—
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or, in short, ‘politics’—did alter what policies were being made. Political arithmetic was 
subsumed within certain interests or parties and helped to accentuate division, highlighting 
inequalities and winners and losers from policies. Data was often caught up in political 
debates and could be tarnished by the persons and interests from which it originated, 
weakening the method as a means of reconciliation or deliberation between interests, and 
flaming divisions instead. Hence, complaints by Davenant, King, and Houghton on the 
inequality of the proportion of the land tax or their demands to strengthen the excise and its 
officers, often fell on deaf ears
 
.
180 
But political arithmetic did have the potential to ‘close’ this culture down through its 
raising of numerical data and the arguments of arithmeticians to the level of an 
unchallengeable ‘truth’. There was a tension between political arithmetic and politics, just as 
there is between democracy and science—not only because science is meant to be the 
preserve of the elite, but scientists are meant to offer certainty and a clear path,  something 
not well suited to the form of deliberative oligarchy that Britain was in the eighteenth 
century.
181
 Political arithmetic as exposed by Petty had the potential to disrupt and weaken 
the deliberative discussion of policy, through raising the status of experts and data above 
those of more ordinary witnesses. In this way, political arithmetic echoed the majoritarian 
rhetoric of some petitions which also sought to undermine deliberation and politics. But it 
was the local nature of politics, the weakness of the executive and the lack of effective 
systematic knowledge that meant this potential went unfulfilled. This ensured participation of 
a wide range of groups selected by interest and experience, rather than solely ‘expertise’, was 
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necessary to fill these gaps in a culture that demanded ‘facts’. The lack of ‘hard’ arithmetic 
meant peers had to continue to balance experience and expertise, ensuring the presence of 
deliberation and negotiation with interests, helping to maintain political stability and 
legitimacy.  
This attempt at depoliticisation—the adoption of ‘rational’ processes and the 
dominance of ‘experts’ as conscious attempt to remove the conflicts inherent in open policy-
making—did not succeed. Despite the shift from the ‘rage of party’ to ‘age of oligarchy’, and 
the passage of the Septennial Act as a means of reducing the role of the public and taking 
some of the heat out of politics, few of these features of depoliticisation (and therefore 
declining participation and conflict) can be said to have been common after 1715. To sideline 
these features of political culture, trading them for the views and judgements of ‘expertise’, 
would have been to undermine the possibilities for meaningful engagement, compromise and 
the empowerment of disenfranchised groups, which was central to the nature of deliberative 
politics in this period. Instead, the ‘culture of fact’ acted like precedents in law—not 
overruling public participation, but something that all partisans mobilised and meant their 
arguments could be undercut by a discourse that both sides recognised as legitimate and the 
‘correct’ way to determine policy. The nature of a deliberative institution set out here 
suggests the reduction of the distinction between actor and spectator encourages reflective 
judgment, because deliberative dialogue was strongest in debates on specific matters of 
policy.
182
 An understanding and tolerance of the political system and other interests operating 
within it was something that active political agents learned and enforced through their 
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experience and participation in governing. A critical public sphere required a deliberative 
political system, and was strongest when applied in such institutional circumstances.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
250 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
Petitioning and Participation, 1688-1720 
 
We should have known the matter of this complaint very soon from other hands, by a just and 
regular application to those whose right it is to hear the complaints of the people, and whose 
glory as well as privilege it is to be able to redress them. 
 
The Just Complaint of the Poor Weavers Truly Represented (1719) 
 
They have considered your addresses 
Our noble peers could do no less. 
 
The Gentlecraft’s Complaint, or, the Jolly Shoemakers Humble Petition to the Queen and Parliament 
(n.p., c. 1702-1714) 
 
Petitioning in itself infers an owning of the government. 
 
 A Collection of State Tracts Published During the Reign of King William III (3 volumes, 1707), 
Volume 3, p. 574.  
 
That early modern Britain had a ‘petitioning culture’ is well known. Addresses and petitions 
were gathered to acclaim the accession of monarchs, to raise a grievance, launch legal 
appeals, and support parliamentary bills. In the 1640s, and again from the 1760s, petitions 
were signed by thousands in aid of campaigns against the church and crown, and later in 
support of campaigns for parliamentary reform and abolition of slavery. Petitioning 
parliament has a long and varied history and conjures up a number of different processes, to 
both contemporaries and historians.
1
 What this chapter examines is a specific form of petition 
                                                     
1
 The petitions of the 1640s are explored in A. Fletcher, The Outbreak of the English Civil War 
(London, 1981), pp. 192, 195, 224. For an overview of petitioning in the eighteenth century, 
see P. Fraser, ‘Public Petitioning and Parliament Before 1832’, History, 46 (1961), pp. 195-
211; J. Innes, ‘Legislation and Public Participation’, in D. Lemmings, ed, The British and 
Their Laws (Woodbridge, 2005); M. Knights, Representation and Misrepresentation in Later 
Stuart Britain (Oxford, 2005), Chapter 3. For the slave trade, see S. Drescher, ‘Whose 
Abolition? Popular Pressure and the Ending of the British Slave Trade’, P&P, 143 (1994), pp. 
136-66. 
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that has received less attention, namely those presented to parliament on legislative matters. 
Due to the records of the Lords surviving the fire of parliament in 1834, these petitions can 
provide systematic evidence on the extent of popular subscription and participation on 
matters before parliament, over an extensive time frame.
2
  Although they were not ‘political’ 
in the sense of demanding alteration to the church or the succession, the majority motivated 
by economic and social concerns, they were divisive, popular, sometimes part of national 
campaigns, and willing to claim to represent the ‘majority’ and argue legislation required the 
‘consent’ of those affected. These petitions had a significant role, mobilising the ‘politically 
hyperactive apprentices, articulate townsmen, and other unruly social inferiors’ that did not 
have a formal voice in parliament, in a period of time when the role of the electorate was 
being reduced, and most did not have a vote all at.
3
  
It is necessary to first briefly consider the forms of petitioning that existed in the early 
modern period, and which of them this chapter explores. Joanna Innes in her survey of 
eighteenth-century petitioning divided them into three forms.
4
 The majority of petitions to 
parliament were procedural in nature, signed by only a small number. These petitions were 
not in opposition to any policy, but used to introduce private bills or legal appeals to the 
                                                     
2
 Some petitions are examined in P. Gauci, The Politics of Trade: The Overseas Merchant in State 
and Society, 1660-1720 (Oxford, 2001); M. Knights, ‘Regulation and Rival Interest in the 
1690s’, in P. Gauci, ed, Regulating the British Economy, 1660-1850 (Farnham, 2011); W. 
Pettigrew, Freedom’s Debt: The Royal African Company and the Politics of the Atlantic Slave 
Trade 1672-1752 (Chapel Hill, 2013), Chapter 4. 
3
 G. De Krey, Restoration and Revolution in Britain: Political Culture in the Era of Charles II and the 
Glorious Revolution (Basingstoke, 2007), pp. 43-4. 
4
 Innes, ‘Legislation and Public Participation’, pp. 114-15.  
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Lords.
5
 The petitions which are the focus of this chapter are those that were contesting 
legislation already before parliament on both local and public bills, forming the second form 
of petitioning. These petitions were not of the procedural or legal type. In total, 56,000 people 
signed one of the 330 ‘large responsive petitions’ to the Lords that were presented on 
legislative matters between 1689 and 1720. These large ‘responsive petitions’, I define as 
having more than twenty signatures.
6
 William Pettigrew estimated only one percent of 
petitions to parliament in 1660 can be described as ‘counter petitions’, rising to twenty-four 
percent by 1713, making these large responsive petitions a more important feature of politics 
after 1689.
7
  ‘Political’ petitioning was the third form, of which the Kentish Petition of 1701 
calling on the tory Commons to act against France, the campaigns of the Episcopalian clergy 
for toleration in Scotland during 1703, or those inspired by John Wilkes in 1769 after his 
exclusion from the Commons, would be examples. In order to differentiate these 330 
petitions from those introducing business to parliament, the ‘adversarial addresses’ of the 
Episcopalians, the ‘political petitions’ of the Wilkites, and the ‘mass petitions’ of the 
Chartists, I refer to them as ‘large responsive petitions’ throughout, as they were produced in 
                                                     
5
 For the role of petitions in relation to private bills, see S. Lambert, Bills and Acts: Legislative 
Procedure in Eighteenth-Century England (Cambridge, 1971), Chapter 5.  
6
 Around 1300 people signed one of ninety-six petitions to the House of Lords in the same time period 
that had between ten and nineteen signatures. As more than a third of these petitions included 
bills dealing with estate, relief of creditors or naturalisations, I focus on petitions that have 
been signed by twenty persons. 
7
 W. Pettigrew, ‘Constitutional Change in England and the Diffusion of Regulatory Initiative, 1660-
1714’, History, 99 (2014), pp. 839-63, at p. 851; idem, ‘Regulatory Inertia and National 
Economic Growth: An African Trade Case Study, 1660-1714’, in Gauci, ed, Regulating, pp. 
25-40, esp. 26-30.  
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response to legislation and were not introducing issues to the political arena as later ones 
were.
8
 
This chapter examines the effect of the transformation of Parliament’s role as a 
legislative marketplace after 1689 on the pattern of petitioning activity and the extent of 
public involvement in the signing of petitions.
9
 In his Public Life and the Propertied 
Englishman, Paul Langford showed parliament was an increasingly important forum for 
middling sorts and communities to regulate their localities through statute, during what used 
to be seen as the ‘aristocratic century’.10 Stuart Handley has shown communities could 
petition parliament frequently, whilst Mark Knights has shown the late Stuart period saw an 
outpouring of addresses and loyalist subscription campaigns.
11
 Lois Schwoerer has 
highlighted a petition from London on the succession in 1689.
12
 Scott Sowerby, meanwhile, 
has used addresses to map support for James II’s religious policies.13 But what has not been 
possible in these previous accounts is any systematic investigation into the numbers 
                                                     
8
 For ‘Adversarial Addressing’, see K. Bowie, Scottish Public Opinion and the Making of the Union 
of 1707 (PhD, 2 volumes, Glasgow, 2004), Volume 2, Chapter 5, esp. pp. 196-8.  
9
 J. Hoppit  ed, Failed Legislation, 1660-1800: Extracted From the Commons and Lords Journals 
(London, 1997). 
10
 J. Cannon, Aristocratic Century: The Peerage of Eighteenth-Century England (Cambridge, 1984); 
P. Langford, Public Life and the Propertied Englishman, 1689-1798 (Oxford, 1990), Chapter 
3. 
11
 S. Handley, ‘Provincial Influence on General Legislation: The Case of Lancashire, 1689-1731’, PH, 
16 (1997), pp. 171-84; Knights, Representation and Misrepresentation, Chapter 3. 
12
 L. Schwoerer, ‘Press and Parliament in the Revolution of 1689’, HJ, 20 (1977), pp. 545-67, at p. 
552.  
13
 S. Sowerby, Making Toleration: The Repealers and the Glorious Revolution (Cambridge, Mass., 
2013), pp. 145-52, 194-212. 
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subscribing these petitions, the weight of opinion they reflected, and how petitioners 
legitimised and imagined their participation. But the archives of the Lords provide systematic 
evidence of all the petitions presented to it between 1689 and 1720. This allows us to 
examine who was signing these petitions, their geographic and social profile, and who 
parliamentarians and lobbyists deemed legitimate participants in the legislative process.  
This chapter, therefore, seeks to fill an important gap in our understanding of 
participation in parliament in a period in which petitioning and addressing can appear tranquil 
compared that seen during the Exclusion Crisis of 1679-1681, when up to 18,000 Londoners 
signed a ‘monster petition’, or when 45,000 signatures were gathered before the Gordon 
Riots of 1780.
14
 National (and sometimes, British) campaigns against the leather duty, landed 
qualifications for MPs, East Indies calicoes, Irish wool, trade bills, and regional campaigns 
on river and road communication, were collected and sent to the Lords throughout this 
period. Petitioning mobilised whole communities, divided them from their geographic 
neighbours or economic competitors, and saw language associated with ‘political petitioning’ 
mobilised in their defence. Given that most legislation was introduced in the Commons, the 
trend is suggestive of many tens of thousands more signing petitions that are now lost to the 
historian as a result of the fire of parliament in 1834. The practices of John Wilkes or the 
anti-slavery movement would have grown directly from these practices, in which 
disenfranchised were clearly participating. Contemporaries were able to argue a ‘sense of the 
                                                     
14
 M. Knights, ‘London’s “Monster” Petition of 1680’, HJ, 36 (1993), pp. 39-67; idem, ‘London 
Petitions and Parliamentary Politics in 1679’, PH, 12 (1993), pp. 29-46; Idem, ‘The 1780 
Protestant Petitions and the Culture of Petitioning’, in I. Haywood and J. Seed, eds, Politics, 
Culture and Insurrection in Late Georgian Britain (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 46-69.  For 
Scotland, see E. Black, ‘The Tumultuous Petitioners: The Protestant Association in Scotland, 
1778-1780’, Review of Politics, 25 (1963), pp. 183-211, at p. 199.  
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people’ was present and the ‘public’ was becoming a more significant force in politics, 
continuing to ignite partisan passions and concerns generated by public participation.
15
 There 
was a high level of engagement with parliament across at least three decades after the 
Glorious Revolution through petitioning.  
The act of petitioning aided the development of a different political consciousness, 
and kept many of the practices and rhetoric of the 1640s alive.  To petition was to make a 
claim about representation and the right to participate, with petitioners claiming the right to 
represent an ‘interest’, locality, or social group.16 They show that the wider public expected 
parliamentarians to act on their views and advice, making them aware they had ‘constituents’. 
Parliamentarians accepted this, taking steps to strengthen the status and importance of 
petitioning in the parliamentary process. The use of the concept of ‘interest’ to represent the 
arguments of petitioners and lobbyists in print helped to create ‘something called the sense of 
the nation’ and ideas of a ‘majority’ without democratic ideas, and identity without class.17  
Regardless of the role of elites in the creation of petitions, the nature and act of petitioning 
did influence how ‘ordinary’ people did and saw politics.  
This chapter begins by demonstrating the extent of large responsive petitioning on 
parliamentary bills during this period, in terms of its chronological and geographical scope. It 
then considers the impact of petitioning on political culture and the nature of the oligarchy in 
early modern Britain, and why parliamentarians had an increasingly tolerant attitude to this 
participation.  This involves a discussion on the basis and justification for petitioning—
                                                     
15
 Knights, Representation and Misrepresentation, pp. 94-108. 
16
 Ibid, Chapter 3, esp. pp. 112-113.  
17
 J. Baker, Character of the Modern Addresser (1701), p. 3; Knights, Representation and 
Misrepresentation, p. 352. 
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particularly the language of interest, the role of social status, and the importance of the local 
context to politics.  
 
I: ‘Responsive’ Petitioning: Chronological and Geographical Trends 
 
Petitions created in response to parliamentary bills were an annual and expected feature of 
parliamentary sessions, being a staple part of the process of deliberation on regional and 
national legislation. Their incidence will be considered here in both a late Stuart and early 
modern context. Late Stuart and early Georgian petitioning practices and techniques showed 
significant continuities with those of the 1640s and acted as powerful precedents for the 
growth of political petitioning in the second half of the eighteenth century. 
Between 1689 and 1720, 330 large responsive petitions were presented to the House 
of Lords. This represented a growing intensity from the Restoration pattern, with the more 
frequent meeting of parliament and higher rates of legislation after 1689. London’s ‘monster 
petition’ is likely to have been the apex of petitioning culture during the Restoration, rather 
than the exception, though as will be explored below, parliament received far fewer petitions 
during the Restoration than it did after 1689. The chronological incidence of large responsive 
petitions to the Lords is shown in table seven. There were two main prompts encouraging 
petitioning. The first were the economic policies pursued in the post-war periods, namely 
bills dealing with the woollen trade of Ireland in 1697, and trade with France and Spain 
during the 1710s. The second was the ‘working up [of] a temper’ of parliamentarians into a 
‘love of navigation’ after the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697 and again between 1717 and 1722, 
when projectors funded ‘bubbles’ in river and road communication schemes.18 The expansion 
in the number of projecting schemes in the context of the South Sea Bubble and the ‘calico  
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 BL, Add MSS 36914, Ashton Papers, River Weaver Navigation, fol. 84. 
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Table 7: Chronology of Large Responsive Petitions to the House of Lords, 1689-1720. 
Time period of 
Parliamentary 
Sessions 
Number of 
Signatures 
Average 
Number of 
Signatures 
per Session 
Total Number 
of Responsive 
Petitions (20 
Signatures or 
more) 
Number with 
Between 50 
and 100 
Signatures 
Number 
with more 
than 100 
Signatures 
1689-1694 19,807 225* 15 3 4 
1695-1700 10,935 2187 105 30 35 
1701-1706 2926 418 37 21 6 
1707-1712 1216 243 20 5 4 
1713-1717 4209 1052 38 14 15 
1717-1720 16,572 5524 112 23 50 
*Note: This average figure excludes a petition from Wales in 1689 signed by 18,000 people, which is 
further discussed below.  There were also two sessions in 1717, the second running into 1718, and so 
has been counted in the last time bracket. Sources: PA, HL/PO/JO/10/1, Main Papers; 
HL/PO/JO/10/6, Main Papers; HL/PO/JO/10/3, Main Papers (Large Parchments).  
 
crisis’, is likely to have caused this outburst of petitioning, rather than the absence of a 
general election since 1715.  
Knights has suggested that there may have been a shift from ‘innovative petitioning to 
a form of national acclamation’ in the late 1710s, threatening the growth of the public sphere 
and the critical debate this was supposed to entail
19
 The signing of addresses as means to 
represent loyalty and allegiance to the government, meant that the role of the public as a 
regular, and critical, arbiters of policy was weakened. If this had occurred in isolation, this 
would suggest that because the public increasingly choose to sign addresses to demonstrate 
loyalty and allegiance to the government, the public’s role as a regular and critical arbiter of 
policy was weakened. However, table seven suggests extensive public mobilisation 
continued, expanding participation and negotiation. Large responsive petitions to parliament 
raised and maintained partisan divisions in periods when addresses were few in number, as 
they were in the early 1690s and the late 1710s, ensuring ‘a civil war [rages] among 
neighbourhoods and societies’, through motivated by a ‘clash of interests’ rather than the 
                                                     
19
 Knights, Representation and Misrepresentation, p. 162.   
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‘rage of party’.20 The absence of petitions on religious issues in this chronology should be 
noted here. There may have been petitions sent to the Commons, with a petition from ‘the 
gentry and clergy of south parts of Lancashire’ presented in 1706 ‘for suppressing 
profaneness’, but few were sent to the Lords, even if petitions with less than twenty 
signatures are considered.
21
 It is possible the frequency of general elections provided a more 
attractive forum for the expression of religious partisanship. Unlike communication projects 
or economic regulation, where division was based on interest or locality, religion was a clear 
divide between whigs and tories, and so capable of being a determining factor in any electoral 
contest. Nonetheless, table seven shows responsive petitioning had become a significant 
feature of business in the Lords by the mid-1690s, and perhaps earlier in the Commons. 
There was no great contraction in the number of large responsive petitions during the period 
to 1720—a year that saw nearly one percent of adult males sign such a petition to the Lords, 
perhaps expanding closer to four percent if the petitions to the Commons followed the same 
pattern. The hostile rhetoric against the ‘more violent and lasting heats and animosities 
among the subjects’ found in the Septennial Act, the Riot Act, or against the Kentish petition 
of 1701 seems to have had little impact, if any, on the extent of public involvement in 
petitioning.
22
  
The pattern represented in table seven can only be taken as suggestive of the general 
trend of responsive petitioning. As Julian Hoppit has shown, most bills failed in the 
                                                     
20
 D. Defoe, A New Test of the Sense of the Nation (1710), pp. 82-3; 85-6; M. Knights, ‘Participation 
and Representation Before Democracy: Petitions and Addresses in Pre-Modern Britain’, in I. 
Shapiro, S. Stokes, E. Wood and A. Kirschner, eds, Political Representation (Cambridge, 
2010), pp. 45-6, Table 2.2; idem, Representation and Misrepresentation, p. 123.  
21
 Handley, ‘Provincial Influence’, p. 72.  
22
 1 Geo 1 st. 2 c. 38.  
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Commons, suggesting most petitioning would have occurred there, making the wider trend a 
different one.
23
 For example, straw hat makers presented thirteen petitions to the Commons in 
1719 when peers received none at all, and the national campaign against the leather duty saw 
154 petitions presented in 1697 to the Commons, and none to the Lords.
24
 Even bills that 
reached the Lords tended to receive fewer petitions, with the bill for navigating the River 
Tone in 1699 only resulting in one petition to the Lords, but six to the Commons.
25
 There 
could be specific factors why peers were petitioned instead of the Commons. The Commons 
was not as receptive to the inhabitants of Wales in 1689 as the Lords were, complaining ‘they 
had several petitions... [and because they] were not well obtained, they did not fit to read 
them’, causing them to present their petition to the Lords.26 Interests were sometimes willing 
to rely on one house, with the London Weavers’ Company only petitioning the Lords 
between 1718 and 1720, presumably reflecting the strength of their interest in that house.
27 
 
Neither can the fact that petitioners were simply ‘not informed of the nature of the bill in due 
time to lodge their petition’ in the Commons, be eliminated as a factor in why petitions ended 
up being presented to the Lords.
28
 As a result, the Lords’ data can only reflect a small 
proportion of overall subscription activity related to parliament. 
                                                     
23
 Hoppit, ed, Failed Legislation, pp. 14-15. 
24
 J. Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783 (London, 1989), p. 
233; CJ, xix, pp. 245, 249-52, 273, 276-7, 283. 
25
 CJ, xii, pp. 154, 423-4, 441, 465; LJ, xvi, p. 380.  
26
 CJ, x, pp. 103-4. 
27
 LMA, CLC/L/WC/B/001/MS04655/011, Weavers Court Minute Book, pp. 245(l), 290(l). 
28
 PA, HL/PO/JO/10/3/203/27, Petition of Several Landowners on or Near the River Douglas, 21 May 
1713. This petition was sent by post to ‘Mr Strewell, Attorney at Law in Cliffords Inn’. 
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The ability to appeal to other parts of the state and resolve issues at a lower level did 
impact on the incidence of petitioning to parliament—as well as showing the extent elites 
could be challenged at all levels. London companies and its corporation were subject to 
petitions, allowing the demands of interest groups to be redressed before parliament was 
involved. Sixty curriers petitioned the Curriers Company in January 1700, and one month 
later the company gave them twenty pounds to support their petition to parliament.
29
 The 
cheesemongers’ petition against the River Weaver navigation went through the common 
council twice before it was presented to the Lords.
30
 Parliament, however, received the 
largest petitions, being clearly perceived as the ‘proper’ recipient of popular pressure as 
opposed to the crown or any local bodies. Describing the ‘poor man’s petitioning at court’, 
Edward Wood described ‘how fruitless and empty the requests of the poor have returned at 
court, whether they have been for justice or mercy’.31 The treasury was also petitioned, but 
the petitions they received were smaller in size. A petition on the regulation of Hackney 
coaches had nearly 120 signatures, and was the largest it received between 1689 and 1720.
32
 
Neither was it just institutions that were petitioned, but personalities. The landholders of 
Frome petitioned Viscount Weymouth in 1710 before petitions were introduced into the 
House of Commons in order to gain his support, and sixty-five men signed the petition to the 
peer.
33
 Parliament served as a more attractive and effective point of contact for petitioners 
than the court. 
                                                     
29
 LMA, CLC/L/CK/B/002/MS06113/001, Curriers Court Minutes, pp. 77, 83. It is not possible to 
give precise dates for the curriers books, the records being badly damaged.   
30
 LMA, COL/CC/03/01/2, Common Council Minutes, January and March 1720. 
31
 E. Wood, Labour in Vain: or, What Signifies Little or Nothing (1700), p. 3.  
32
 TNA, T 1/31, Hackney Coachmen Petition, December 1694, p. 59. 
33
 PA, PET/1/33, Petition of the Landholders of Frome, 1710/11. 
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It can be seen that extensive participation in responsive petitioning was firmly part of 
late Stuart and early Hanoverian political culture. This has wider import than seventeenth- 
and early eighteenth-century historiography, however. The patterns and practices of 
petitioning in this earlier period showed a great continuity into the late eighteenth century, 
with the trends shown in table eight. The high level of petitioning reflects the fact responsive 
petitioning could be national in scope. Large numbers of petitions were received from across 
the English nation against the Leather Duty in 1697, with more than 150 petitions sent to the 
Commons, and the British nation in 1719 when 220 petitions were received by both houses 
on the Calico Bill.
34
 Between 1730 and 1732, 109 communities petitioned the Commons 
against the practices of hawkers and pedlars.
35
 This compares favourably with the sixty 
petitions against the Irish propositions of 1785, mainly from the Midlands and North Britain, 
the thirty-seven presented on economical reform in 1780, or the thirty-eight petitions on the 
Middlesex election affair in 1769 (though these were on ‘political’ issues).36 It is also at a 
comparable level to the 1640s, when thirty-eight out of the forty English counties sent a 
petition to the Commons between December 1641 and August 1642, and sixteen petitions 
were received against the decay of trade in 1642.
37
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 PA, HL/PO/JO/10/3/212/39-68, Petitions on the Calico Bill; CJ, xix, pp. 180-391. 
35
 J. Price, ‘The Excise Affair Revisited’, in S. Baxter, ed, England’s Rise to Greatness, 1600-1763 
(Los Angeles, 1983), p. 293. 
36
 D. Schweitzer, ‘The Failure of William Pitt’s Irish Propositions 1785’, PH, 3 (1984), pp. 129-45, at 
p. 132; J. Bradley, Popular Politics and the American Revolution (Macon, Georgia, 1986), p. 
3. 
37
 B. Kümin and A. Wügler, ‘Petitions, Gravamina and the Early Modern State: Local Influence on 
Central Legislation in England and Germany (Hesse)’, Parliaments, Estates and 
Representation, 17 (1997), pp. 39-60, at p. 52; Fletcher, The Outbreak of the Civil War, pp. 
192, 195, 224. 
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The level of national petitioning reflects a consciousness of a shared grievance and 
capacity for national organisation, even if petitioners’ descriptions of themselves retained 
their specificity of locality and interest. London curriers requested their clerk to write to 
others in the country to ‘desire their assistance in money and making interest of the members 
of parliament to promote’ the act, and on a further occasion entered correspondence with 
those in Bristol to draft a petition.
38
 The London weavers also sent copies of their petition to 
Norwich in November 1719 to encourage it to follow suit.
39
 The ‘brother’ ports of Kent and 
Sussex were active in coordinating petitions along the southeast coast in the 1710s and 1720s. 
The Mayor of Folkestone was able to gain the support of Great Yarmouth to act for ‘our own 
common interest’, whilst in London he ‘hear[d] several petitions will come up on that subject 
from many places’.40 The response of the mayor to the presentation of petitions from the 
‘western towns’ was to ‘get a petition from your town with all expedition signed by as many 
hands as you can get, I hope Hythe, Sandwich, Dover, Rye and Hastings will do the same’.41 
The final petitions were jointly agreed by the ports.
42
 London was an important keystone in 
this, but petitioning campaigns from across Britain were also organised in the localities. 
Cheshire tanners showed such a capability. They wrote to ‘all the county towns in the north 
and west of England’ on leather issues.43 They planned to ‘join our petition with...several  
                                                     
38
 LMA, CLC/L/CK/B/002/MS06113/001, Currier Court Minutes, p. 83; 
CLC/L/CK/D/001/MS14346/003, Currier Annual Accounts, p. 159.  
39
 N. Rothstein, ‘The Calico Campaign of 1719-1721’, East London Papers, 7 (1964), pp. 3-21, at p. 
9. 
40
 CKS, NR/AZ/79, Mayor of Folkestone to New Romney Borough, 26 March 1716, fol. 1.  
41
 CKS, NR/AZ/79, Same to Same, 12 April 1716, fol. 1.  
42
 CKS, NR/AZ/79, Towns of Winchelsea, Rye and Hastings to New Romney Borough, 17-18 April 
1716, fol. 3. 
43
 CA, ZG 21/8/25, Letter from Northern Tanners to Tanners of Chester, 1712?  
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Table 8: ‘Large Responsive Petitions’ Presented to Parliament, at Select Periods, 1660-1815. 
 
Period House of Lords 
House of Commons (General 
Bills)
44
 
1660-1665  113 
1666-1670  38 
1671-1675  19 
1676-1681  19 
1689-1694 15  
1695-1700 105 
136 [1694-5 only] 
154 [Leather Duty, 1697] 
1701-1706 37  
1707-1712 20 86 [1708-9 only] 
1713-1717 38  
1717-1720 112 369 [1719 only] 
 
1779-1784 33  
1784-1789 141 880 
1789-1794 - 519 [anti-slavery only] 
 
1800-1805 - 1026 
1810-1815 
700 [1811 only; 
Nonconformist Minsters] 
4498 
Sources: In addition to those listed under table seven; CJ, viii- xix, LJ, xiv-xxi; Reports From 
Committees, 1831-2, (London, 1832), Volume 5, p. 10; Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p. 233; Hoppit, 
Failed Legislation , p. 19; Innes, ‘Legislation and Public Participation’, pp. 117-19, C. Leys, 
‘Petitioning in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries’, Political Studies, 3 (1955), pp. 45-64, at p. 
57; M. Rutz, ‘Politicizing of Evangelical Dissent, 1811-1813’, PH, 20 (2001), pp. 187-207.  
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 Due to the loss of records for the Commons in the fire of parliament in 1834, in order to enable a 
comparison petitions presented to the Commons on general bills have been counted for the 
figures before 1720. ‘General’ does not mean governmental, but that the bill reflected more 
than an individual and had a larger geographic scope. However, not all of these petitions 
would have been heavily-subscribed—for example PA, HL/PO/JO/10/1/413/140(c), Petition 
from Divers of the Inhabitants of the Counties of Bedford, Buckingham, and Hertford, 14 
August 1689. This had only four signatures despite its suggestive title.  
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others of the like nature from Bristol, Exeter, Worcester, Gloucester, Sudbury and 
Shrewsbury and other places’.45 They had already written ‘to our brethren in the country of 
Cumberland, to whom was enclosed a copy [of] proposals for additional duties on leather’ 
they had received as intelligence from parliament.
46
 They also received letters from the 
Bristol tanners on the progress of petitions.
47
 Even dispossessed groups were able to show 
national co-ordination. The Cry of the Oppressed recorded that sixty-five debtors prisons 
were informed that there was a bill in parliament for their relief, and were advised ‘to petition 
all the members of the several counties... [and] particularly the Fisherton prison in Wiltshire, 
sent me word they had petitioned thirty-one members of the House of Commons’.48  
This culture was not solely a feature of London or wider urban society, with extensive 
subscription campaigns occurring in the localities and more rural regions, although London 
was a great source of its strength. The geographic distribution of large responsive petitions is 
shown in table nine. London presented sixty-nine petitions, or twenty percent of the total. The 
distribution of petitions reflects the nature of the issues that motivated them. River navigation 
and port improvements resulted in petitions from Yorkshire, Cumberland, and the northern 
Midlands, whilst the regulation of the cloth and woollen industry inspired petitions from the 
West Country, and the enclosure of the New Forest created petitions from Hampshire. The 
largest responsive petition came from Wales, with 18,000 signatures—equivalent to the entire 
‘voterate’ of the province, relating to the abolition of the Council of the Marches. The ‘final’ 
union of Wales and England was embraced by the Welsh, and initially in spite of opposition  
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 CA, ZG 21/8/59, Ralph Doll to Thomas Wilson, 4 April 1717. 
46
 CA, ZG 21/8/30, Letter from William and Thomas Wilson to Edward Croughton, 13 March 1711. 
47
 CA, ZG 21/8/32, Letter from Bristol Tanners to Chester Tanners, 18 March 1712. 
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 M. Pitt, The Cry of the Oppressed (1691), p. v.  
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Table 9: Geographic Distribution of Large Responsive Petitions and their Signatories to the 
Lords, 1689-1720 
 
Regions (in Descending Order) 
Number of Large Responsive 
Petitions per Thousand People 
London 0.14 
North 0.07 
Southwest 0.07 
Midlands 0.03 
Southeast 0.03 
East Anglia 0.02 
Wales 0.01 
Scotland 0.00 
 
Regions (in Descending Order) Signatures per Thousand People 
Wales 45 
London 21 
Southwest 10 
North 8 
Midlands 2 
Southeast 2 
East Anglia 1 
Scotland 0 
Note: Thirty-six petitions make no reference to their location, and so are not recorded in this table. 
Sources: see references under table seven. The regions are those used in P. Clarke, ed, The Cambridge 
Urban History of Britain, 1540–1840 (3 volumes, Cambridge, 2000), Volume 2, p. 30—apart from 
London, which is shown separately here. Population figures are from E. Wrigley, ‘Rickman Revisited: 
The Population Growth Rates of English Counties in the Early Modern Period’, EcHR, 62 (2009), pp. 
711-35.  
 
from William III.
49
 Significantly, the court had been re-established in 1660 with the support 
of petitions signed by 3000 people sent to the crown from Worcester, Hereford and 
Shropshire. The court’s judgements had been frequently subject to prohibitions by other 
courts, halting the implementation of its judgements.
50
 Petitioners argued the court was 
‘oppressive’, ‘useless’, and ‘different to other courts’, and, as such, it was removed as part of 
                                                     
49
 The ‘voterate’ refers to the number of electors actually voting, as only in a small number of 
constituencies is it possible to provide estimates of the ‘electorate’. The figures are from HP 
1690-1715, Volume 2; H. Foxcroft, ed, Life and Works of Sir George Savile, First Marquis of 
Halifax (2 volumes, London, 1898), Volume 2, p. 210. 
50
 PA, HL/PO/CO/1/5, Committee Book, 11 and 13 June 1689.  
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the Glorious Revolution, marking out well the significance of the institutional revolution 
between crown and parliament that resulted from the events of 1688/89.
51
 
Although no large responsive petitions came from Scotland to the Lords, Scots also 
had a strong petitioning culture. Forty petitions were sent to the Commons from Scotland on 
the Calico Bill in 1719 and petitions were part of its Glorious Revolution.
52
 Narcissus Luttrell 
recorded ‘there is a petition by several thousand hands for the settlement of that kingdom 
according to the example of England’ in April 1689, and petitions were also collected to 
dissolve the union in 1713.
53
 As Karin Bowie has explored, seventy-nine addresses were 
organised against the Treaty of Union in late 1706 and early 1707, representing the hostility 
of around 20,000 subscribers, with different communities able to shape the messages of each 
address.
54
 The lower levels of Scottish legislation at Westminster meant national institutions 
in Scotland were more common recipients of popular pressure, but petitions were presented 
to the Commons in defence of Scottish linen interests throughout the 1710s.
55
 In August 
1709, the General Assembly received ‘addresses subscribed by some thousands of hands 
from Edinburgh...against... [the] abuses’ of the Episcopal minister James Greenshields. He 
had appealed to the Lords from the Court of Session against the suppression of his reading of 
                                                     
51
 C. Skeel, The Council in the Marches of Wales: A Study of Local Government During the Sixteenth 
and Seventeenth Centuries (London, 1904), pp. 167-8; TNA, SP 29/27-39, Petitions on the 
Council of the Marches, 10 July 1661, fols. 84-131. 
52
 CJ, xix, pp. 180-391.  
53
 N. Luttrell, A Brief Historical Relation of State Affairs (6 volumes, Oxford, 1857), Volume 1, p. 
518; Daily Courant, 22 September 1713, Issue 3726. 
54
 Bowie, Scottish Public Opinion, Volume 2, pp. 187-90, 207. 
55
 B. Harris, ‘The Scots, the Westminster Parliament, and the British State in the Eighteenth Century’, 
in J. Hoppit, ed, Parliaments, Nations and Identities (Manchester, 2003), p. 128; Idem, 
‘Towards a British Political Economy’, in Gauci, ed, Regulating, pp. 83-106, esp. pp.93-7.  
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the English liturgy in Scotland.
 56
 The Convention of the Royal Burghs also served as a 
significant point of contact for Scottish localities after 1707.
57
  
The proportion of the population signing petitions in this early period compares 
favourably with their later eighteenth-century counterparts, which are shown in table ten. In 
contrast to the Wilkite petitions which gathered signatures from qualified electors, campaigns 
in the later Stuart period on legislative issues did involve those from the lowest levels of 
society and those formally excluded from power.
58
 Wilkite petitions claimed they were 
signed by ‘electors’ and ‘freeholders’, with over eighty percent of Middlesex petitioners in 
1769 having voted the previous year, whilst ninety-percent of petitioners from 
Northumberland and Hereford had.
59
 Even if this was the case with earlier petitions, their 
language does not reflect any significance being attached to whether they could vote. Only 
three of the twenty-six petitions in 1780 referred to ‘inhabitants’ and one of the twelve 
presented for parliamentary reform in 1783.
60
 From the 330 large responsive petitions 
presented between 1689 and 1720, it is clear those signed by ‘gentlemen’ were a minority. 
Whilst ninety-six large responsive petitions included the description of petitioners as 
 
                                                     
56
 T. McCrie, ed, Correspondence of Reverend Robert Wodrow (2 volumes, Edinburgh, 1842), 
Volume 1, pp. 30-1. 
57
 The records of the convention are found in J. Marwick, ed, Convention of the Royal Burghs of 
Scotland (7 volumes, Edinburgh, 1870-1918). Some economic business of the Convention 
before the Glorious Revolution is explored in J. Toller, ‘Now of Little Significancy’? The 
Convention of the Royal Burghs of Scotland, 1651-1688 (PhD, Dundee, 2010), especially 
Chapters 1-2, 5.  
58
 Innes, ‘Public Participation’, p. 116.  
59
 J. Phillips, ‘Popular Politics in Unreformed England’, JMH, 52 (1980), pp. 599-625, at p. 605.  
60
 Ibid, p. 607.  
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Table 10: Number of Signatures on Large Responsive Petitions at Select Points, 1695-1780 
Parliamentary 
Session 
House of 
Lords 
Signatures 
Proportion 
of 
‘Voterate’ 
Percentage 
of Adult 
Males 
House of 
Commons 
signatures 
(pre-1720 
Projected) 
Percentage 
of 
‘Voterate’ 
(incl. 
Lords pre-
1720) 
Percentage 
of Adult 
Males 
(incl. 
Lords pre-
1720) 
1695/6 2067 0.8 0.1 14,795 6.3 0.9 
1696/7 1460 0.5         
1697/8 6493 2.4 0.3 
18,954 
(leather 
duty 
only) 9.5 1.3 
1705/6 1743 0.7         
1713/14 1796 0.7         
1719/20 15,706 5.7 0.8 53,170 25.8 3.6 
 
1769 
   
60,000 
[Wilkite 
Petitions] 
c.25 
 
1780 
   
60,000 
[Reform 
Petitions] 
c.20 
 
Note: Figures for the Commons are estimates, with no petitions surviving. Sources: In addition to 
references listed under table seven; ‘voterate’ figures from HP 1690-1720, Volume 2; Phillips, 
‘Popular Politics’, pp. 602-3 for 1769 and 1780 data. Figures of population are from P. Wallis, 
‘Labour Markets and Training’, in R. Floud, J. Humphries and P. Johnson, eds, The Cambridge 
Economic History of Modern Britain, 1700-1870 (2 volumes, Cambridge, 2014), Volume 1, p. 192, 
Table 6.2. This assumes that a third of the population were under fourteen, and a population of 5.21m 
in 1701 and 5.5m in 1721. A sex ratio at baptism of 104 males to 100 females has been used, from 
Wrigley and R. Schofield, The Population History of England, 1541-1871 (Cambridge, 1989), p. 225, 
Table 7.13.  
  
 ‘inhabitants’, only forty-three included ‘gentlemen’, and seventeen of these were signed 
alongside ‘inhabitants’. Equally, there were only thirteen occurrences of the use of the terms 
‘chief’ or ‘principal’ inhabitants, which are likely to reflect the status of petitioners as rulers 
of a parish and the signatories being firmly of  the ‘middling sorts’ of people.61 This reflected 
the attempts of local communities to ‘pull together’ and represent a unified front—an 
                                                     
61
 H. French, ‘The Search for the “Middle Sort of People” in England, 1660-1800’, HJ, 43 (2000), pp. 
277-93; idem, ‘Social Status, Localism and the “Middle Sort of People” in England 1620-
1750’, P&P, 166 (2000), pp. 66-99, at pp. 76-7. 
269 
 
‘interest’—to parliament, reflecting the presence of an alternative social perspective to one 
based on rank and hierarchy. It also reflects the wider opportunities for public participation 
on non-‘political’ issues. 
It is clear that petitioning entered a different phase in the nineteenth century, with 
petitions from the chartists reaching into the hundreds of thousands, but the pre-democratic 
age still saw high levels of participation on bills dealing with the everyday functioning of 
society and the economy. The 1706 bill for building a pier at Parton in Cumberland saw one 
in twenty adult males of the county petition the House of Lords alone.
62
 The same proportion 
is likely to have signed a petition in Hereford on the Wye and Lugg navigation of 1696.
63
 The 
Welsh petition of 1689 was a larger petition than the ‘monster’ one collected on the streets of 
London during the Exclusion Crisis.
64
 A number equivalent to a fifth of the ‘voterate’ of 
Wiltshire was mobilised to petition to the Lords alone on the wool industry and road 
communication in 1714 and 1717 respectively, whilst subscribers equivalent to half the 
‘voterates’ of both Chester and Durham were mobilised against river projects.65 If petitions to 
the Commons had survived, it is likely nearly 11,000 signed a petition on the Night Watch 
                                                     
62
 PA, HL/PO/JO/10/3/195/10(a), Petitions on Parton Pier and Harbour Act, 1706; Population figures 
from Wrigley, 'Rickman Revisited’, p. 721, Table 3. 
63
 PA, HL/PO/JO/10/3/187/32, Petition of Freeholders of the Hundred of Ewias Lacy, 4 March 1696; 
HL/PO/JO/10/1/482/1017(a-d), Petitions on the Wye and Lugg Navigation Act, 29 February- 
4 March 1696 . 
64
 Knights, ‘Monster Petition’; PA, HL/PO/JO/10/1/408/80, Petition of the Inhabitants of Wales, 
1689.  
65
 ‘Voterate’ figures from figures from HP 1690-1715, Volume 2. Petitions from PA,  
HL/PO/JO/10/3/205/15-17, Petitions on the Woollen Industry, 1714; HL/PO/JO/10/3/208/19-
27, Kensington Road Act, 1717; HL/PO/JO/10/3/212/20-38, River Weaver, 1720; 
HL/PO/JO/10/6/271/4026 and HL/PO/JO/10/3/208/10-11, River Wear, 1717.  
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Bill of 1719 from Westminster.
66
 In this context, the gathering of 60,000 signatures in 
support of Wilkes in 1769 looks far more like a continuation of a late Stuart culture.
67
 The 
ability to mobilise between one and four percent of the adult male population on occasion 
after the Glorious Revolution, means that although petitioning was at a lower level of activity 
compared with the mass-platform and chartist petitions of the nineteenth century, large 
numbers of petitioners were nonetheless mobilised and a ‘sense of the people’ was present 
and maintained. Petitioning between 1689 and 1720 was on a scale, at least in terms of 
petitions to parliament, not seen since the 1640s and offered some early parallels to the 
collection of thousands of signatures on petitions relating to economic bills in the 1780s.
68
 
What changed was less the scale of petitioning across the eighteenth century, but the shift of 
the public from ‘responding’ to parliamentary bills, to initiating debate.  
The number of large responsive petitions suggests public participation in legislating 
and ruling of Britain was an established feature of political culture in the late Stuart and early 
Georgian period. The next section considers the conventions and rules governing petitioning 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
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 PA, HL/PO/JO/10/3/212/79-85, Petitions on the Night Watch Bill, 12 April 1720; 
HL/PO/JO/10/6/307(a-b), Petitions of Westminster on the Night Watch Bill, 28-29 April 
1720; CJ, xix, pp. 233, 250, 255, 258, 260, 296. 
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p. 179. 
68
 J. Innes, ‘People and Power in British Politics to 1850’, in idem and Mark Philp, eds, Re-Imagining 
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II: Parliamentary Attitudes to Petitioners.  
 
The scale and frequency of large responsive petitions after 1689 would have been a fairly 
novel experience for parliamentarians. As can be seen from table eight, the Commons 
received only 189 petitions on general bills during the Restoration, many of which would 
have had fewer than twenty signatures, whilst 154 petitions were presented against the leather 
duty to the Commons in 1697 alone. Although parliament remained ‘secretive’ in some 
respects after 1689, with the Lords continuing to refuse printing even a summary of its 
proceedings, as the Commons did in the form of its votes, everyday participatory practices 
reflected changing expectations of both parliamentarians and those ‘out of doors’ to public 
participation. Peers and MPs increasingly saw participation as desirable and necessary for the 
functioning of legislative business, and took steps to organise and regulate participation 
through petitioning, rather than seeking to reduce and suppress it. In this form, practices of 
responsive petitioning and participatory lobbying continued to be informed by the practices 
advanced in the 1640s.
69
   
Parliamentarians did act against petitioners responding to legislation this period—but 
primarily if they were intimidating either house or threatened to riot when signatures were 
being collected.  Both the ordinance Against Tumultuous Assemblies Under Pretence of 
Preparing Petitions of 1648 and the 1661 act Against Tumults and Disorders Upon Pretence 
of Preparing or Presenting Public Petitions or other Addresses, placed similar limits on 
petitioning. They both had their origins in concern for ‘political petitioning’, but they also 
contained clauses that helped to regulate the numbers of petitioners appearing at 
Westminster. The 1661 act is often interpreted alongside the Licensing Act of 1662 as 
attempts to ‘prevent the more effective involvement’ of the public in politics, discouraging 
petitions signed by more than twenty people and the use of print to publicise them. However, 
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 J. Peacey, Print and Public Politics in the English Revolution (Cambridge, 2013), Conclusion. 
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the aim of the 1661 act was to hinder the creation of ‘political petitions’ and suppress the 
violent presentation or creation of all petitions.
70
  
As Norman Smith noted, the 1661 act restored the ordinance on petitioning of 1648 
almost verbatim, reflecting the common attitude of parliamentarian and Restoration regimes 
to petitioners.
71
 The 1661 act may be seen as restoring an ordinance declared void as part of a 
wider practice of Restoration, in the same vein as the Navigation Acts. The primary 
difference between the limits in 1648 and 1661 lay in their definitions of the number of 
presenters required to threaten intimidation. Although there was a reduction from twenty to 
ten between 1648 and 1661, suggesting more restrictive attitudes, this echoed the practice of 
the City of London throughout the 1650s. The requirement that presenters delivered their 
petition to an MP or peer as a ‘buffer’ between parliament and petitioners, was absent from 
the act of 1661.
72
 Both laws identified the same remedy, having identified the same target of 
petitioners who had caused ‘mischief…and bloodshed’ in the view of the ordinance, or the 
‘late unhappy confusions and calamities’ that created ‘like mischief’ for the act.  
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 Knights, Representation and Misrepresentation, pp. 126-7; P. Seaward, The Cavalier Parliament 
and Reconstruction of the Old Regime, 1661- 1667 (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 72-3; J. Scott, 
England’s Troubles: Seventeenth-Century English Political Instability in European Context 
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What MPs and peers feared was their intimidation by large crowds, who would ‘fright 
him [a peer] into unwilling compliance’.73 In the sights of both the ordinance and act were 
intimidatory acts of petitioning. In a series of articles on petitioning published in early 1706, 
the Review of the Nation noted tumultuous rioting associated with a petition meant ‘the thing 
ceases to be...a petition, and becomes a demand, a force, or threatening of force...and cannot 
be called petitioning’, becoming instead an act of ‘opposition to authority’.74 Such fears can 
be seen in the reactions of parliamentarians to petitioners in 1648, 1660 and 1689.  
 The immediate context for the ordinance of 1648 was ‘violence [being] offered to 
both houses’ that placed ‘force upon the parliament’.75 On 16 May the numbers of 
apprentices and Londoners had been so great as to block access to the house, whilst the next 
day saw a ‘riot at the door’ with the ‘gentlemen and freeholders of Surrey’ threatening to 
‘take the blood of the house’.76 On 20 May, after only a gap of one day, the ordinance 
‘regarding tumultuous assemblies under the pretence of presenting petitions’ was passed by 
both houses. This same context of responding to a specific series of violent events was also 
present in the Restoration. In 1660, the Commons journals suggest members were subject to 
pressure from demobilised soldiers who ‘continually attend[ed]’ the ‘house door’, presenting 
twelve petitions during the 1660 and 1661 sessions, one by 2500 soldiers and 3000 widows.
77
 
Mass intimidation was also a concern during the passage of the 1661 act, with two orders to 
clear the Lords’ lobbies. The only other orders passed after 1661 during the Restoration refer 
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to the controlling of space around the court of requests and once from the lobby of the Lords 
in 1663, suggesting an absence of crowds and large groups of petitioners after 1661.
78
  
The same fears of violence were present in 1689, and caused the Lords to reject two 
petitions. The first petition to be rejected was ‘the humble petition of a great number of 
citizens and other inhabitants of the Cities of London and Westminster’ which ‘desire[d] 
the....Prince of Orange... [to] be speedily settled on the throne’.79 Significantly, the petition 
‘was not signed’, but presented ‘in a tumultuous manner’.80 It was noted ‘the gang’ said ‘if 
[they were] not satisfied, [they] will come themselves’ and were ‘begin[ning] to threaten the 
bishops’.81 It was actually presented to the Lords, but ‘they could not read it because it was 
not signed by any person, but if [it] had been they would have accepted it’. However, the 
process of gathering signatures led to the petition being suppressed by the Lord Mayor, 
fearing it had ‘improved into a tumult’.82 A petition in the same year from the silk weavers of 
London and Canterbury on the Silk Manufactures Bill was also ‘presented...in a tumultuous 
manner’, because there was an ‘unusual manner of application of men, who ought to be better 
directed’.83 The petition, signed by only seven men, was only accepted after the Lords had 
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‘first require[d] that those crowds would go home’ and after the ‘quelling of the rabble’.84 
This was a large crowd, with Narcissus Luttrell estimating ‘two or three thousand men and 
women of the trade’ were present.85 This fear also hindered the collection of larger 
responsive petitions in the localities—Mr Oglethorpe in a Commons debate in 1731 said he 
had declined to procure a petition signed by more than 6000 people because ‘it might 
occasion tumults’.86 These were the forms of petitioning the 1661 act was against— not 
where more than twenty signatures had been gathered to a petition or presented by more than 
ten people, but when either had been done in a ‘tumultuous’ fashion.   
Parliamentarians were in the business of ‘policing’ petitioning, meaning that even the 
clause of the 1661 act banning more than ten persons presenting a petition was used to 
regulate and control access to parliament, rather than to restrict it. As examined in chapter 
three, attempts to add guards were seen as ‘not the way to make friends for the king’.87  It 
was not until the 1817 Seditious Meetings Act that meetings of more than fifty people ‘for the 
purpose or on the pretext of considering...or preparing any petition’ within a mile of 
Westminster Hall were banned when parliament or the courts were sitting.
88
 
Within the boundaries set by parliamentarians petitioning was becoming a more 
central part of the parliamentary process in the second half of the seventeenth century, as a 
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result of the actions of parliamentarians themselves. That the wider public should be 
informed of relevant bills was an expected part of parliamentary procedure. It was traditional 
to have public notice for a bill—in 1678 the bill for a church in St Martin’s in the Fields was 
recommitted because ‘there was no summons sent forth to the parties concerned’, whilst the 
opponents of the River Wey in 1759 got the bill thrown out because ‘no public notice, either 
by advertisement or otherwise, was given of the intention to petition parliament.’89 Even 
before petitioning occurred, meetings were held to ensure support in an attempt to co-opt any 
opposition. The petitioners for the Dunn Navigation stressed that they ‘frequently proposed 
[their project of navigation] to many of the landowners of the river...at a general meeting’.90 
There had also been a ‘large meeting at Doncaster to prove the practicalness of the thing’.91  
The institutionalisation of print in the procedures of parliament expanded the numbers 
who would learn such bills were being proposed. In 1685, the Commons had ordered all 
private bills must be introduced by petition. Echoing the practice of the 1640s when the 
Commons had ordered cloth workers to print their petition because the ‘business [was] of a 
general concernment’, the Commons ordered all private bills had to be printed before their 
first reading in 1705, later made a standing order in 1722 for both houses.
92
 Similarly, the 
Lords ordered petitions on legal appeals should be ‘published in print, to the end that all 
persons concerned may take notice thereof’.93 Parliamentarians were willing to wait for 
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petitions, arguing ‘we ought to allow them time’ or to put off business as ‘there are so few 
petitions yet delivered’, and demand that public bills should be printed to inform the public.94  
The Marquis of Hartington, ‘seeing there are so few petitions yet delivered’ believed ‘the 
house will think fit to put it off’, whilst the petition from Wales in 1689 was able to hold 
proceedings, their witnesses being ‘given time’ of eight days ‘to give proof of their 
grievances’.95 Reflecting this, parliamentarians produced a ‘skeleton’ of future business 
providing advance notice to petitioners, with the Commons ordering that ‘no petitions be 
received after ten o’clock in the forenoon’.96 This process was not new in the 1690s, but there 
was a more intensive attempt to organise and inform those who sought to participate after 
1689.
97
   
Although parliamentarians increasingly saw the utility of petitioning and both the 
1648 ordinance and 1661 act had recognised the right to petition within certain limits, 
responsive petitions could still be rejected by either house. The Lords thought twice about 
accepting the largest surviving petition of this period from Wales, which was signed by 
eighteen thousand and demanded the abolishing of the Council of Wales. The petition of the 
‘several inhabitants of Wales’ was accepted, despite ‘the statute 13 Car II concerning riots 
[being] read [in the house] as to the petition...’98 A limit to petitioning on non-‘political’ 
matters was introduced on those relating to public finance in 1697. The banning of such 
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petitions in 1697 can be linked to the desperate need for finance during the Nine Years War, 
and MPs justified their decision by arguing that ‘all are represented here’ by their member, 
petitions not being necessary—however small the number of subscribers, or great the 
corporation or company.
99
  
The invoking of the idea that parliament was representative and sovereign did cause 
MPs and peers to reject petitions if they were politically difficult, though this did come at 
some cost. Rhetoric on the power of parliament initially intended by parliamentarians to 
justify the suppression of ‘political’ petitions could filter down into suppression of ‘lower’ 
forms of petitioning. However, this resulted in heightened rhetoric on the right to petition 
from petitioners and their supporters, checking parliament’s actions. One rejected petition 
from the London clergy in 1721 to the Lords saw peers protest that ‘the right of 
petitioning...is as essential to the public...as the liberty of debate to the constitution of 
parliament’.100 The first septennial parliament was also attacked on these terms, whigs having 
rejected petitions for the relief of those affected by the South Sea Bubble, with opponents 
arguing that ‘our servants’ in parliament had ‘been the great invaders of [the right to 
petition]....[and] prevented our redress’.101  
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Participation through petitioning was becoming more intense and accepted after 1689, 
reflecting attempts by parliamentarians to make relevant parts of their business more 
transparent.  This regulated culture of participation recognised attitudes to the accountability 
of parliamentarians and the role of the public in politics were very different to those that had 
operated in the early Stuart period.  Let us turn now to examine why parliamentarians largely 
accepted the presence of large responsive petitions in the parliamentary process, when other 
innovations of the 1640s—such as the print reporting of debates—had been curtailed or 
actively suppressed.
102
 
 
III: Representing the ‘Sense of the People?’: Interpretations of Petitioners 
 
Although concerns were present about the gathering and presentation of petitions, there were 
positive reasons for parliamentarians to accept and hope for petitions on the business before 
it, and to encourage the debate which the collection of signatures to a petition tends to 
generate. It was not a matter of the larger responsive petitions being uncontroversial and 
sporadic, because they could be organised and divisive within communities. They could 
result in local tumults, being issues that affected stability. They were not like the petitions 
Brian Weiser has studied that were directed to Charles II, being ‘humbly phrased… touching 
national issues only peripherally…for mundane things like jobs or grants... [being] legalistic 
in form’.103 During proceedings on the navigation bill for the River Don, Mr Sheburne had a 
‘mob of five or six hundred about his house for the apprehension that he opposed the 
navigation’.104 In Tiverton, 500 people signed a petition on the wool industry in 1698, with 
later complaints labourers were forming themselves ‘into combinations or clubs’ and said to 
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have become ‘insolent [and] comply with whatever their clubs shall determine and assemble’ 
against the wishes of the Mayor and Corporation.
105
 Through accepting their petitions 
parliamentarians were acknowledging the presence of wider political nation, and made the 
process of ruling more open to negotiation and popular pressure; something parliamentarians 
had been unwilling to do on matters of finance or on overtly ‘political’ subjects. 
Significantly, petitions were recognised as a means to maintain the institutional 
arrangements after the Glorious Revolution, and give legitimacy to the local improvements 
being pursued in parliament. They should be seen as a nonviolent means for negotiation, 
aiding the development of political stability, but through different means to those J.H. Plumb 
set out nearly fifty years ago.
106
 In response to another petition rejected in 1722, protesting 
peers explained ‘the rejecting such petitions, and the not receiving of them, is the way to 
occasion disorders and tumult’.107 In the context of 1719, rioting weavers could be appealed 
to petition instead. Mary, Countess Cowper, wrote that ‘weavers [were] very discontented 
[over the Calico Bill]; people [are] assaulted in the streets [by those] that are dressed in 
calico’.108 Petitioners ‘submit[ed] to the wisdom and authority of the person’ they petitioned 
to, strengthening the legitimacy of the Lords and constitution after the Glorious 
Revolution.
109
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Neither did accepting these petitions require parliamentarians to consider them when 
judging the merits of a bill. There was a tacit recognition that by accepting petitions, rather 
than suppressing or rejecting them, the role of the ‘public voice’ could be safely contained 
without seeming to threaten the right of the wider public to participate, which could escalate 
towards riot and violent petitioning. As a result, in response to the adversarial addresses in 
Scotland against the union, supporters of the union argued addresses threatened to turn MPs 
into ‘delegates’, arguing parliament was a ‘sovereign constituted body’ that would not be 
directed by outside opinion.
110
 Daniel Defoe stressed the unrepresentative nature of addresses 
compared to the Scottish parliament, writing ‘I have not heard [of] above five [of the] three 
hundred gentleman of quality and estates in Lothian’ who had petitioned.111 Others portrayed 
anti-union addresses as involving the ‘meaner sort [who] were imposed upon and deluded’.112  
The same discourse in Scotland that aimed to undermine the legitimacy of adversarial 
addressing was found south of the border with regard to larger responsive petitions. There 
were allegations petitioners were ‘unwearyingly drawn into the signing of the petition’ in 
1721 on a river navigation scheme.
113
 In 1698, the Corporation of Hereford were accused of 
‘clandestinely prevail[ing] upon William Williams, a poor boatman, and several other poor 
men of the town of Monmouth to subscribe a paper’, whilst ‘ignorant work people’ were said 
to have signed blank sheets against Blackwell factors.
114
 Organisers of a petition on the cloth 
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industry were alleged to have kept ‘the clothiers ignorant of [their] design...for if they do 
once take wind, they will sign a counter petition, as the Frome clothiers have done’.115 
Petitions presented against the laying of water pipes in Southwark led to complaints they had 
been signed ‘by a number of persons for the most part unknown’ to the people of Southwark, 
with allegations that petitioners were ‘rewarded’ for signing, or given ‘half a crown...to carry 
round the petition’.116 The unrepresentative nature of petitions was also attacked, with the 
Newcastle Courant criticising a petition against the City Election Bill of 1725, with claims 
the ‘petition for the bill was only signed by 2000, whereas by computation there are 60,000 
freemen of London’.117 There were also allegations signatures had been forged. On petitions 
on the River Weaver navigation, it was ‘proved the petition was altered after it was signed’ in 
1716 and again in 1719.
118
 The legitimacy of these larger responsive petitions could be 
undermined by attacks on the social status or local credentials of the petitioners, claims that 
signatures were fraudulently obtained, or stress on the role of parliament as the true 
‘representative’ body, echoing the rhetoric against overtly ‘political’ and adversarial 
petitioning. This could be done without parliamentarians openly challenging the validity of 
claims of petitioners or their right to participate.  
                                                     
115
 A Dialogue Between Dick Branzenface the Card Maker and Tim Meanwell the Clothier (n.p., 
1711), p. 3. 
116
 PA, HL/PO/JO/10/1/460/771(d), Petition of Divers Inhabitants of the Borough of Southwark, 22 
January 1694; HL/PO/JO/10/1/460/771(b)(d), Petitions of Persons Residing and Dwelling in 
Southwark, 15 January 1694 and Inhabitants of Southwark, 22 January 1694; 
HL/PO/JO/5/1/29, Manuscript Minutes, 22 January 1693. 
117
 Newcastle Courant, 13 February 1725, Issue 243. 
118
 BL, Add MSS 36914, River Weaver Navigation, fols. 63, 77. 
283 
 
Elites in counties and towns also sought to create the impression of control and 
suggest the subscription of large numbers of ‘inhabitants’ had occurred under their watch and 
advice. They did this through stressing a hierarchy of subscribers in petitioning campaigns. 
Peter Shakerley, MP for Chester, hoped petitions from the county would have a common 
statement and initially signed by ‘the justices and grand jury at the quarter sessions’. The next 
petitions would be from ‘justices, gentlemen, [and] freeholders, adjacent to the River 
[Weaver]’.119 Established county bodies like the grand jury were given precedence when 
signatures were collected. The opponents of the bill for improving the navigation of the River 
Weaver hoped their petitions ‘will be of some height to your lordships, when it is observed 
that the county petition is signed by the high sheriff, and above 100 of the justices of the 
peace, deputy lieutenant, and others, the most considerable of the landed interest’.120 The 
grand jury was seen as the ‘representative body’ of the county.121 Reflecting this, Sir John 
Lowther’s father was in ‘so dangerous a condition’ about the Parton Harbour Bill, being 
concerned ‘with a list of the whole grand jury, the hands of the mayor and aldermen and 
others of Carlisle [and a] great many justices of the peace’ he needed the support of.122 This 
concern was justified, for when the petitions came to the Lords ‘Lord Wharton...pressed the 
content of the petitions against the bill, and was seconded by the Bishop of Carlisle who 
observed there were the subscriptions of fifteen (out of seventeen) of the justices of the peace 
and deputy lieutenants’.123 The Kentish petition of 1701 also reflected this control of county 
elites, who had ‘refus[ed] to add any more rolls of parchment...insisting more upon the merits 
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of the petition than the number of subscribers,’ which could have been ‘many thousands’.124 
The impression of ‘sponsorship’ of petitioning campaigns by elites and corporate interests 
helped to legitimise the reality of popular participation in politics. 
Elites and projectors did attempt to create the impression of control and unanimity of 
local opinion. Four draft petitions against the Weaver navigation were seen centrally in 1699, 
and may have been circulated under terms established by elites.
125
 The shared wording of 
petitions from Tiverton and Colchester, and between towns in Essex, Devon, Somerset and 
Suffolk in favour of the Woollen Manufactures Bill in 1698 also suggests a degree of 
organisation.
126
 Reflecting this, there was no overturning of the ‘humble’ and deferential 
nature of petitioning in this period. The Ludlow Post believed linen drapers were right to 
petition because the ‘British poor...are undoubtedly entitled to the care of the British 
parliament.
127
 Petitioners stressed the ‘ruin’ of their trades and of the ‘poor increasing beyond 
the power of maintaining them’, and others feared that they would have to ‘quit their native 
land’ to find work, striking at mercantilist conceptions of population.128 Bills were also seen 
as creating unjust mechanisms where ‘all buyers of cloth [could] cheat the clothiers’.129 
Petitioners threatened social instability and called for the protection of wages, the 
‘livelihoods’ of the ‘greatest part of the poor’, and for parliamentarians to support local 
                                                     
124
 Defoe, The History of the Kentish Petition (1701), p. 2.  
125
 BL, Add MSS 36914, River Weaver Navigation, fols. 16-29. 
126
 PA, HL/PO/JO/10/1/189/2(b-c)(i)(l)(n)(p), Petitions on the Woollen Manufactures Bill, 2-28 
March 1698. 
127
 Ludlow Post Man or the Weekly Journal, 25 December 1719; Issue 12. 
128
 PA, HL/PO/JO/10/3/189/2(e)(g), Petitions of Clothiers of Bocking, Braintree and Other Towns in 
Essex, and Gentlemen, Freeholders, Traders and Inhabitants of Moreton-Hampstead, Devon, 
12-15 March 1698; HL/PO/JO/10/1/484/1051(c), Dyers of Wrought Silks, 3 April 1696.  
129
 PA, HL/PO/JO/10/3/205/15, Petition of Clothiers and Others of Trowbridge, 2 July 1714. 
285 
 
industries against competitors.
130
 Whether this can be taken as evidence of a ‘moral 
economy’, with petitioners calling on parliamentarians to live up to their obligations is 
unlikely as many of the protections were recent introductions, but shows the language of 
interest made parliamentarians prisoners of the rhetoric of ‘public interest’ and who could 
claim to represent and define it.
131
  
This debate over who represented the ‘public interest’ meant projectors or 
corporations sought petitions to convey an impression of local consensus on the issue. Their 
role as initiators of legislation did give them a head start in this process. The Doncaster 
Corporation began their petitioning campaign by sending a member to ‘consult there with 
persons vested in the usage and custom of parliament, to know how the corporation shall 
proceed as to the navigation’.132 They decided to send out agents to collect petitions from 
York, Kings Lynn and Liverpool on the Dunn navigation in 1723.
133
 Robert Harding 
recorded in 1698 ‘the navigators at Derby and Burton are very busy, going to every town on 
the river and petitioning all people’.134 The gathers of signatures could also be employees of 
the projectors. The River Weaver projectors paid William Watts, a Middlewich attorney, to 
organise local petitions and watch parliamentary proceedings.
135
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The accepting of large responsive petitions and the associated subscription campaigns 
was, in part, an attempt by parliamentarians and elites to maintain the political status quo, 
being a tacit acknowledgement by them that it was no longer possible to eliminate the ‘public 
voice’. However, petitions were actively sought by elites, who saw them as advantageous to 
informing parliamentary deliberations on policy. A justification for petitioning was offered 
by John Brewer, arguing petitions provided information that was not available to 
parliamentarians at Westminster.
136
 Even though a feature of large responsive petitions was 
the absence of detailed commentary, they can be still linked with information collection. The 
importance of petitions lay not just in the number of signatures, but their representation of the 
views and claims of those deemed knowledgeable on the matter at hand. This was not 
sufficient to cause or justify subscription on a large scale, but explains the differential 
subscription rates and a preference for ‘expertise’ rather than numbers in some cases. Defoe 
argued petitions could offer a ‘just knowledge of the reality’ and encourage parliamentarians 
‘to look a little into the state of manufactures’.137 Petitions could be subscriptions of ‘expert 
witnesses’, being statements of those judged to be knowledgeable about certain matters. To 
reject these petitions would, as peers put it, ‘deprive the legislature of proper lights, which 
they might otherwise [have] received’, resulting in poorer policy and weaker deliberation.138 
The importance attached to ‘expertise’ suggests an explanation for why the average petition 
from merchants was signed by forty-nine people, less than half the average number of 120 
who signed a large responsive petition to the Lords.
139
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But many who petitioned were not ‘experts’ defined by an occupation, but 
‘inhabitants’, defined by a locality. These were groups that the Marquis of Halifax saw as 
requiring ‘solicitors to pursue and look after their interests’, which would otherwise be too 
weak and unwieldy.
140
 Their participation was problematic and partially solved by stressing 
the role of elites in ‘guiding’ their opinion. However, as shown in chapter three, the language 
of interest also made a plural politics compatible with stability. Briefly, all ranks of society 
could hold an ‘interest’, regardless of whether they were propertied or not. Contemporaries 
talked of the ‘protestant’, ‘landed’ or ‘private’ interest of projectors and communities, and it 
was perceived that policy should aim to strengthen certain ‘interests’ by discovering the true 
‘national interest’.141 James Harrington argued that ‘the people taken apart are but so many 
private interests, but if you take them together they are the public interest’.142 This conception 
of society necessarily meant exploring what interests existed, and resulted in a politics which 
had a more diverse makeup then one solely based on rank or status.
143
 
There were two competing processes at work in petitioning—an initial attempt to 
stress social hierarchy by gathering signatures from the mayor, borough corporation or 
county body, followed later by lesser inhabitants, but also the use of print to appeal to the 
wider public, legitimised by the search for the national ‘interest’. Although elites attempted to 
demonstrate that the wider public was being regulated and their views had been ‘filtered’, 
petitions were still considerable agents of popular opinion in this period. If we consider the 
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actual collection of petitions, we can see the extent that petitions were capable of reflecting 
the different attitudes of local communities, and the agency of lower sorts that stood behind 
the impression of a united front presented by elites. 
The pamphlets that surrounded petitioning campaigns reflect the attempt of petitioners 
to represent the national interest. The language of public and private interest was an 
important legitimising factor to petition. Importantly, it meant contemporaries expected and 
searched for a ‘clash of interests’ on each bill. The MP Peter Shakerley sought petitions from 
different economic sectors—farmers, those employed in land carriage, the corn millers, and 
those who paid the poor rates—in order to illustrate the range of interests that supported his 
case on the Weaver navigation.
144
 The Corporation of Rye wrote to inform New Romney 
they were ‘obliged to try their interest’ and procure a petition to protect their harbour, whilst 
the opponents of the Aire and Calder navigation argued that the scheme was ‘only to the 
private advantage of the undertakers’, and projectors of the River Dunn navigation believed 
they were opposed by ‘private interests and views’.145  
The imagining of society as a collection of interests was important as it meant the 
extent of popular participation would vary by locality. Some petitions reflected the opinions 
of gentlemen and county elites, whilst others represented those of lower and middling rank.  
Inhabitants could play an important, if subservient role, in discussions on the merits of bills. 
In the debate on the Parton Harbour Bill, the Bishop of Carlisle stressed ‘almost all the 
citizens of Carlisle that could write their name’ had also signed a petition against the bill.146 
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The printed Reasons Against Making the River Weaver Navigable stressed that ‘if it were for 
the common good of the county, for the advantage of trade or the public good, the same 
would have been proposed by the gentry, grand jury, the quarter sessions, or by some number 
of the inhabitants’ (my italics), allowing inhabitants a key role in determining the ‘common 
good’. The ‘very few of the lowest rank of gentlemen in the county’ were not enough to 
determine the policy.
147
 The opponents of the Don navigation, after collecting signatures 
from the aldermen and principal inhabitants, then ‘consider[ed] the unite[d] strength of all 
hands in the county against the bill’.148  
The participation of lower groups shows the importance of shared legal rights, with all 
having some property to protect, but also that lower sorts were capable of holding an 
‘interest’.149 Sir Gilbert Clarke told the MP Thomas Coke that he thought ‘it very proper for 
those whose interest it is to be against the making [of the River] Derwent navigable to join in 
a petition. But...having no land upon that water...I am not willing to sign any paper’.150 
Inhabitants did have land or livelihoods on the water, allowing them to be part of this 
petitioning ‘interest’. A petition for a new harbour at Rye in East Sussex was ‘handed from 
town to town along the coast’, but the ‘Folkestone fishermen [who] generally complain’ of 
                                                     
147
 BL, Add MSS 36914, River Weaver Navigation, fol. 123. 
148
 NUL, Mellish 162/14, from Willan, Don Navigation, p. 114.  
149
 Women were also included in this petitioning culture. See M. Schmit Blaine, ‘The Power of 
Petitions: Women and the New Hampshire Provincial Government, 1695-1770’, International 
Review of Social History, 46 (2001), pp. 57-77, at p. 64. For an example to the Lords, see PA, 
HL/PO/JO/10/1/484/1051(c)(m), Dyers of Wrought Silks and Divers Shopkeepers, 3 April 
1696.   
150
 HMC, Manuscripts of the Earl Cowper, Volume 2, p. 383.  
290 
 
the state of fishing, constructed their own.
151
 Petitions had been ‘handed about and signed by 
some of the town’ in Sheffield, suggesting that copies were circulated, creating a network of 
petitioners.
152
 Many copies of a single petition were sent around to different hundreds against 
the River Weaver, ‘intending to unite them in one roll’.153 
The fact that petitioners knew their ‘interest’, were knowledgeable of ‘facts’, and able 
to provide information to parliament, suggest that parliamentarians were content for the 
public to participate in debates on these legislative issues. Whilst the public acting as arbiters 
on ‘political’ issues was seen as problematic, because it was feared they were being mislead 
by competing partisan fictions, public participation on issues the public had direct and lived 
experience of was believed to be conducive to the application of reason.
154
 In response to the 
‘monster petition’ created during the Exclusion Crisis, it was said that men ‘are to be 
esteemed capable of knowing their own wants, fears and dangers...yet not everyone is not to 
be accounted sufficiently qualified...to umpire differences between his majesty and his great 
council’.155 Merchants petitioning in 1738 were said to ‘the most proper hands for giving in 
such a representation... [being] the most immediately interested in the facts’.156 West-Country 
clothiers, it was said, ‘certainly must be the best judges [of] what cards are most necessary’, 
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and whether an act for regulating cards was necessary.
157
 Petitioners were said to provide ‘the 
best information...of their own neighbourhood particularly’. This was because the lower 
people, such as the ‘small heritor’s and husbandmen, shop-keepers, seamen, [and] artificers’, 
were petitioning on issues linked to how they ‘get their bread, and therefore must have great 
knowledge of the particular...without knowledge of the particulars, he [the parliamentarian] 
may with all his brightness invent very good things for utopia, but not for Britain’.158  
The experience of ‘people’ in their ‘own dealings’, contrasted with the issues of 
‘high’ politics that they only learned of as representations in print. Parliamentarians could 
trust them to act as rational actors and witnesses to their own lives, for the ‘creator, has not 
formed his rational creatures incapable of what is so needful for their wellbeing’.159 The 
interest that ‘will not lie’ acted as a guide for public actions, it being only ‘fools or 
madmen...that do not know or understand their own interest...[and] act directly contrary to 
it’.160 Through the ordinance of 1648 and the act of 1661, parliamentarians aimed to shift 
public involvement away from faction and violence, towards more reasoned and deliberative 
debate on matters of their locality and circumstances. 
Reflecting their signing, petitions were also organised by middling and lower sorts. 
Groups against the Don navigation were ‘pleased by the farmers to send about petitions...and 
got one for Rotherham pretty unanimously signed...as the navigators have declared they shall 
                                                     
157
 A Dialogue Between Dick Branzenface the Card Maker, and Tim Meanwell the Clothier (n.p., 
1711), p. 6. 
158
 The Right of British Subjects to Petition and Apply to Their Representatives Asserted and 
Vindicated (1734), p. xi. 
159
 Ibid, p. xxv. 
160
 D. Defoe, A Review of the Affairs of France, With Some Observations on Transactions at Home 
(1705), Volume 2, Number 63, p. 254. 
292 
 
have no benefit of a wharf’.161 The towns of Pocock and Withington sent ‘two small 
petitions...at the request of the people of those towns’ to Edward Mellish in London.162 The 
Don navigation petitions were led by several men, with ‘many petitions...procuring here by 
Mr Folejab’ whilst ‘Mr Roswell has undertaken to solicit several hands near him.163 Petitions 
were also garnered in spaces outside a county assize. The Don scheme had been ‘declared in 
general terms...to a great crowd of people’ and a petition was collected in a Southwark coffee 
house, which nineteen women also signed.
164
 Local elites were unlikely to have organised 
this female support.  
On occasion, the numbers signing petitions for or against a measure was seen as 
sufficient to judge whether a measure should succeed. As Daniel Defoe remarked, ‘what can 
the meaning of numbers be, but of strength?
165
 It was argued that petitions gave a ‘sense of 
the county’.166 Counsel and petitioners in committee did appeal to the importance of 
numerical support, with the Droitwich Salt Works Act supported by ‘forty-eight proprietors, 
[whilst] Mr Tremaine [appears] for only fourteen of them’ and that bills were ‘brought in by 
very few throwsters [and] their main body...disown it.
167
 The clerk of the proposed 
Southwark court of conscience stressed that ‘he [was] recommended by many hundred of the 
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inhabitants there’.168 Clothiers claimed they ‘are three or four more than those who have 
petitioned for the bill’.169 Emphrain Parker believed as the calico trade was ‘so populous 
throughout the nation they [parliamentarians] will hardly lay it on without their own 
consents', whilst Seymour Cholmondley argued that ‘it is the law and custom of parliament 
upon any new device... to confer with their country before they agree.’170 Petitions were 
representations of the ‘sense’ of a community or area, allowing the ‘public’ to exist as a 
pressure and factor in politics. 
The local context of bills reflects the importance of negotiation in the locality between 
the projectors of bills and the wider population to determining whether petitioning campaigns 
would occur. Through the public petitioning on local and regional bills and acts, the 
participative culture of the localities was carried to Westminster.
171
  Petitions were commonly 
collected by churchwardens and other parish officials, as was the case with Welsh petition of 
1689, and is suggested by a petition from Portugal Street ward in Westminster on a Bill for 
Setting up a Night Watch in 1720.
172
 In Scotland, ministers asked men to stay after their 
sermons to sign addresses against the union.
173
 Coffee houses were also used as sites to 
garner signatories, with opponents of the Weaver Navigation Bill ‘organising petitions at Mrs 
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Kenneys and other places’ to get signatures in 1726.174 These spaces were publically known, 
being advertised in newspapers to meet to ‘sign a petition... which lie[s] at...Garway's coffee 
house, between the hours of twelve and two’ or ‘on Tuesday...at the crown tavern...in order to 
consider a petition’.175 
The capacity for independent action by large numbers outside the elite was aided by 
the use of print, which was used to mobilise and widen those that constituted the ‘public’. 
The ‘citizens, tradesmen, and others, in and about the City of London’ initially ‘requested Mr 
Thompson to print their case, which is now publicised’, before announcing they ‘intend to 
petition the parliament.’176 Copies of the London petition on the succession of 1689 were also 
printed and circulated in coffee houses.
177
 This was also a non-London phenomenon. James 
Lowther ‘brought the printed case of the port of Whitehaven’ on 12 January 1706 to the 
Lords, although the first responsive petition was not presented to the Commons until 8 
February and the Lords on 19 February.
178
 In response to a proposal for raising a tax on tin, 
one writer ‘printed my first proposal and sent it into Cornwall and Devon, [where] the 
tinners... of both counties were for it.
179
 They were also ‘shown, and [did] read... [the] book 
of proposals to many gentlemen, and a great many tinners’ in February 1696.180 The petitions 
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committee of the London Weavers’ Company sent their printed cases and petitions to 
Norwich and the throwsters and dyers of London in 1719.
181
 Cheshire tanners ‘made it our 
business to show and communicate the contents of your [letter] to our neighbouring 
tanners’.182 They had also sent ‘copies for the reasons...to all those who are willing to join in 
so good a work’, suggesting encouragements to petition had been circulating in the north and 
west.
183
 Printed sheets were circulated in Wales in 1689 to garner signatures for their petition 
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for the abolition of the Court of Marches.
184
 Print was a mechanism appropriated by a range 
of interests to encourage petitioning, becoming a key means for non-elites to organise and 
engage a locality. 
Interests could also rely on newspapers to publicise their activity. Often information 
was at a general level, with the Weekly Packet reporting that  
the weavers begin [to] swarm with their petitions against the calicoes, and the cause 
is now grown popular; the cities of London, Worcester, Norwich, and Coventry 
have petitioned already, and the towns of Calne and Kidderminster, and we are 
told, there are fifty petitions more coming after them.
185
  
 
The Weekly Journal said that ‘on Tuesday last the Weavers’ Company of London presented 
their petition...as on the Saturday before were several others presented from the poor clothiers 
and manufactures in the country, all begging relief against the exorbitant use of the 
calicoes’.186 The printing of notices gave the sense of a collective grievance and strength of 
the ‘sense of the nation’. A pamphlet on the River Derwent had also included a list of ‘the 
places that have petitioned for the navigation’.187 Collections of petitions were printed against 
the trade bill with France in 1713, on the ‘complaining of the great miseries’ of the South Sea 
Bubble in 1721, and in Scotland on the African Company in 1700, whilst Peter Shakerley had 
copies of the petitions against the River Weaver navigation printed.
188
 Reporting could also 
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be more specific, enabling other interests to mobilise counter-petitions. The Post Man 
informed its readers that ‘the country [of Lincolnshire] [was] intend[ing] to petition the 
parliament’, whilst the Post Boy reported that the silk weavers of London had prepared a 
petition against the East India Company in 1696.
189
  
The growth of provincial press in this period should also be noted here, it being a new 
feature of British political culture.190 The Ludlow Postman, which ran for only one year, 
published information on petitions being presented or solicited in almost every issue.  The 
paper, which was ‘publish[ed] every Friday morning at Ludlow’ and promised to ‘be 
dispersed thirty or forty miles round’, was able to report on the petitions relating to the 
Derwent navigation, the Calico Bill and the statements made by witnesses in both houses on 
the legislation.
191
 The paper also reported ‘the goldsmiths and potters are about to join 
together in a petition for a bill to prohibit the importation of china ware into the kingdom’.192 
The Newcastle Courant and Stamford Post also advertised petitioning and provided 
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commentary on parliamentary business in both Houses of Parliament. The Newcastle 
Mercury informed its readers the city’s merchants attended the Commons in 1712 with a 
petition, and a thousand citizens of London had signed a petition to the parliament in 1724, 
‘which no doubt [will] meet with the desired redress from parliament’.193 The Stamford 
Mercury told its readers of the petitions against the Septennial Bill.
194
 The establishment of 
local newspapers undoubtedly aided this culture of petitioning and the accessibility of 
parliament, through advertising the existence of petitioning activity and providing advanced 
warning of petitions and bills, particularly during the ‘calico crisis’ of 1719/20. 
Once presented, petitions sparked wider debate and response in print, asking the 
public to adjudicate on the claims of petitioners. A manuscript petition from the weavers of 
London was followed by a printed petition, which hoped that ‘parliament would be pleased to 
lay aside that bill...’195 Weavers circulated printed cases to peers at the moment of the 
presentation of their petition in 1713.
196
 The Humble Reply of the Company of White Paper 
Makers was written in response to other paper makers, who ‘in several printed papers 
(delivered to the House of Commons) and to this most honourable house...last Saturday... 
[had attempted to] vindicate themselves.
197
 The 1689 petition of the inhabitants of Wales saw 
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one paper answer the ‘charge[s] of the inhabitants of Wales,’ arguing the administration of 
justice would be ruined by the ‘union’ with England.198  
The extent of popular involvement in petitioning helped to strengthen local identities. 
Keith Snell has argued that ‘local xenophobia’ was an increasingly important dynamic to 
early modern Britain, to which we can add ‘interest’ as a further driver of local hostilities and 
identities.
199
 The ‘clash of interests’ explicit in these petitions and the campaigns in print that 
surround them ensured ‘interest’ functioned as an alternative identity to party, rank or class.   
The origins behind petitioning often lay in local jealousies, which themselves 
motivated much legislation. Many parliamentary bills were pursued with the aim of 
furthering the strength of one town or community against another. The town of Kirby Kendal 
petitioned for the Aire and Calder Bill, arguing that it would be to the ‘great profit of the 
inhabitants’, whilst Newcastle saw it as ‘injurious to trade...of the port’.200 Chesterfield was 
said to be ‘jealous of losing their market [to] Sheffield...’, whilst Sheffield itself was 
‘exceedingly angry at the counter petition from Doncaster and...said they would...do all they 
can to suppress it’.201 The town of Chester was in competition with Liverpool, a port at 
Parton was feared by Whitehaven in Cumberland, whilst communication acts saw conflicts 
between waggoners and mariners. Mariners on the River Ouse argued that they ‘will be 
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ruined’ if the Aire and Calder Navigation Bill passed, whilst the ‘company of merchants of 
the City of York’ appealed to parliament to protect an institution ‘of ancient standing’.202  
If conflicts could be resolved at a local level, no petitions would be sent to parliament 
from the locality. A vote of the Corporation of Shrewsbury, by thirty-one votes to twenty-
one, meant that they did not petition against the Septennial Act, as six other areas did.
203
 The 
River Weaver Bill succeeded in 1721 and not a single petition was presented for or against it, 
meaning that if enough interests were negotiated with before a bill was presented no petitions 
would be created.
204
 In this case, the ‘prevent[ing] [of] subscriptions in the county...’ was 
done by ‘convinc[ing] even the people of Northwich [that] even though they subscribed for it, 
[to] oppose it’.205   
The signing of a petition could create and solidify social identities. As Daniel Defoe 
wrote, ‘the procuring [of addresses]...raises and maintains factions in every town and country, 
keeps up the heat and propagates party divisions’, to such an extent that ‘a civil war [rages] 
among neighbourhoods and societies’.206 They could give identities to small villages, 
parishes, towns and boroughs, for a wide range of social ranks.
 207
 The Don navigation 
petitions had been supported by a ‘handsome subscription to support our opposition’, with the 
towns of Bentley and Arksey ‘agree[ing] to raise about twenty-four pounds by an 
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assessment’.208 In the West Country, there was an agent of the card makers ‘for taking 
subscriptions’, including from a  ‘poor card maker of Trowbridge…[who] subscribe[d] five 
guineas’ towards the bill.’209 ‘Not one in the town of Frome...subscribed less than three 
pounds and your journeymen, as poor as they are...advance[d] forty shillings each’ in support 
of the same bill.
210
  
The frequency of petitioning was also important. The county of Lancashire presented 
111 petitions to the Commons between 1689 and 1731, sending an average of 2.5 each 
session to the Commons, allowing these identities to be sustained over time.
211
 Local 
communities were subject to negotiation, mobilisation and division, session after session. The 
River Weaver Bill was revived five times between 1679 and 1721, with three other attempts 
previous to this.
212
 Petitions collected for the Dover Harbour Act were collected annually 
between 1756 and 1758, and London cordwainers organised petitions to parliament on issues 
relating to leather annually between 1694 and 1696, and again between 1711 and 1714.
213
 
The river and communication projects, once passed, aided regional economies and tightened 
regional identities further.
214
 The capacity of interests to represent themselves by petition to 
parliament meant regional and local distinctiveness remained throughout the eighteenth 
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century. It was seen as a point of criticism to ‘get petitioners for the bill from many places 
where they are not at all concerned’, rooting petitioning in a locality.215 A regional scheme, 
like river navigation, led to the representation of interests to parliament based on location or 
interest, adding a further layer to the plethora of social identities present in early modern 
Britain.  
Litigation was an important organisational and legitimising backdrop to many of these 
petitioning campaigns. The long histories of many of these bills and acts meant these disputes 
were persistent features in many communities, raising the awareness of shared interests 
amongst inhabitants. A legal dispute over improving Parton Harbour in Cumberland had 
lasted for nearly thirty years, and continued to do so after the bill of 1706 was passed. It had 
already been ‘rais[ing] a great hubbub’, with the first legal proceedings beginning in 1678, 
well before petitioning started and the act of parliament proposed.
216
 The cheesemongers of 
London had been at law against the Corporation of Chester in the Court of Exchequer about 
paying town duties, fearing the judgement would be ‘troublesome to all the ports in the 
county’ in 1699, and went on to petition on the Weaver Navigation Bill associated with it.217 
The Aire and Calder navigation saw inhabitants of five areas and eleven individuals sue the 
commissioners for navigation between 1709 and 1711 in order to prove the damage the 
navigation scheme had on their properties.
218
  The projectors of the River Tone scheme 
sought a bill ‘to end these disputes and quiet all the differences for the future’ from the 
‘several suits in law’ they were engaged in.219 The laying of water pipes in Southwark had 
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already seen complaints by ‘many inhabitants... against Mr Gulston [who was alleged to 
have] raised and exhaust[ed] prices’, and led to nearly a thousand inhabitants signing a 
petition.
220
 Litigation helped crystallise identities and strengthen common interests amongst 
inhabitants, which could be transferred to Westminster through petitioning.  
The two languages of ‘interest’ and ‘majority’ are significant in three respects. Firstly, 
their use would have strengthened the concern of political elites for the capacity of the public 
to act as rational arbiters of disputes, an issue explored by Mark Knights. However, rather 
than the Septennial Act and the ending of the ‘rage of party’ reducing many of these fears, 
this culture continued into the 1720s, driven by petitioning and interest-groups.
221
 Secondly, 
this language marks the abandoning of any notion of unity within society, and the recognition 
by elites of the need for negotiation. Even despite the restrictive electorate, individual 
judgement and an active citizenship had its place when determining the merits of a bill.  
These two features suggest that elites were relatively tolerant of opinion ‘out of doors’ and 
sought to direct it into deliberative and peaceful representation on specific matters of policy. 
The time between winter and late spring when parliament assembled was used by 
those outside the political nation as a ‘petitioning season’. In 1719, London weavers called 
for the end to ‘violence...upon the wearing of printed calicos’. They did so by arguing that 
there were ‘proper seasons, as well as proper methods, to be used to get redress of 
grievances.... [and] weavers [should] wait [until] the proper season to lay our case before the 
parliament’.222  Although the 1661 act did not go as far as in 1648, when it was declared there 
was a ‘right and a privilege’ to petition, both laws acknowledged the existence of a legitimate 
space and avenue to petition. The rise of legislation, the growth in responsive petitioning, and 
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tolerance of widespread participation meant that parliament was firmly established as a ‘point 
of contact’ for petitioners after 1689. Such responsive petitioning was quickly shifted into 
adversarial and initiatory petitioning when it came to events such as the Excise Crisis of 
1733, the public already used to being mobilised to comment on matters of public policy.  
 
IV: Conclusion.  
 
The pattern of subscription campaigns to parliament in the first thirty years after the Glorious 
Revolution shows the extent of popular mobilisation, participation and negotiation that 
occurred on bills before parliament. Petitioning involved a high degree of participation from 
many social groups and locations, and was not limited to established companies, boroughs, 
the electorate, or men. As part of this culture, petitioners actively sought to appeal to the 
public to sign and organise, violated the ‘secrecy’ of parliament, and contributed to a divisive 
political culture that continued beyond the repeal of the Triennial Act in 1716 and the decline 
of the ‘rage of party’. In these respects, petitioning did follow the pattern David Zaret set out 
as occurring in the 1640s, at a more sustained and intense level.
223
 Petitioners criticised elites 
and proposed laws, appealed to the public to sign through print, and claimed legitimacy on 
grounds other than rank or membership of corporate bodies. The later revival of ‘political 
petitioning’ drew on the rhetoric, experience, and identities created and maintained through 
large responsive petitions to parliament. The ‘clash of interests’ inherent in legislation helped 
to keep the features of partisanship and the concerns resulting from it, alive.  
Paul Langford’s work has been particularly significant in showing the extent that 
propertied society was active in ‘public life’, with associations, voluntary organisations, and 
other non-statutory bodies and individuals using the power of parliamentary statute in the 
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eighteenth century to advance schemes for ‘improvement’.224 Petitioning by interest groups 
offers evidence of the extent the wider public were part of this culture, ensuring a porous 
culture of negotiation was present despite the restrictive membership of the oligarchy. The 
extent of subscription to the larger responsive petitions gave a ‘second wind’ to the 
participatory local state. Those affected by local and regional legislation petitioned directly 
on matters affecting them at the centre, strengthening further the participative and self-
governing nature of these communities. 
Driven by interest, rather than declining party strife, petitioning continued to enlarge 
the ‘public’ after 1716 and ensured that the oligarchy was a negotiable and challengeable one. 
Petitions may not have raised party matters or threatened the existence of the crown or state, 
but ensured that politics, the extent of negotiation and how policies were justified, was 
conducted on a different basis to what was the practice in the Restoration when parliament sat 
far less frequently and passed less legislation, and before the 1640s when responsive 
petitioning and the print culture associated with it was less developed. The regulation rather 
than suppression of ‘public opinion’ by parliamentarians reflected changing attitudes towards 
public access and their wish to uncover the ‘public interest’.225   
The extensive participation of the public in signing petitions to parliament meant there 
was a growing culture or representation via petitioning in the eighteenth century on 
legislative matters. Petitioners could claim to represent the ‘public interest’ and pressure 
parliamentarians to act. This ‘system’ with high rates of petitioning made the pre-reform 
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parliament more palatable and useful than it would have been. Even though parliament in the 
eighteenth century was in many respects ‘secretive’ and the role of the electorate was being 
reduced, participative petitioning remained central to the ruling of Britain.  
This chapter also gives a new account of the role of peers in society. They were not as 
closed to outside influence, distant from wider politics or as hostile to the ‘public’ as accounts 
of them have stressed. Bishop Burnet believed the Lords had 
by their knowledge, good judgement and integrity, raised the House of Peers to a 
pitch of reputation and credit, that seemed once beyond the expectation or belief of 
those that now see it. Their actions had raised the peerage, to such a regard that 
people contrary to all former precedents, have considered them more than their 
own representatives.
226
  
 
The reception of petitions by elites suggests that peers were firmly part of wider political 
culture. Parliamentarians did not wish for or create a model of petitioning that left parliament 
as an isolated body that would have been declining in importance for those seeking redress. 
This growth of petitioning was not a linear process, with the level of petitioning 
fluctuating from the 1640s to the present. The voice of the public was contested and 
‘misrepresented’, but these features were present in the nineteenth century, and indeed in the 
present, with the contestation of the authority of petitions and opinion polls.
227
 Issues of 
credibility, judgement, and distortion, as Knights hinted, ‘are still apparent in the way in 
which politics works today and may be inherent to public politics per se.’228 Murray Edelman 
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explored the presence of misrepresentation in the modern world, arguing that ‘rationality 
[was] the exception’ in the post-1945 period.229 Even after the passage of the Septennial Act, 
that did reduce the role of the public as voters, the incidence of large responsive petitions 
suggests the culture of divided communities and adversarial politics continued, and were 
becoming more intense after 1716. Allegations of clandestinely signed petitions and the 
multiple opinions a single area could present on a bill at the same time continued to be 
present. Local communities were subject to negotiation, mobilisation and division, session 
after session.  This situation must have been unsustainable, otherwise confidence and 
legitimacy of the law, parliament, parties, and the state would surely collapse. Considering 
parliament as a ‘theatre’ and a ‘public show’, with participants part of a ‘society of spectacle’ 
that stressed confrontational rhetoric, overlooks the need of a space for deliberation. The 
answer must lie in two places—the local context of politics and the ability to represent the 
locality at the centre, and the direct experience and nature of law-making and ruling. 
The local context of the state enabled a division to exist between perceptions of the 
national political culture and the local one. Administration of poor relief, the collection of the 
land tax, or the use of parliament to pass local acts meant communities were to a great extent 
self-governing, allowing them to negotiate with the central state.
230
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participation in governing at a local level meant that reconciliation between divided interests 
was possible, and a different perception of the state may have existed between a personal and 
known ‘local state’ and a partisan, national one. A participative politics may also differ from 
a representative one by allowing governance and rulers to be ‘experienced’, countering a 
representative culture based on ‘images’ and ‘imagination’ of political divides and the nature 
of rule. At some point in the ‘circulation of power’, interest and the wider population could 
negotiate in a deliberative fashion, challenging the claims of elites and those that claimed to 
‘represent’ certain interests and factions.  
 The second cause, direct engagement in lawmaking and negotiation, builds upon 
what has been shown in previous chapters. Parliament and the legal system had a ‘culture of 
deliberation’ that helped to create legitimacy, resolve disputes and create dialogue between 
parties, both before and during the decision-making process in parliament. As has been 
shown, parliamentary inquiry was a key means to how the house functioned. Before 
committees, witnesses were able to pursue different perspectives, including personal and 
local ones, and interact with ‘experts’ and political arithmetic, which was only one of the 
forms of knowledge available. The hearing of these arguments would mean peers and 
participants would have to respond and frame their own decisions in relation to what others 
had stated and disagreed on. The discourses of ‘facts’, ‘law’ and  ‘interest’ were accessible, 
and there was an ability to present personal recollection to Lords committees, lowering the 
barriers to participation— aided further by the growth of print and petitioning. Committees 
were a space in which multiple interests acknowledged the opinions of others, in order to 
uncover the ‘public interest’ under common and agreed rules and norms. It was increasingly 
reconciliation through law, coercion and institutions, rather than through informal 
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mechanisms of a ‘Christian community’, that contemporaries looked towards to bring 
conflicts to an end.
231
 This meant that in addition to an adversarial politics, focused on 
elections and petitioning, policy-makers and participants were in a culture of dialogue, 
creating legitimacy for the state and tying in the wider political community. The reality of 
dialogue and deliberation through participation in institutions at both the centre and locality 
was the counterpoint to polarisation.  
As a result, it should be argued policy in eighteenth-century Britain was made by 
what could be termed, a ‘deliberative oligarchy’. Membership of the oligarchy was limited by 
wealth, rank and contacts, but this did not mean it was closed from outside influence, having 
porous methods of policy-making and ruling. The participation of the public was directed into 
more deliberative and stability-inducing institutions in response to its greater role as arbiter of 
politics and policy. There had long been elements of parliament, especially in committees, 
that showed potential for this, but the presence of parliament after 1688 meant these were 
becoming everyday features. Society was able to move beyond solely the adversarial, towards 
deliberation as a co-existing feature of British politics. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
 ‘The Growth of Political Stability’ Fifty Years on: The Establishment of a ‘Deliberative 
Oligarchy’ 
 
J.H. Plumb’s 1965 Oxford Ford Lectures explained how Britain, and England especially, 
achieved a political stability from the 1720s which those living in the seventeenth century 
could only have imagined. The taming of the electorate and the City of London, the growth of 
social and political oligarchy, the development of the executive, and the effective elimination 
of the tory party under Sir Robert Walpole offered a compelling account of how the transition 
was made from seventeenth-century instability and the ‘rage of party’ into the ‘age of 
oligarchy’, where power was held by remarkably few and with virtually no transparency or 
accountability. Legislation strengthened its legal basis, constraining public commentary on 
and participation in politics: the Septennial Act reduced the frequency of general elections 
from three to seven years, the Riot Act made public protest harder, and the City Elections Act 
calmed the politics of the City of London. Such a view did not grate with the hitherto 
dominant Namierite framework, nor with the new studies of the social history of politics, 
notably by E.P. Thompson. Historians of all shades saw governance in eighteenth-century 
Britain in terms of narrow elite, preoccupied with matters of kinship and patronage, and its 
membership and policies isolated from broader society. Remarkably, fifty years on, Plumb’s 
account remains an established pillar of the historiography of eighteenth-century Britain.
1
  
But throughout this period, our approach to the question of oligarchy and the political 
history of early modern Britain has remained on the same interpretative framework, namely a 
                                                     
1
 For critiques, see C. Roberts, ‘The Growth of Political Stability Reconsidered’, Albion, 25 (1993), 
pp. 237-55 and N. Landau, ‘Country Matters: “The Growth of Political Stability” a Quarter-
Century On’, Albion, 25, pp. 261-74. Norma Landau saw Plumb as raising the question of 
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government would eventually infringe’ (p. 261).  
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focus on the representative and democratic elements of the constitution. This has led to the 
logical conclusion that a demonstrable reduction in the frequency and importance of elections 
ensured the triumph of oligarchy. But the political culture, modes of policy-making, and the 
functioning of parliamentary institutions of early modern Britain were not just about the 
handling of power by elected or appointed chambers, confined to elites or a clearly defined 
state. Petitions, participation and print—as John Brewer, Frank O’Gorman and Mark Knights 
have shown—were capable of disrupting stability. But these have largely been considered in 
the context of the wider public sphere, and not parliament.  Our typical geography of 
parliament is a simple one—dominated by the Commons (or the monarch in Namierite 
accounts) and the study of elections. Who went to parliament as MPs and their party (or 
none) is what concerns us—a concern exacerbated by recent attempts to label all legislation 
as party-political.
2
 Historians are not alone in this focus: responses to voter apathy usually 
attempt to strengthen representative elements of the constitution and political accountability, 
resulting in recent calls for allowing the recall of MPs, public holidays for voting and even 
the ‘preference for unpolitical figures on the political scene’. As Jürgen Habermas asked, 
does participation in democratic procedures have only the functional meaning of 
silencing a defeated minority, or does it have the deliberative meaning of including 
the arguments of citizens in the democratic process of opinion- and will-formation? 
... Democracy depends on the belief of the people that there is some scope left for 
collectively shaping a challenging future.
3
 
 
This thesis has sought to mark new contours on our map of politics, which turns our 
focus on its head. It is less centred on party, legislatures, their membership, and the central 
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66 (2013), pp. 1084-1100.  
3
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state. Governing was not just carried out by parliamentarians at Westminster, but by wider 
society. Parliament was still not the maker of major events, remaining an institution reacting 
to proposals and ideas from legal courts, local communities, and interest-groups.
4
 This thesis 
has argued we need to reconsider how states, statutes, and parliaments operate in our 
interpretive model, shifting our concern towards participation and governance, and litigation 
as well as statutes. Historians have been circling this for some time, and work on the public 
sphere and print culture does illustrate the vibrancy and extent of political culture, but this 
approach fails to make the connection between words and action. The narrative remains that 
between the Restoration and the printer’s case of the 1770s that parliament was secretive, and 
therefore hard to influence. Reasoned debate in coffee houses, petitions, or popular protests, 
were done against parliament, rather than working through it. This strengthens a continuing 
division between spectators and participants—only MPs, peers, and ministers being the 
actors, the public, at best, being commentators. The weakening of the power of the electorate 
after 1716, therefore, removed the most important mechanism of public involvement with 
parliament. 
But not only should we take issue with the means of how political stability was 
established by the 1720s, but how far late Stuart and early Georgian political culture was 
dominated by concerns of misrepresentation, conspiracy and ‘party rage’, as there was a 
developing deliberative counter-balance. Historians have been quick to explore the ‘informal’ 
elements of the Habermasian public sphere in terms of the ability of free public 
communication, but far slower in examining the second part of Habermas’s model, that is the 
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creation of deliberative political institutions and the involvement of the public in them.
5
 
Cultural history has been important in the demonstrating the importance of symbolism, 
consumerism and ritual to the operation of power.
6
 This reflects the fact politics can be based 
on emotion, irrationality, and conspiracy theories—all these launched being as research 
projects in the past few years.
7
 Clearly the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had their fair 
share of conspiracies (both real and imagined), misrepresentations and political symbolism. 
Fear of popery was a significant driver of both seventeenth-century revolutions.
8
 Reflecting 
this, we have stressed the anti-deliberative nature of politics, focusing on the theatrical nature 
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of both parliament and the law.
9
 Significant aspects of philosophy support this view. Murray 
Edelman, an American political scientist who has been quoted in this thesis, and who formed 
an important basis for Mark Knights’ Representation and Misrepresentation, had a simple 
fear. This is that rational debate is not possible in the era of mass-politics. He argues there is 
an uncomfortable truth that many decisions and perceptions are based on misrepresentation 
and misunderstandings.
10
 His division is one between ‘mythical’ and ‘utilitarian’ politics—in 
the era of mass-politics, politics is an irrational spectacle. Only direct users of politics are 
capable of rational decisions (though this is not guaranteed either), being able to brush away 
illusionism and dogma to create rational decisions, through ‘reality testing’ their ideas. If this 
is how politics functioned, then it makes sense to consider parliament’s role through the lens 
of a theatre or study of ritual. Politics and legitimising the state was about consuming 
symbols and images, not policy-making. 
Ritualistic behaviour is an important sphere of politics, election rituals being aimed as 
much at voters as non-voters.
11
 But this means there is a remaining question about how 
interest in politics can be shifted towards reasoned engagement, as certain institutional 
conditions can encourage, and whether this occurred in the eighteenth century, it being an 
                                                     
9
 C. Kyle, Theatre of State: Parliament and Political Culture in Early Stuart England (Stamford, 
2012); J. Peacey, ‘Disorderly Debates: Noise and Gesture in the Seventeenth-Century House 
of Commons’, PH, 32 (2013), pp. 60-78. On crime, see D. Hay et al, Albion’s Fatal Tree: 
Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England (London, 1976); T. Laquer, ‘Crowds, 
Carnival and the State in English Executions, 1604-1868’, in A. Beier, D. Cannadine, and J. 
Rosenheim, eds, The First Modern Society: Essays in English History in Honour of Lawrence 
Stone  (Cambridge, 1989). 
10
 M. Edelman, The Politics of Misinformation (Cambridge, 2001). 
11
 F. O’Gorman, ‘Campaign Rituals and Ceremonies: The Social Meaning of Elections in England, 
1780-1860’, P&P, 135 (1992), pp. 79-115.  
315 
 
aim of parliamentarians and elites. Symbols and rituals do act as mechanisms of social 
integration, but it is law, the state and the ‘norms’ they are operated by which regulate 
conflict when these other mechanisms fail.
12
 Current studies of political culture echo the 
explosion of communicative media which constitute the ‘monitory democracy’ of the early 
twenty-first century, which is not well focused on the daily functioning of politics. This is a 
shallow and defensive form of political engagement, where citizens examine the climate, 
rather than the day to day political weather. It is very different to early modern forms of 
politics and engagement in governing, as has been illustrated in this thesis and elsewhere. But 
the nature of political culture in a monitory democracy does have an important parallel with 
early modern Britain; in that it furthers the sense politics is not about some governing the 
many, but a wide variety of pressure-groups and interests negotiating with representatives at 
particular moments. What monitory democracy lacks, like in previous historical studies of 
early modern Britain, is a consideration of how to bring together an explosion of 
communicative media with traditional representative institutions and the processes of 
governing. Currently, it stands as a process of criticism and accountability and dependent on 
a shallow definition of democracy encapsulated in arguments about the ‘majority’, 
demonstrated in petitions and elections, as the means of representing the ‘public’. 
The antithesis to Edelman’s view is to show that the lower sorts of people were actors, 
not just spectators, being involved in utilitarian politics, demanding of some hard result, and 
able to get it.
13
 This is something that representative democracy struggles to achieve, but 
‘monitory democracy’ has the potential to move closer to this model. But we have seen less 
study by historians of the potential for ordinary Britons to participate in governing, beyond 
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the governing of the parish in the seventeenth century. This is a partly result of sources—the 
destruction of those of the Commons in the fire of 1834, the confused nature of Chancery 
records, lack of evidence of petitioning, and the assumptions about access laid out in earlier 
chapters, have all discouraged this exploration. But political arithmetic, debates in 
committees and the rule of law, were all important aspects of a deliberative system. 
Impartiality, a search for certainty, reasoned argument, and an awareness of self-interest were 
features of parliamentary debates parliamentarians and the participating public had to at least 
acknowledge. This ensued policy was the result of a process of negotiation, which helped to 
identify and restrain ‘blind passion’. The control of the executive was weak over most aspects 
of policy in the eighteenth century, with the potential origins of policy many and varied. 
Participation of the public in politics through petitions, litigation, lobbying and providing 
witnesses to committees, had an important legitimising aspect to the restricted oligarchy of 
the eighteenth century. Parliamentarians increasingly directed the public towards 
participatory avenues that tended towards reasoned deliberation, and away from violent 
petitioning or partisan elections. 
The continuing partisanship after the establishment of the whig oligarchy raises the 
question of how political stability and oligarchy was achieved, in spite of concerns regarding 
public participation. In 1716, the Triennial Act was repealed, and reduced the role of public 
judgement in politics.
14
 The establishment of an economy of credit and the crisis of the South 
Sea Bubble demonstrated to the whigs that the public was irrational and corruptible, 
struggling to adhere to the norms of rationality and politeness held up as the ideal political 
culture. Elections removed an aspect of public participation, but many elements of 
partisanship and misrepresentation remained in the issues brought before parliament. But, as 
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has been argued, in the early eighteenth century the print revolution combined with 
parliament’s increased presence after 1689 to create the ‘deliberative oligarchy’. At its base 
was a transformation which occurred in political culture throughout the seventeenth and early 
eighteenth century, one that shifted the role of non-elites from spectators to participants, 
elites seeing political divisions as amenable to stability, rather than a cause of revolt.
15
 
Stability rested on participation, not disengagement, and trust in subjects to interact with 
reasoned and deliberative modes of thought within the ‘correct’ institutional framework. This 
led to the reduction in the frequency of elections and the removing of certain issues from 
public debate (such as religion and the abandonment of controversial measures like the 
French Trade Bill), but also the strengthening of directed participation under subjects largely 
initiated from the middling sorts.  
The features of the culture that formed the ‘deliberative oligarchy’ may appear a rag-
bag list of loosely-related studied items, united by only a shared concern for the operation of 
the House of Lords. In this thesis, I have discussed the rise of the Lords as high court, civil 
litigation, physical access to parliament, parliamentary secrecy,  the role of interest-groups, 
attendance at committees, political arithmetic and petitioning—not to mention the British and 
local aspects to many of these features. What these subjects have in common is their enabling 
of plural publics to exist, providing alternative viewpoints and information to various parts of 
the British state. The ‘slow and strong drilling through hard boards’  that constitutes politics 
was something many Britons were involved in, and sustained over many sessions of 
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parliament and legal terms.
16
 The diversity of voices and influence of the public on policy 
was on the increase—regardless of the outcome of general elections and the establishment of 
oligarchy.  
The development of this ‘deliberative oligarchy’ was unplanned, and was not solely in 
response to the ‘rage of party’. Central to its presence was the structural weaknesses of the 
state and memories of the dislocation of the 1640s. The decision to avoid general acts, thanks 
to the fear of absolutism, resulted in a state that was in many respects still weak and 
decentralised—something reflected in the growth of local legislation and litigation.17 The 
protection of property meant the first (but limited) General Enclosure Act for England did not 
occur until 1756, allowing local initiative and negotiation to retain a central policy-making 
role, despite the development of the central state and parliamentary sovereignty.
18
 Equally, 
the rhetoric of defending property rights legitimised the petitioning and legal activity of lower 
orders, who could claim their interest as property-owners was being affected by legislation.
19
 
As Mark Knights has shown, demand for political arithmetic and other impartial 
discourses gained new ground during the ‘rage of party’, being used by partisans of both 
sides to challenge the other.
20
 The emergence of petitioning, a ‘culture of fact’, and ideas of 
interest offered a practical means of stabilising a society where consensus was no longer seen 
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as possible after associations, parties and interests had grown in number from the 1640s 
onwards.
21
 The language and decision of the ‘majority’ was not enough to bring stability—
policy was not surrendered by the minority or defeated party after parliament or the electorate 
had ‘spoken’, because debates continued in print, the law and when it came to be enforced. 
Intellectual developments were important also in achieving stability—the imagining of a 
society as a collection of interests meant it was necessary to discover private interests to 
advance economic growth, whilst demands for ‘facts’ and political arithmetic in the context 
of a weak executive provided a window for local interests and experts to influence 
policymaking and resolve disputes. These were important in creating a common means to 
resolve conflict, and acknowledged by both sides; but many elements and the institutions of 
the deliberative oligarchy existed without the presence of party, because they were needed to 
resolve disputes experienced on other issues. The presence of the House of Lords as high 
court (as well as lower ones) ensured that anti-majority and anti-elite mechanisms were 
present across the British Isles through the legal system. These elements created a culture of 
‘governance’, where there was a lack of division between state and non-state actors, with an 
overlapping process of governing, shared between locality, interest groups, parliament and 
the crown. Political pluralism was seen as compatible with stability.   
The narrower aims and ends of government in early modern Britain enabled wider 
participation and the easier establishment of avenues for deliberation. The importance of the 
locality has always been part of early modern British historiography, but the narrative of state 
formation is essentially a state expanding towards a centralised Victorian one. John Brewer’s 
‘fiscal-military state’ strengthened its financial and bureaucratic elements, Geoffrey Parker 
showed the impact of the ‘military revolution’ on the early seventeenth century, whilst 
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Edward Higgs has demonstrated the growth of the ‘information state’.22 Parliament is seen as 
central this process, through granting the civil list, funding the national debt, and providing 
legitimacy to the growing fiscal demands of the state. Marxist accounts stressed the decline 
of local custom through increased statutory regulation, tightening the power of the central 
state and its ruling elites further.
23
 The nation-state was also on the rise, with the growth of 
Britishness building off one of the consequence of the fiscal-military state, namely the 
expansion of Empire.  
But much of British politics was dependent on local rivalries and identities, and less 
about national categories of class or rank. People did not petition or sue social elites because 
of class or rank, but because they were perceived to threaten the economic or social strength 
of a community.
24
  The legal system and parliament were structures that were conducive to 
the patchwork of identities and politics that was eighteenth-century Britain. Keith Snell’s 
‘culture of local xenophobia’—a hostility and fear of near neighbours—was a powerful part 
and motivator of politics and engagement in the period examined in this thesis. The towns of 
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Chatham and Rochester were divided only by a boundary stone, but still feared one another.
25
  
These localities could be political (a parish or county), but also geographical (particularly 
along a shared river) and economic (a shared West-Country cloth interest, for example). The 
role of the ‘county community’ and the ‘parochial state’ are commonly examined in the 
context of seventeenth-century historiography, but they did not disappear after 1689.
26
 
Richard Price has argued the period from 1680 to 1880 should be seen as a ‘distinct stage’ in 
British history, partly based on being the ‘age of localism’.27 These are layers of the state and 
social identities we have not yet integrated into our accounts. Statutes, as we have seen, often 
had their origins in litigation, which had their origins in local negotiations. Britons may have 
killed in the name of national patriotism in the eighteenth century, but they also sued, 
petitioned, and occasionally fought for their locality or interest. Local interests and material 
concerns were not parochial, but significant in terms of governing and continuing to raise 
concerns on the role of the public as an arbiter and judge.  
Participation was deepened through the presence of these small-scale ‘minipublics’ 
that were capable of introducing and influencing national policy and legislation. Provincial 
newspapers, assize meetings and petitions organised in local coffee houses and churches 
meant local communities, at certain times, were ‘living democratically’. Their mobilisation 
was strongly goal-orientated, and dependent on ‘socialising politics’, with an important role 
for shared interests, kinship, locality and church. These local origins of policy-making were 
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important in creating legitimacy for the state, for it was easier to trust a policy made by 
known locals and interests than an institution at the centre. Equally, it was conducive to 
deliberation—knowledge of local circumstances by communities, rather than national ones 
would have been more likely, and increased the incentives for negotiation and compromise, 
as this would reduce the likelihood of further locally-disruptive petitioning campaigns. More 
research is needed about why (and how) communities finally succeeded in reconciling local 
tensions—it is notable, for example, that Norfolk provided no appeals to the House of Lords, 
and few large responsive petitions between 1685 and 1720. 
There is a threat created from devolved power, however, in that it makes it easier for a 
majority or already-powerful interests to dominate the politics of a given area, being not 
conducive to pluralism and the engagement of the wider community.
28
 Coercion, deference, 
and habit—not to mention party rage—were all alternatives to deliberation. Petitions from 
local areas can be seen as enforcing a particular view on a locality by leading petitioners. But 
a larger state takes in more varieties and interests, making it less likely that a majority will 
dominate. This was clearest in the case of Scottish appeals to the House of Lords. Being able 
to apply the Lords for legal redress meant that minorities in Scotland, such as Episcopalians 
and those not members of Royal Burghs or economic corporations, did have a means of 
balancing the power of established interests. Dynamic law making acted as a safety-valve for 
society, and provided an avenue amenable for deliberation—something the union of 1707 
helped to advance. Access to litigation helped to guarantee widespread participation in 
lawmaking and checked the power of the executive, local elites, and established institutions. 
They also played an important role in blocking the views of the majority, forcing 
compromises and the initiators of a policy to rethink.
29
 Forcing citizens into legal discourse 
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and processes aided the construction and maintenance of a framework of negotiation about 
what policies were seen as reasonable and for them to hold the consent of more than one 
interest.  
Deliberative politics was a cultural mindset as much a procedural achievement—
though both must be present to ensure procedures are used in a deliberative fashion. ‘Every 
deliberation pre-supposes a doubt’ of ‘what is possible’, instead of ‘what is necessary’.30 For 
a deliberative system to have legitimacy, the involvement of non-parliamentarians had to 
have an impact on policy, requiring MPs and peers to recognise and use the views of those 
‘out of doors’. It is important, therefore, that contemporaries did reflect on the concept of 
deliberation during the eighteenth century, and saw pluralism as compatible with political 
stability—something not easily imaginable under Charles I or James II. The comments of 
Burke and an anonymous MP of the 1730s were noted in the introduction to this thesis. In 
addition to them, works of rhetoric stressed the advantages of a deliberative method—René 
Rapin noted that judicial rhetoric was ‘offensive or defensive’, whilst thinking deliberatively 
was ‘to show what is useful and expedient...31 ‘Mature’ was a common adjective for 
describing deliberation; one account claimed the Lords had acted in a ‘deliberative’ fashion 
during the impeachments of 1701, contrasting the ‘fierce, hot, and bitter’ expressions of the 
Commons with the ‘mature deliberation and wise counsel’ of the Lords.32 Another asked the 
reader whether decisions ought to be concluded by the: 
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opinion of the privy council after a full hearing and mature deliberation; or the 
opinion of another body, without any hearing, and upon examining only some 
persons on one side....and not upon their oaths...
33
  
 
The Craftsman, when describing parliamentary proceedings, saw the process of voting 
tobacco duties as ‘deliberative’, the house having heard data and calculations of tobacco 
duties, the views of a projectors and of ‘other gentlemen’.34 It was desired MPs would be 
capable of ‘mature deliberation, void of pique as well as interest’ to avoid the ‘wounds made 
in private men’s circumstances’, encapsulated in the South Sea Bubble.35 Deliberation was 
seen as having several features: the lack of pre-determined decision, the hearing of experts 
and interests, and a decision based on their substantial participation. It shared many features 
with the genteel culture of politeness, but went further in many respects, not least because it 
was institutionalised in parliament and other parts of the state, involved a wider part of the 
public and was not restricted to urban society.
36
 Importantly, this culture of ‘deliberation’ 
recognised the importance of non-state actors to the proceedings of parliament. The desire 
was not for a decision that was value or interest-free, effectively hiding politics under a 
scientific pose, but rather one where the public were co-creators in legislation, where various 
interests would be negotiated with to determine the public interest, and for this to occur with 
reference to ‘facts’.37 Potentially this culture declined by 1800, with one study suggesting 
clothiers and parliamentarians talked past each other during a committee investigation on the 
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state of woollen manufacture, though further research is needed to determine the nature of 
committee deliberations.
38
 
This culture of deliberation ensured negotiation was firmly part of the processes of 
policy-making. Some features of this culture were present in the mid-seventeenth century, 
though not to the extent they were in the eighteenth century. As we have seen, large 
responsive petitions were present during the Restoration, though on a smaller scale; litigation 
was arguably a stronger feature of the seventeenth rather than eighteenth century and William 
Petty was active from the 1650s, but it took the permanent establishment of parliament after 
1688/89 to institutionalise and regularise these features. Deliberative politics was not possible 
to the same extent under the political culture or institutions of the early Stuarts, for it required 
a number of overlapping institutions, a less hostile attitude to public dissent, and the pressure 
of both ‘party rage’ and the ‘clash of interests’. Even during the period of the whig oligarchy, 
deliberation was not a constant presence. Interest groups were not continuous and ever-
present, instead there were waves of participation, with people ‘on standby’, capable of 
holding multiple levels of political identity raised at particular political moments. In this 
respect, it was less about continuous public sovereignty than the relative power of different 
interests. The key to the ‘deliberative oligarchy’ was institutional, in that power circulated 
amongst various institutions, rather than contained solely in parliament, making it accessible 
and amenable to a range of interests. As John Morley, writing at the end of the nineteenth 
century, stated: 
one great tap-root of our national increase has been the growth of self-government, 
or government by deliberative bodies, representing opposed principles and 
conflicting interests. With the system of self-government has grown the habit—not 
of tolerance precisely, for Englishmen when in earnest are as little in love with 
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tolerance as Frenchmen or any other people, but of giving way to the will of the 
majority, so long as they remain a majority .
39
 
 
These are elements of political culture we have lost and not regained. If our political 
institutions had their origins in the medieval period, they ‘came of age’ in the late seventeenth 
century, but on very different terms to how they function today. The role of interest groups, 
petitioning, of lobbying committees, did not survive into the age of mass-democracies in the 
same form, and have traditionally not formed part of parliamentary history. As graph three 
plausibly suggests, the failure of the Chartist petitioning campaigns and demands for suffrage 
suggest the shift away from mass-petitioning began in the 1850s, something also supported 
by the decline in petitioning and their size in table eleven.
40
 As groups became integrated into 
party politics—particularly nonconformists from the 1870s, and women after the suffrage 
campaigns of the 1910—there was less need for petitioning, with petitions in the twentieth 
century being largely on issues more distant from party politics, such as the campaign for 
nuclear disarmament.
41
 More frequent general elections in the nineteenth century also 
reduced the need for petitions to ‘represent’ the public. Before the end of the nineteenth-
century, the dominant place of politics was in a public space, rather than ‘tucked away in the 
private sphere’. Campaign rituals, like chairing a candidate, also declined at the same time, 
with the last ‘chairing’ of a parliamentary candidate occurring in 1857 at Dover, a popular  
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Graph 3: Incidence of ‘Vote’ and ‘Petition’ in Google Books, 1600-2000. 
 
Source: Google Ngram viewer. ‘Vote’ and ‘petition’ were entered for the dates 1600-2000 (though the 
results are stronger after 1800) and results were case-incentive, with a smoothing of ten years. The 
results have a cross-over of 1849 here—only four years after the largest petition in British History. 
Search carried out on 5/11/2014. 
 
Table 11: Petitions to the Commons at Select Years, 1836-1911.  
 
Year Signatures Percentage of Electorate 
1836 1,500,000 175 
1843 6,135,050 718 
1857 674,915 119 
1865 811,964 34 
1875 2,966,607 132 
1883 4,638,235 91 
1901 1,084,953 31 
1911 165,870 2.4 
Sources: C. Rallings and M. Thrasher, eds, British Electoral Facts, 1832-2006 (Aldershot, 2007), p. 
61, Table 2.03, and are taken from the closest general election; Leys, ‘Petitioning in the Nineteenth 
and Twentieth Centuries’. 
 
ritual of politics that had developed in the late Stuart period.
42
 Paula Cossart has also 
suggested that public assemblies and petitioning in France declined from spaces of 
deliberation to demonstration between the mid- nineteenth and twentieth century, having 
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more theatrical ends as a result of greater social antagonism.
43
 Neither are current petitioning 
practices as substantive as those of the early modern period, having little impact on 
government policy.
44
 At Westminster, the petitions system has been described as ‘populist 
democracy’, existing largely in virtual form, with little substantive debate or comment 
involved and without a meaningful impact on policy before the Commons (indeed, its ends 
are to be raised as a debating issue if petitions collect more than 100,000 signatures).
45
 
Broadly speaking, political engagement has transformed from a public duty, enforceable by 
party or group pressure (through petitioning, litigation, or a non-secret ballot) to a private act, 
enforceable through private conscience.
46
 
The Revolutions of the 1640s and 1688/89 ensured that political pluralism became the 
predominant feature of eighteenth-century Britain. These two events are part of the same 
story, in that irreconcilable tensions were created across British society, first between 
royalists and cavaliers, and later driven by parties and interest groups. But only the second 
ultimately led to the transformation in the public sphere from ‘informal debate’ to ‘formal 
deliberation’ (accepting the limits to political arithmetic discussed earlier). Given the longer 
length of parliament after the repeal of the Triennial Act, it is no surprise that because ‘it is 
impossible for the people to foresee at the time of the election what affairs might come under 
their [MPs] deliberation’, there was a need to ‘furnish them with matters of instruction...[or] 
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addresses...’.47  The majority gained in an election rarely lasted long; new majorities would 
be formed during parliamentary sessions, and these changes in public opinion needed to be 
reflected for the maintenance of legitimacy and consent.  
The reliance of elites on the law, their defence of property and distrust of a standing 
army meant there remained many sites of power, and the competing interests to use them. 
The Glorious Revolution and the annual sessions of parliament did alter the basis of public 
debate—even without electoral strife. The shift from policies being made through patents and 
prerogative means to statute in parliament increased the ability of the wider public to 
participate in its making, the terms on which they participated, and the ‘rules’ by which 
policy was made and justified by. The law and the importance of certain rules helped to 
enforce a greater plurality of voices in political debate and at some point in the ‘circulation of 
power’ for the decisions of elites to be tested against known and accepted rules.48 These rules 
were a response to the growth of interests and involvement of the public in politics that the 
more open political culture centred on parliament, rather than a small court, created.  
Despite the presence of a deliberative pluralistic political culture and institutions 
encouraging of reasoned public deliberation, Britain remained an oligarchy. Social and 
political inequality was still implicit in eighteenth-century Britain, the largest riots of the 
                                                     
47
 D'Anvers, The Craftsman, Volume 11, p. 262. 
48
 The institutional revolution of 1688/89 altered the means and norms by which policy was made. 
Ideas such as political arithmetic and the language of interest found their importance to lie in 
attempts to manage and understand the divided political culture of the post-1688/89 period. 
Parliamentarians often sought to provide constraints against dominant interests and a ‘misled’ 
public voice, not the crown, as was argued in D. North and B. Weingast, ‘Constitutions and 
Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-
Century England’, Journal of Economic History, 59 (1989), pp. 803-32.   
330 
 
century were motivated by anti-popery, and the rule of law was abused. Neither was the 
culture of ‘representation’ any less important than Knights has shown, with ‘deliberation’ 
being an important response to it. Just like the culture of ‘representation and 
misrepresentation’ it sought to manage, deliberation could be episodic and focused on 
moments of policy-making, just as elections were moments of concentrated partisan activity. 
More research is needed in central and local institutions and at different times, to place this 
concept on surer footing. How extensive was the ‘great litigation decline’, and for which 
groups, subjects, and regions?  The tension between the importance of a locality and the 
extent of genuine pluralism, and whether it encouraged reasoned deliberation, is a real one, 
and needs further research. The situation in Scotland before 1707 and the extent the union 
enabled opportunities to challenge elites, is also an important gap. If there was a multi-
layered and circular-process of law-making, ruling, enforcement and challenge, work is 
needed on the functioning of local institutions and key national ones—especially the 
Convention of Royal Burghs. Nonetheless, I believe we need to think about a dualist 
conception of political engagement—the role of the public being heard through voting and 
contestation, but also as authors and editors of policy. The study of the public doing things 
together to affect policy, is what we need now. To quote an extract from Soame Jenyns’ 
poem, The First Epistle of the Second Book of Horace, Imitated, written in 1748:
49
 
But now the world’s quite altered, all are bent 
To leave their seats, and fly to parliament; 
Old men and boys in this alone agree,  
And vainly courting popularity 
Play their obstreperous voters all night long 
With bumpers, toasts, and now and then a song: 
Even I, who swear these follies I despise, 
Than statesman, or their porters tell more lies; 
And, for the fashion-sake, in spite of nature, 
Commence sometimes a most important creature, 
Busy as Carus rave for ink and quills, 
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And stuff my head and pockets full of bills. 
Few land-men go to sea, unless they’re pressed, 
And quacks in all professions are a jest; 
None dare to kill, except the most learned physicians, 
Learned or unlearned, we all are politicians: 
There’s not a soul but thinks, could he be sent, 
He has parts enough to shine in parliament. 
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